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30 YEARS AFTER THE BREAKUP OF THE USSR: RUSSIA AND 
POST-SOVIET EUROPE,  NARRATIVES AND PERCEPTIONS 
Special Issue Introduction 
The year 2021 marks a major milestone in the global geopolitical 
history – 30 years since the collapse of the USSR. Our Special Issue is a 
scholarly reflection on the evolving and evolved narratives and perceptions 
formed in the post-Soviet time and space. In our focus is one piece of the 
post-Soviet puzzle – five independent states of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Ukraine and Russia that once built the ‘western flank’ of the USSR. The five 
countries have remarkably different paths following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1991. Yet, we argue that the three Baltic states, Ukraine and 
to certain degree Russia share a common plank in their identity of post-
communist states, sometimes described as “liminal Europeanness” 
(Morozov 2011, Filippov, 2020). A “historical legacy of the Western 
European Enlightenment, which invented and juxtaposed Western (superior) 
and Eastern (inferior) Europe” (Matheson et al. 2021) has triggered a 
particular vision of this region in Europe of “ever becoming European” and 
being “betwixt and between” (Mälksoo 2009) East and West. These spatial 
identities, related to the visions of core and periphery, intersect with the 
temporal dimension. The 30-year time line is a critical historical period when 
slowly evolving perceptions, images and narratives start crystallising into 
modified and/or new mental schemas shared collectively. Moreover, there is 
a new generation born after the watershed event – a generation without direct 
historical experiences of the USSR and its shared legacy. This generation is 
already the backbone of the work force and voting cohorts in the respective 
countries. New identities emerge – identities without reference to the Soviet 
past.  
The 30-year historical period is characterised by an uneasy intersection 
between different generations. The “rosy past syndrome” – a phenomenon 
well-known in political psychology (see Duffy 2018 for review) – means that 
older generations tend to see the past better than it used to be. While 
cognitive details fade as time goes by, the emotive and normative image 
elements remain and may dominate. This Special Issue reflects on the three 
image elements – cognitive, emotive and normative (see also Boulding 1959; 
Hopmann 1996) – and uses these concepts to reflect on political 
communication flows shaped by narratives and perceptions communicated 
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by influential opinion-maker and multipliers, as well as shared by the 
members of the respective societies. Of special interest to us are young 
people in the post-Soviet societies and their political imaginaries of the 
world, region, their country and themselves.   
The temporal dimension is important not only for its longer historical 
span. This region has become a new ‘hotspot’ in the geopolitics of Europe in 
the most recent history of the continent. It features the ongoing Russia-
Ukraine conflict following Ukraine’s Euro-Maidan in 2013-2014, Ukraine’s 
strategic vision of its “European choice” and its direction to the Euro-
Atlantic integration sealed by the Ukrainian Constitution. The region is 
marked by growing security concerns among the three Baltic states that are 
currently members of the European Union (EU) and NATO, and ardent 
supporters of Ukraine’s pro-Western orientation. Russia’s ambitious and 
aggressive geopolitical stance in the region and in the world is perceived by 
these four states to be the main threat. Such perceptions are reinforced by the 
annexation of Crimea from Ukraine by Russia (the first landgrab in the post-
WWII Europe), the war by proxy in the east of Ukraine, and numerous 
incidents and provocations challenging the Baltic states and Ukraine (e.g. 
Russian cyberattacks against Estonia, the capture of Ukrainian navy ships in 
November 2018, or deployment of substantial number of Russian troops – 
85,000 to 110,000  soldiers (The Washington Post 2021) – and military drills 
near the border with Ukraine in May 2021). Challenging relations between 
the Baltic States and Ukraine on the one side and Russia on the other are 
unfolding against the background of an increasing instability in the post-
Soviet space. The war between Azerbaijan and Armenia and the bloody 
suppression of domestic opposition in Belarus in 2021 demonstrate that the 
post-Soviet space remains volatile 30 years into independence. This period 
has also demonstrated that the current leadership of the largest and most 
powerful post-Soviet state, Russia, is very clear in its visions that the collapse 
of the Soviet empire “was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 
century” (NBC 2005). According to President Putin, if he had a chance to 
alter modern Russian history, he would reverse the collapse of the Soviet 
Union (Reuters 2018). Perhaps more concerning is the Russian leadership’s 
consistent anti-Ukrainian frame – from the 2008 statement by President Putin 
to President Bush that “Ukraine is not a country” (The Washington Post, 
2018) to his most recent statement that Ukraine is becoming “anti-Russia,” 
“requiring our special attention from a security point of view” (Reuters 
2021). The Baltic states remain highly aware and outspoken on the current 
uneasy situation and threat perception. Voting against the 2021 Franco-
German proposal to hold an EU summit with Russia, Lithuanian President 
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Gitanas Nausėda said the idea was like “trying to engage the bear to keep a 
pot of honey safe,” while Latvian Prime Minister Krišjānis Kariņš said 
Russia might see a summit as a reward when diplomacy had failed to end 
the conflict in eastern Ukraine (Reuters, 2021). Reflecting on the complex 
region with sensitive geopolitics, tangled dialogue between generations and 
approaching historical celebration, our Special Issue features 
interdisciplinary reflections, collaboration between generations of scholars 
and diverse geography.  
Contextual background: History, politics and geopolitics 
One third of a century after the break-up of the USSR has featured a 
roller-coaster ride for the citizens of the former republics. They faced a 
challenge of revisiting their identities, cultures and political outlooks. 
Evolution and transformation – or resistance to change – have affected 
several generations in the post-Soviet states. In our Special Issue, we focus 
on the intersections between identity, culture and geopolitics in five post-
Soviet states which ended with very different paths post-USSR. We put 
analytical focus on perceptions and narratives of post-Soviet Europe. We 
argue they build the foundation of the political communication flows inside 
the now independent societies and across their borders – when they interact 
with each other or when they relate to the world. 
The three Baltic states – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – proclaimed 
their firm pro-Western and pro-EU orientation following the historic fall of 
the Berlin Wall in 1989.  After the end of the Soviet Empire in 1991, the 
three states have entered the waiting list of the EU’s candidates and dedicated 
a decade to major political, economic and social reforms of their societies. 
In 2004, the three Baltic countries became member states of the EU, an 
exclusive and highly coveted club of developed European nations. 
Approaching the end of the second decade in the EU, the three societies 
explicate ebbs and flows in their visions of Europe, Russia, immediate geo-
political region and a wider world. However, their overall attitudes remain 
staunchly pro-Euro-Atlantic integration. Contributions to our Special Issue 
will reflect on the complex web of visions of Self and Others in Estonia 
(articles by Vlad Vernygora and Elizaveta Belonosova), Latvia (articles by 
Pauline Heinrichs, as well as Vineta Klienberga and Elizabete Vizgunova), 
and Lithuania (article by Gintaras Šumskas).  
In contrast, the then newly independent Ukraine was not chosen by the 
EU as a potential candidate country. This decision reverberates within 
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Ukraine until today (see Chaban and Elgström 2018, 2020; 2021a, b). In the 
early 1990s, Pew Survey poll of the post-Communist countries (199X) 
demonstrated that Ukrainian citizens were more pro-democracy than their 
counterparts in Poland or the Baltic states. At that time, Ukraine saw itself 
as a country with a sizeable and diverse economy, highly-educated work 
force, large strategically-located territory and big population. Immediately 
after the collapse of the USSR, Ukraine had ended with the third largest 
nuclear arsenal in the world. Following the Budapest Memorandum, Ukraine 
relinquished its nuclear arsenal in exchange for promises by the signatories 
of the Memorandum – Russia, the US and the UK – to protect its sovereignty. 
Newly independent Ukraine has had a turbulent ride in the 30 years of its 
statehood. Endemic corruption, problematic rule of law and economic 
underperformance have riddled Ukraine. Yet, the Ukrainian political 
landscape has preserved the institute of democratic elections. Since 1991, 
Ukraine has been led by six democratically elected presidents. Irrespective 
of their political leanings and surroundings, all Ukrainian leaders have 
proclaimed Ukraine’s European ‘vector’, even if on a superficial level only. 
When the fourth Ukrainian president reneged on his previous promise to 
strike an Association Agreement with the EU choosing Russia instead, the 
events of the Maidan Revolution in 2013-14 demonstrated that decades of 
independence have solidified perceptions and narratives of Ukraine 
belonging to Europe and produced new generation ready to stand for this 
vision. Post-Maidan Ukraine has struck several main accords with the EU 
and NATO. In 2020, Ukraine has become as Associate Member of NATO. 
In 2017, Ukraine signed an Association Agreement/Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (AA/DCFTA) and the agreement on 
visa-free travel into the Schengen zone up to 90 days by Ukrainian citizens. 
However, to this day, the EU has not opened a pathway to membership 
candidacy for Ukraine. Contributions to our Special Issue deal with 
Ukraine’s problematics: article by Sabatovych dissects narratives and 
perceptions of the EU evolving over time and article by Natalia Chaban, 
Svitlana Zhabotynska and Anatoliy Chaban consider the external reception 
of the EU’s granting of the visa-free status to Ukrainian citizens (case-study 
Russia). 
Russia’s initial reaction to the transforming post-Soviet world saw 
Russia trying on some democratic practices and reforms under Yeltsin’s rule. 
Yet, following the change in leadership, Russian political outlook towards 
the West (including the EU) has reverted back to the guarded and even 
hostile attitudes. The change was partially triggered by the EU’s policies and 
initiatives towards its eastern neighbours. These were interpreted by Russia 
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as meddling into what traditionally has been the Russian sphere of influence, 
if not a threat by the West. In addition, the end of the first decade of the 21st 
century showed to the world the EU challenged by multiple crises of 
political, economic and social nature. Finally, the changing global landscape 
demonstrated an eroding multilateral rules-based global order, with a new 
set of existential non-traditional threats (climate catastrophe and global 
pandemics among them). A combination of internal and external factors have 
revived Russia’s “grand” geopolitical narrative as a key actor in Europe and 
globally. Contributions to our Special Issue engage with post-Soviet Russia’s 
self-narratives and self-images vis-à-vis Europe and the rest of the world, 
while factoring temporal dimension (article by Henrietta Mondry and 
Evgeny Pavlov), Russia’s narrative formulate and disseminated by 
influential think tanks (and specifically on “grey zones”) (article by Šarūnas 
Liekis and Viktorija Rusinaitė), and Russia’s media narratives on Ukraine 
and its pro-European dynamics revealed in framing Ukraine receiving a no-
visa regime from the EU (article by Natalia Chaban, Svitlana Zhabotynska 
and Anatoliy Chaban). 
This brief historical overview highlights that the five countries have 
intricate connections to each other in the course of their short-, mid- and 
long-term history, and their current and historical understanding of and 
attitudes to the West and the EU are a part of the story of their relations. 
Importantly, all contributions to the Special Issue also reflect on narratives 
and perceptions of Russia vis-à-vis Europe – as either a main or secondary 
theme. The three Baltic States and Ukraine remain ‘in between’ the two 
bigger players in the region – feeding into the concept of “liminal 
Europeanness” discussed at the start of this Introduction. We argue that a 
geopolitical competition between the two regional ‘hegemons’ will continue 
to affect Ukraine in the years to come, but also the three Baltic EU member 
states. The latter have a significant share of population who are Russian by 
ethnicity or Russian-speaking due to the legacies and migration patterns of 
the Soviet Union (33.8% of Russian speakers in Latvia, 29.8% in Estonia 
and 8% in Lithuania (Jakniunaite 2020)). 
Self-Other Imaginations: Continuum of Otherness 
One of the leading premises that informs our Special Issue is that 
narratives and perceptions, if dissected in cognitive, emotive and normative 
planes (see political psychologist Hopmann 1994), will not reveal clear-cut 
patterns. On the contrary, narratives and perceptions will demonstrate a 
complex intersection of self-identities and visions of the Other, the latter 
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located along the continuum of Otherness. Different positions on the 
continuum will elicit different attitudes. For the Baltic states, it is a dominant 
self-vision of historically belonging to the West and returning to the Western 
‘family’ after the collapse of the USSR. The Baltic societies conceive that 
their dominant norms and values resonate fully with the normative priorities 
of the Western societies. This vision, however, is complicated by the 
argument of “liminality” of the Baltic identities – the constant need to 
overcome their contested “Europeanness” as post-Soviet and post-socialist 
states caught between East and West (Mälksoo, 2009). Russia, on the other 
hand, is perceived to belong to a different normative camp (see e.g. 
Kleinberga and Vizgunova or Vernygora and Belonosova in this Issue).
One of the main findings of the Special Issue is a particular vision of the 
Self in the region and the world emerging among younger citizens of the 
Baltic EU states.  For them, the historical break-through to Europe has 
been already achieved by the Baltic nations and it underlines a proud self-
narrative of the present and future and informs narratives on Ukraine (see 
e.g. articles by Šumskas and Heinrichs in this Issue).
Literature in the field points to the post-Soviet Ukraine having a deeply 
polarised self-vision. On the one hand, it is about Ukraine’s centuries-long 
strife to be a part of the Western paradigm and value system. This narrative 
justifies the need to reform the Ukrainian society post-USSR. On the other 
hand, there is a narrative of the historical connections with Russia and certain 
normative resonances with the neighbour to the East. This narrative contests 
Western values and Ukraine’s rapprochement with the West. The most 
recent events in the relations between Ukraine and Russia – the annexation 
of Crimea, the ongoing violent conflict in the east of Ukraine and propaganda 
affronts undertaken by the Russian Federation against Ukraine – have been 
solidifying the images of Russia as Ukraine’s hostile Other (see also 
Sabatovych in this Issue). In contrast, the Western actors (including the EU 
and the Baltic states in it) are increasingly seen as allies and friends.  
Russia’s self-vision registers becoming a key pole of the global politics 
of the 21st century. This includes Russia’s self-definition as an heir 
presumptive to the USSR legacy – a vision that provides justification to 
control former Soviet republics.  Following this self-image, Russia sees itself 
as a viable power with a proud history of domination and influence and 
current geopolitical ambitions. Official Kremlin narratives asserting this 
right to hegemony in the post-Soviet space explicitly draw on neo-
Eurasianist proleptic constructs and neo-medievalist models propagated by 
Russia’s ultra-right intellectuals (see Mondry and Pavlov in this Issue). 
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Russia also defines itself as an international actor with a unique (Eurasian) 
set of norms and values informed by its rich culture and history. Importantly, 
Russia conceives these values as different – better and often opposing – to 
the norms and values of the West (including Europe) (see Liekis and 
Rusinaitė in this Issue). In this context, Russia solidifies the image of 
Ukraine which is perceived to be moving in its norms and values closer to 
the West/Europe – as the Other (see Chaban et al. in this Issue), arguably 
corroborating the official Russian narrative of Ukraine becoming an “anti-
Russia” (see above). 
The Russo-Ukrainian conflict reminds us again that intersections of 
identity and geopolitics are never simple. The Russian treatment of the 
former Soviet republics as it “natural” area of geopolitical control clashed 
with the EU’s vision of its enlargement and neighbourhood policy. Initially, 
Russia, hit by the collapse of the USSR on socio-economic and political 
planes, did not react aggressively to the introduction of the EU’s 
Neighbourhood Policy in 1995. Yet, the creation of the EU’s Eastern 
Partnership with six post-Soviet states of Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Ukraine in 2009 was perceived in Russia as a 
threat. This perception was further supported by the official applications by 
Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia to become members of NATO (declined by 
the Alliance). Russia saw the West encroaching into Russia’s traditional 
sphere of geopolitical influence and has retaliated with aggression against 
Georgia and later Ukraine, the two most pro-Western post-Soviet states. The 
Baltic states, aware of Russia’s hard power and methods of influence through 
their own experiences in the past, share growing concerns about their own 
security. These states have become the most vociferous supporters of 
Ukraine (and earlier Georgia), advocating for a pan-EU support of Ukraine 
in the ongoing violent conflict, insisting on sanctions against Russia and 
backing up Ukraine’s case as a future EU candidate country. 
A complicated map of relations between the six actors brings in the first 
key theme in our Special Issue – Self-Other relations in an uneasy process of 
identity transformations typical for this region. This theme invites systematic 
considerations of the process of Othering and its result – the imaginary 
continuum of Otherness from friends and allies to distinct Others who may 
become enemies and even nemeses (see e.g. the model of “difference” – 
“otherness” – “enmity” examined by Chaban et al. in this Issue). All 
contributions to our Special Issue engage with the continuum of Otherness 
and contemplate its role in shaping and re-shaping identities in this 
12    N. CHABAN, H. MONDRY, E. PAVLOV
geopolitical region. The contributions also factor complex interactions 
between time, space and change. 
Temporal Considerations 
The second theme that unites contributions to this Special Issue deals 
with fluidity and uncertainty, changing world and transition. In our brief 
overview above, we highlighted profound historical changes in the last 30 
years in this region. However, the societies in the focus of this SI have been 
affected by transformation and change event before the collapse of the USSR 
in the summer of 1991. Perestroika, a complex reform programme of the last 
Soviet government, inflicted major shocks on the existing narratives and 
self-visions. And while debates on the effectiveness of perestroika on the 
worldviews of Soviet citizens and elites are ongoing, we argue that it has left 
a distinct imprint on the perceptions of the ever-changing world, relativity of 
the historical truth and fluidity in this particular region. Relevant and vast 
literature on the post-Soviet space traces changes at the levels of identity; in 
views of how the world is organized and evolves; and how every-day 
matters, policies and issues are conceived and executed. Contributions to the 
Special Issue focus on both the process of change and major ruptures 
(“critical junctions”). Recognizing temporality as a key feature of any 
narrative unfolding from the past through present to the future, some of the 
scholars in this Issue prioritize a trajectory of the change “from past to 
present” (e.g. Sabatovych, Kleinberga and Vizgunova). Others provide an 
insight into the move “from the present to the future” (Heinrichs), or, 
proleptically, constructing political narratives in a way that disturbs normal 
temporal progression (Mondry and Pavlov). Change and continuity are 
always dependent on perspective. Contributions to the Special Issue map 
those perspectives when examining their cases studies. 
Narratives, images and perceptions: conceptual models 
The third theme of this issue is a conceptual engagement with the 
notions of images, perceptions and narratives in political communication 
around international relations to understand the unfolding of change in 
reality and construction of change in the minds of publics in the region. The 
already axiomatic statement “whose story is better, wins” (Nye 2019) gets 
additional traction at times of uncertainty and fluidity. In the contested post-
Soviet space, recognition and reputation matter, and ideology and 
propaganda techniques influence everyday frames of political 
communication inside the states and exchanges across borders. As such, 
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contributions to this issue have engaged with several models considering a 
concept of “narrative” linking different disciplines together – international 
relations (IR), cognitive science, cultural studies, political science, 
communication studies.  
Several contributions engage with the IR’s strategic narrative theory 
(Miskimmon et al. 2013). This model proposes a three-level paradigm in the 
life-cycle of a strategic narrative: system, policy and identity levels. In this 
theory, system narratives define actors’ views on international order; identity 
narratives describe how actors view themselves and the others within the 
system; and issue narratives reveal actors’ attitude towards specific policy 
issues (Miskimmon et al., 2013, p.7). The theory also talks about three 
distinct yet intertwined phases in the information flow: formulation, 
projection and receptions. Contributions to the Special Issue explore cases 
on all levels. Papers by Klenberga and Vizgunova, Mondry and Pavlov, 
Chaban et al., Vernygora and Belonosova, Liekis and Rusinaitė deal with 
formulation and projection of the narratives. Reception of narratives is in 
main focus of the articles by Heinrichs, Sabatovych and Šumskas. 
Contributions to this Special Issue also bring analytical attention to different 
narrators (e.g. official discourses, think tank influencers, media, or youth). 
Contributions to the Special Issues that engage with the strategic 
narrative theory introduce several conceptual innovations to it. For example, 
Kleinberga and Vizgunova add to the conceptualization of the alignment 
between the narrative levels. In their focus are two different types of 
alignment – between levels of narratives produced by the same narrator and 
between narratives projected by different narrators in one society (in this 
case, official political and media actors). Both cohorts are in the business of 
opinion-making, and narrative alignment in terms of consonance between 
them is telling and revealing of opportunities to persuade, especially in the 
democratic societies.  The divergences are also important. 
Adding to the strategic narrative theory conceptualization, our 
contributors develop the notion of temporality (long, short and medium) 
(Heinrichs); argue the central role of the identity-level narrative in the SNT 
model (Heinrichs); examine scope conditions for the stickiness of the 
narratives (Šumskas); explore the role of visuality and intertextuality in the 
projection of narratives (Chaban et al.); study the nature of public 
information important in understanding the reception stage within the 
strategic narrative cycle (Sumskas) as well as propose the notion of a hybrid 
toolbox where  there is a need to promote strategic narrative in potentially 
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hostile environments (Liekis and Rusinaitė) and explore public diplomacy 
analytical instrumentarium used to communicate strategic narrative in such 
environments (Vernygora and Belonosova).  
The Special Issue also features case studies that engaged with other 
theoretical models to explain perceptions, and more specifically their 
evolution. Sabatovych engages with a theoretical approach from the school 
of historical institutionalism, namely path dependency theoretical approach. 
While the school focuses on radical institutional change, Sabatovych 
demonstrate how this model may be used to advance perceptions studies by 
explaining the mechanism of change in public attitudes. This approach is 
useful when dramatic changes in outlook are taking place. In the case by 
Sabatovych, it is ideology that is accepted as a marker of an institutional 
change. Mondry and Pavlov explore the application of proleptic futurity in 
narratives of newspaper articles. They focus on the specific genre of 
editorials as it emerged in the late Soviet Union and demonstrate features of 
continuity between Soviet editorials and the current writing of important 
public and political personalities, such as Aleksandr Prokhanov, Aleksandr 
Dugin, and Vladislav Surkov. Mondry and Pavlov argue that employment of 
temporo-spatial aspects of the popular Neo-Eurasianist ideology as well as 
use of folk narratives based on the ability to dream allows the promotion of 
the notion of culture-specific temporality linked to the stability of country’s 
geopolitical borders. They conclude that today’s official Kremlin narratives 
increasingly rely on the proleptic temporality typical of the particularistic 
ideology of the Russian far right.  
Methods 
This Special Issue showcases a range of methods to study narratives 
and perceptions. These methods applied to analyse multiple sources of data 
such as media texts (editorials and daily news articles), media visuals 
(photographs and cartoons), opinion of elites and educated youth, official 
documents. 
Heinrichs applies the method of narrative analysis to analyse youth 
opinion collected in the course of the Q-Sort focus groups in Latvia. Šumskas 
applies a mixed qualitative and quantitative content analysis techniques to 
identify indicators of media texts in Lithuanian e-press that correlate with 
higher audience demand for news that report Russia. Kleinberga and 
Vizgunova employ narrative analysis to analyse narratives on Ukraine, the 
EU and Russian that emerge in media and official discourses in Latvia. 
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Sabatovych undertakes an interpretative analysis of elite interviews 
comparing opinions across time. Chaban, Zhabotynska and Chaban apply the 
cognitive science protocol of the Narrative-Based Political Concept to 
analyse visual images accompanying Russian e-media news texts on 
Ukraine’s no-visa agreement with the EU. Vernygora and Belonosova 
employ discourse analysis and process tracing when examining eight annual 
reviews of the Estonian Internal Security Service (2012-2019/20). Liekis and 
Rusinaitė focus on content analysis of the productions by the Russian think 
tanks that lean towards advocacy model and publish in English language, 
seeking to internationalise their advocacy model. Mondry and Pavlov use a 
thematic interpretative approach in their analysis of narratives which 
strategically blur the boundaries between objectivized style of newspaper 
articles and subjective style of editorials.  
Structure of the Special Issue 
The Special Issues starts with four article that dissect perceptions and 
narratives in the Baltic states: Vineta Klienberga and Elizabete Vizgunova 
on Latvia; Pauline Heinrichs on Latvia, Vlad Vernygora and Elizaveta
Belonosova on Estonia, and Gintaras Šumskas on Lithuania. Article by Iana 
Sabatovych focuses on Ukraine, while article by Natalia Chaban, Svitlana 
Zhabotynska and Anatoliy Chaban deals with Russia’s framing of Ukraine. 
Special Issue concludes with articles by Šarūnas Liekis and Viktorija 
Rusinaitė, and Henrietta Mondry and Evgeny Pavlov – both teams of authors 
elaborate opinion making discourses in Russia. 
Concluding remarks 
Some case studies demonstrate that post-Soviet cultural narratives are 
often concerned with aspects of transgenerational stability and the passing of 
cultural and ethnocultural knowledge to future generations. This concern is 
manifested in the notion of ontological future in the case of Latvia with its 
diminishing population and inter-EU migration of young people. Issues of 
demographics drive this preoccupation with the ontological future where, 
paradoxically, being part of EU brought challenges of assimilation and 
acculturation which threaten the national identity to no less a degree than in 
Soviet times. In Russia with its multiethnic population the complexities of 
transgenerational continuity are resolved in the narratives of cohesion 
achieved by the notions of scientific know-how and the alleged ability to 
dream about the future, all of which is underpinned by the construct of a 
shared past. Yet, internal and external strategic narratives differ. 
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Contributions to the Special Issue unpack complex visions, perceptions and 
narratives along the Self-Other continuum that emerge in each country 
discussed here and contemplate their impact on mapping the understanding 
of the geo-political future in this region and charting future actions.   
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Abstract 
Ukraine and its integration in the Euro-Atlantic structures has been an undisputed priority 
of Latvia’s foreign policy for years. We argue that Russia has been an important part of 
Latvia’s strategic narrative to ensure both domestic and international support to Ukraine’s 
integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures, especially after the 2013 Euromaidan events. 
Inspired by theoretical frameworks of strategic narrative and cascading activation framing 
models, we explore Latvia’s official narrative on Russia vis-à-vis post-Maidan Ukraine 
as projected by the most popular Latvian-speaking digital news platforms in the country. 
Engaging with a concept of narrative alignment, we analyse how Latvian digital media 
outlets communicate and shape political narratives in their representation of Russia and 
Ukraine. We discover that narratives projected by media feature a highly negative 
emotive evaluation of Russia in Ukraine-related news stories aligning in this aspect with 
Latvia’s official narrative. However, we also observe a fragmented alignment of political 
and media narratives, as media often depict Ukraine as a negative actor too in contrast to 
the official narrative. By exploring alignment among political and media narratives we 
contribute to the emerging body of scholarly literature that evaluates the supporting role 
of narratives and perceptions in agenda-setting in international relations and foreign 
policy-making. 
Keywords: Russia, Ukraine, Latvia, strategic narratives, projection, alignment, digital 
news platforms 
1. Introduction
Latvia’s international reputation cements it as one of the ‘hawks’ when 
it comes to Russia’s illegitimate annexation of Crimea, the ongoing Russo-
Ukrainian war in the Eastern territories of Ukraine and imposition of 
sanctions on Russia for its military aggression (ECFR, 2016; ECFR, 2015). 
On multiple occasions, Latvia has used international formats to remind the 
world of the price Ukraine had to pay for its ‘European choice’ (Zarembo 
and Vizgunova, 2018). In the official narrative, Latvian policy-makers frame 
Ukraine as a victim of Russia’s geopolitical ambitions and blame Russia for 
its efforts to rearrange the liberal world order established after collapse of 
the Soviet Union in 1991.  
Given the power of information—and disinformation—at the age of 
global digital transformation, strategic communication has grown as an 
increasingly important field in the scholarship and practice of international 
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relations. It is not only country’s military, economic or normative 
performance that determines its might and attractiveness in international 
affairs, but, increasingly, it is the strategic narratives that influence power 
relations (Miskimmon et al., 2013; Roselle et al., 2014). Actors use the 
strategic narratives to ‘extend their influence, manage expectations, and 
change the discursive environment in which they operate’ (Miskimmon et 
al., 2003, p.2), thus defending their interests and pursuing goals in 
international environment. 
The scholarship on Latvia’s strategic narratives with regard to Russia 
has been limited. Relevant literature focuses mostly on Russia’s footprint in 
Latvia’s information space, and specifically on channels and instruments 
Russia uses to exert its influence (Valtenbergs et al., 2018). Some authors 
explore framing of Russia in Latvia’s media, analysing Russia’s image vis-
à-vis various international events. Content analysis of the most popular 
Latvian- and Russian-speaking media channels in Latvia covering the 
annexation of Crimea reveals that media often use different news sources 
(either Western or Russian) thus sending contradictory messages (Šulmane, 
2017). Latvian press’ reluctance to produce original content on Russia, and 
reliance on reprinting instead, is uncovered by Denisa-Liepniece (2017) in 
her analysis of Russia’s war in Syria. Berzina’s (2016) research indicates that 
media targeting Latvian and Russian-speaking audiences in Latvia tend to 
construct opposing narratives on the role of Russia in Ukraine, depending on 
their ownership and funding organisation (Latvian or Russian). Two news 
broadcasts are scrutinised there — Panorama from the Latvian state 
television and Vremya from Channel One Russia, rebroadcasted in Latvia via 
the First Baltic Channel. Berzina concludes that the Latvian-speaking media 
reproduce Latvia’s official discourse, whereas the Russian-speaking media 
largely follow Putin’s line. Similarly, she finds out that the Latvian-speaking 
part of the population mainly aligns with the Latvian media stories, while the 
Russian-speaking one — with the Russian media narratives (ibid, p.171). 
Some studies deal with the emotions in the reception side of the 
communication cycle. Rozukalne (2015) explores the level of aggressiveness 
after the 2014 events in Ukraine, analysing user comments of the most 
popular Latvian digital media. Our study has a different focus: we explore 
the interaction between political and media narratives on Russia through the 
prism of Russia’s relations with post-Maidan Ukraine. We add innovatively 
to the studies of perceptions and narratives about Russia in Latvia — we 
assess how different Latvian narrators convey the importance of Russia when 
telling a ‘story’ about Ukraine.  
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Our special interest goes to the role of digital media — Latvian-
speaking e-news media portals with the highest readership in Latvia. With 
the official Latvia’s narrative being consistent and clear on Latvia’s position 
towards Russia vis-à-vis Ukraine, what role do the leading popular and 
prestigious media in Latvia play in supporting or counter-arguing it? 
Whereas Latvia’s foundational foreign policy documents take into account 
the complexity of global international relations, arguably the majority of 
Latvia’s foreign policy decisions since 1991 has been motivated by the 
willingness to cement Latvia’s place among powerful Western countries in 
order to permanently protect itself from Russia. As we detail in the article, 
media narratives largely align with this position and it has important 
implications for the power of the official narrative. Digital media are 
important mediators in conveying political messages about domestic and 
foreign policy realms. They play a crucial role in shaping attitudes among 
audiences. Alignment between political and media narratives, and in 
democratic societies in particular, ensures a more coherent message to the 
audiences while facilitating the persuasive powers of official narratives.  
Informed by an international relations theoretical framework of 
strategic narratives (Miskimmon et al., 2013) and the cascading activation 
framing model (Entman, 2003) we explore alignment between official 
political and media narratives on Russia vis-à-vis post-Maidan Ukraine. Our 
main research question is how media project the official narrative at system, 
identity and issue levels, and whether media projections align with those of 
official narrative. Empirical evidence for the analysis comes from the 
dataset1 of 173 Ukraine-related articles published in the Latvian-language 
editions of three digital media outlets — Delfi, Tvnet and Latvijas 
Sabiedriskais Medijs (Latvian Public Broadcasting, LSM) — from February 
to March 2019. In our particular focus are 73 articles from the dataset that 
report the relationship between Russia and Ukraine. The focus on relations 
between the two actors led in the sample finalisation. In our analysis, we 
explore the elements of the narrative—actors, action, time and setting. We 
also ask: How visible is Russia in these articles? What emotive evaluation 
journalists assign to Russia? How is Russia framed vis-à-vis post-Maidan 
Ukraine? How is Ukraine framed in this context?  
We structure the article as follows. We first describe the analytical 
framework informing our analysis. Specifically, we detail the strategic 
1   The data has been collected within the framework of the Jean Monnet Project ‘Youth Opinion and 
Opportunities for EU Public Diplomacy: Youth Narratives and Perceptions of the EU and EU-Ukraine 
Relations in Ukraine and the three Baltic States’ (E-Youth, 2018-21).
22 VINETA KLEINBERGA AND ELIZABETE VIZGUNOVA 
narrative theory and cascading activation framing theoretical model, and 
derive our operationalisations focusing on the concept of alignment. Further 
on, we detail our methodological approach in extraction of narratives. We 
move forward by tracking official political narratives of Latvia on Russia 
through the prism of Russia’s relations with post-Maidan Ukraine. Here we 
focus on conceptualization of Russia in Latvia’s key foreign policy and 
security documents. Finally, we present our main findings from media 
content analysis on the depiction of Russia in Ukraine-related media 
narratives. We test the concept of alignment and evaluate convergences and 
divergences between media and official political narratives at system, 
identity and issue levels. The article concludes by revealing convergence of 
media and official narratives at system and identity levels, while disclosing 
divergences at the issue level. Given this, we discuss the implications of our 
empirical findings for the viability of Latvia’s strategic narrative on Russia 
in the context of post-Maidan Ukraine.     
2. Analytical framework: strategic narrative theory and cascading
activation model
Global information space is filled with messages formulated and 
projected by state-level actors as well as messages created by non-state 
actors. Both types of messages do not exist in the vacuum — they interact 
with each other, sometimes resonating and sometime clashing. Relevant 
literature argues that the ability of official political narratives projected by 
state-level actors to reach domestic and international audiences is determined 
not only by the material capabilities of states, but also by the power and 
attraction of their value systems, ideologies and beliefs (Cepurītis and 
Kaprāns, 2017).  
The theory of strategic narratives addresses this problematique. 
Developed around Nye’s concept of ‘soft power’ (Nye, 1990) theory of 
strategic narratives helps to explain how states construct the image about 
their power and attraction in order to persuade others to observe and follow 
their interests. The founders of strategic narrative theory define strategic 
narratives as ‘means for political actors to construct a shared meaning of the 
past, present, and future of international relations to shape the behaviour of 
domestic and international actors’ (Miskimmon et al. 2003, p. 2). Actors 
shape strategic narratives ‘to change the discursive environment in which 
they operate’, and thus aim ‘to influence the behaviour of others’ on behalf 
of actors’ strategic goals (Ibid.). 
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However, strategic narratives are not only created by actors. They also 
structure their behaviour simultaneously. As the reaction of other actors is 
almost never the same as expected, the viability of strategic narratives 
depends not only on their persuasiveness in itself but also on their perception. 
This is why it is important to consider the complete communication cycle of 
a strategic narrative — formation, projection and reception (Miskimmon et 
al., 2003, pp. 8-12). Whereas formation refers to the efforts of political actors 
to shape particular strategic narratives, projection reflects the diffusion of the 
narratives in the media environment and reception concerns the perception 
of these narratives by the public, be it domestic or international one. In their 
strategic communication, political actors strive to address all phases of 
communication, aiming to achieve the highest possible alignment within 
their strategic narrative communication cycle. Chaban et al. (2017) claim that 
the chances for strategic narratives to become more persuasive and 
influential increase when there is an alignment between system, policy and 
identity narratives. System narratives define actors’ views on international 
order; identity narratives describe how actors view themselves and the others 
within the system; and issue narratives reveal actors’ attitude towards 
specific policy issues (Miskimmon et al., 2003, p.7). Greenland 
conceptualizes the alignment between three levels as internal coherence, 
while defining the alignment between narratives of different actors as 
external convergence (Greenland, 2019).  
This article chooses to dissect the formation and projection phases of 
the narrative life-cycle — and examine external convergence of official 
political and media narratives. It is true that successful formation does not 
ensure successful projection, and successful projection does not guarantee 
successful reception, as actors do not have control over other actors’ initial 
perceptions. Besides, strategic narratives can be challenged by actors seeking 
to put their own narrative forward or to highlight the issues with the opposing 
narrative (Chaban, et al., 2017). However, the higher the level of alignment 
between the narratives of different actors the more persuasive power they 
have with regard to other actors. Consequently, we focus on the alignment 
between the first two phases of narrative life-cycle, while leaving the 
reception phase for further research.  
We link the formation and projection phases of Latvia’s strategic 
narrative on Russia vis-à-vis  Ukraine by using Entman’s (2003) cascading 
activation framing model. Entman claims that there is a need for ‘spreading 
activation’ for particular foreign policy frames, shaped by political elites. 
Framing means ‘selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, 
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and making connections among them so as to promote a particular 
interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution’ (Entman, 2003, p.417). Framing 
differs from strategic narratives with the latter’s emphasis on temporality. 
While strategic narratives ‘include a sequence of events and aim to construct 
impressions of the past, present and future’, frames are ‘snapshots used in 
narratives about particular events or issues’ (Greenland, 2019, p.121). 
Cascading activation framing model conceptualizes the ways the state 
administration disseminates particular foreign policy framing at the domestic 
level. According to it, media are a part of the cascading activation model, 
within which both top-down and bottom-up circulation of frames occurs, 
though in differing speeds. Not all information from policy-makers attract 
the attention of media and not everything is reported, yet the model allows 
to see which aspects of the official discourse ‘attract dissent’ or ‘earn 
acceptance’ in the media representation (Entman, 2003, p.421). Media in 
democratic societies thus have a potential to contest the dominant frames and 
to propose counter-frames. However, the diffusion of counterframing themes 
would require ‘not merely the push of journalists themselves but also 
political elites interested in contesting the dominant problem definition, 
causal analysis, moral judgment, and remedy’ (Entman, 2003, p.425). This 
suggests that the top-down and bottom-up interaction between the policy-
makers and media are of utmost importance for spread and activation of 
strategic narratives in foreign policy realm. Their level of convergence or 
divergence is crucial for exerting the influence on the next level of the 
‘cascade’ — the general public.  
3. Operationalisation: framework of analysis for narratives
Informed by the theory of strategic narratives and the cascading 
activation framing model, this study uses a method of mixed (qualitative and 
quantitative) content analysis. The study begins with the analysis of the 
official political narrative on Russia in the context of post-Maidan Ukraine. 
We focus on how the key subjects ‘Russia’ and ‘Ukraine’ are represented in 
main national security and foreign policy documents—Latvia’s National 
Security Concepts and Foreign Policy Reports. These documents are the 
Latvian key documents that inform both domestic and international 
audiences about Latvia’s strategic goals and priorities, and formulate 
Latvia’s official attitude on perceived threats. 
We continue by analysing the projection of the official political 
narrative in three most popular and reputable Latvian-speaking digital news 
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media in Latvia — Delfi, LSM and Tvnet.2 The news media were selected 
following two characteristics. Firstly, there is an increased popularity of 
electronic news media for obtaining daily news. According to Valtenbergs 
et al. (2018, p.10), 81% of Latvian population gets information about actual 
political events from Latvian-speaking internet portals. Secondly, the chosen 
news platforms pride high level of readership. Delfi and Tvnet are the most 
popular online news media in Latvia, reaching the audiences of 867,600 and 
725,200 people accordingly,3 whereas the LSM is the biggest public 
electronic media consortium in Latvia, involving Latvia’s Radio and Latvia’s 
Television. It is in the 6th place in Latvia in terms of media consumption, 
and reaches an audience of 443,300 people (Gemius, 24.04.2018.).  
Importantly, we analyse not the narratives of Russia per se, but 
narratives of Russia in the context of Russia-Ukraine relationship in the post-
Maidan period. The sample includes 73 articles, and all report on the 
relationship between Russia and Ukraine. In terms of limitations, the dataset 
deals with digital media targeting Latvian-speaking audiences only. No 
Russian-speaking news-media were included in this study.  
Tracing system, identity and issue levels is at the core of our analysis 
for both political and media narratives. To uncover the narratives and to 
compare them, we employ a set of narrative structure elements. According 
to Miskimmon et al. (2003, p. 5) ‘a narrative entails an initial order, a 
problem that disrupts that order, and a resolution that re-establishes order’ 
which may differ from the initial one. The structure involves ‘actors; events, 
plot, and time; and setting and space’ and it is through ‘a particular structure’ 
how ‘sense is achieved’ (Ibid.).  
Actors are central to the narrative and are constructed around certain 
‘characteristics, interests, and behaviours’, while setting reveals the context 
within which action takes place (Roselle et al., 2014, p.75). Action refers to 
events, most often involving the conflict: what actors do to each other, and 
what interaction follows from that. It leads to resolution or proposed 
resolution, which ‘in many ways bounds the possible — both in thought and 
action’, limiting future options for actors’ behaviour (ibid, p.76). 
Importantly, action highlights the temporal dimension of the narrative, 
disclosing how past, present and future are addressed.  
2 Data come from international Jean Monnet Project ‘Youth Opinion and Opportunities for EU Public 
Diplomacy: Youth Narratives and Perceptions of the EU and EU-Ukraine Relations in Ukraine and the 
three Baltic States’ from 2018 till 2020 (E-Youth, 2018-20). 
3 At the beginning of 2020 Latvia had 1 907 675 inhabitants. 
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Our protocol focuses on the following elements of structure and categories 
of analysis (Table 1): 
Table 1. Framework of analysis for narratives (Roselle, Miskimmon and 
O’Loughlin, 2014; E-Youth, 2018-20) 
Elements of 
structure 
Categories of analysis 
Actors Visibility and centrality (major, secondary or minor 
actor) 
Relationship between actors  
Emotive evaluation (positive, neutral, negative or 
mixed; use of conceptual metaphors)  
Action, plot Events, conflict, resolution 
Time Past, present and future 
Scene, setting Scale (local, international); 
Thematic context (security and military; diplomacy 
and international relations; economy; Ukraine’s 
domestic politics; normative domain; culture; 
religion; social affairs; sport; research, science and 
technology (RST)) 
In the final element of our analysis, we evaluate external convergence of 
political and media narratives comparing them across the three levels of the 
narrative—system, identity and issue. We assume that alignment of 
narratives — between the levels and across the narrators—increases the 
opportunities for persuasion and influence. 
4. Latvia’s official political narrative on Russia vis-à-vis post-Maidan
Ukraine
From the perspective of the system-level narratives, Latvia’s political 
discourse reflects on Latvia’s fifty-year long experience in the Soviet Union 
and Russia’s denial to admit the fact of forceful occupation, made possible 
by the Secret Protocol of the 1939 Molotov-Ribentrop Pact. After collapse 
of the Soviet Union Latvia established and sustained a pragmatic and values-
based relationship with Russia. Yet, Latvia has remained wary of Russia. 
After the occupation of Crimea in March 2014, the feeling of existential 
threat to Latvia returned, leading to defining Russia as the main threat for 
Latvia’s national security on the official level (Saeima, 26.09.2019). The 
centrality of Russia in Latvia’s security perception is well illustrated by an 
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increased number of references to Russia in Latvia’s National Security 
Concepts. In the 2011 document, the word ‘Russia’ was mentioned 5 times, 
in 2015 43 times, and in 2019 65 times (Saeima, 10.03.2011; Saeima, 
26.09.2019; Saeima, 26.11.2015). Russia’s ‘aggressiveness’ towards 
Ukraine — ‘an unprecedented action against fundamental principles of 
international law’ not experienced ‘since the World War II’ — is mentioned 
as the main challenge to the European security and global order with ‘a long-
term impact also on Latvia’s national security’ in Latvia’s National Security 
Concept of 2015, immediately following Russia’s annexation of Crimea 
(Saeima, 26.11.2015). In Latvia’s strategic narrative, Russia’s activities in 
its neighbourhood (Ukraine, but also Georgia and Moldova) carry strong 
references to the Cold War. The narrative of regional security rests on two 
actors — Russia and the United States (US) protecting Latvia (and other 
post-Soviet countries) from Russia — reminding of the discourse of the 
‘Russian/Soviet confrontation with the West’ that characterized the bipolar 
world order. The Foreign Policy Report, evaluating year 2018 in Latvia’s 
foreign policy, states: ‘Russia constantly maintains a confrontation course 
with the West and continues to act contrary to the principles of international 
law’ (MFA, 2018). National Security Concept of 2015 underlines that 
‘Russia's growing confrontation with the West, aggressive demonstrations of 
military force and mounting military potential in the West's strategic 
direction are creating tension and uncertainty’ (Saeima, 26.11.2015). Latvia 
is positioned as ‘belonging to the West’, embodying and defending 
democratic values and liberal international order (MFA, 2019), including in 
the dialogue with Russia on observation of human rights (MFA, 2018). 
Common historical experience with the Eastern Partnership countries is a 
factor, determining Latvia’s support to them, and establishing ‘the role of 
Latvia as a responsible regional and international player in the 
implementation of standards of democracy and the rule of law’ (MFA, 2018). 
Therefore, Latvia’s efforts are seen as complementary to those of 
international organisations ‘seeking solutions to the conflict in Ukraine and 
promoting its stability, territorial integrity, the strengthening of democracy 
and European values’ (Saeima, 26.11.2015). 
Identity narratives for Latvia are highly important. Given the traumatic 
consequences of the Soviet occupation Latvia’s identity formulation is 
highly exclusive. It is based on a set of rules to politically and culturally 
preserve a country, which is small in terms of its size4 and population5, and 
geopolitically is located at the border with an asymmetrically bigger country 
4 64 589 km². 
5 At the beginning of 2020 Latvia had 1.9 million inhabitants. 
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which historically has proven its political and territorial ambitions. The 
exclusiveness of Latvia’s identity is best defined in the preamble of the 
Constitution of Latvia, added in 2014:  
Since ancient times, the identity of Latvia in the European cultural 
space has been shaped by Latvian and Liv traditions, Latvian folk 
wisdom, the Latvian language, universal human and Christian values. 
Loyalty to Latvia, the Latvian language as the only official language, 
freedom, equality, solidarity, justice, honesty, work ethic and family 
are the foundations of a cohesive society (Constitutional Assembly, 
1922). 
The introduction of this paragraph to the Constitution was, however, seen as 
highly controversial both by politicians and general public as Latvia is a 
multi-ethnic society with 25% of ethnic Russians in Latvia, some of whom 
still have the status of non-citizens or do not use Latvian as the language of 
inter-ethnic communication, which only adds to the insecurity of Latvia.6 
Latvia sees Russia’s diaspora policy and Russia’s information activities 
targeted to change public’s perception on history and influence public 
opinion against Latvia’s Euro-Atlantic orientation as a particular threat 
(Saeima, 26.09.2019; Saeima, 26.11.2015). In this sense, the dichotomy of 
Latvia’s belonging to the Euro-Atlantic region (thus, the Western alliance) 
and Russia’s opposition to it underlines a sense of radical difference that 
Latvia sees in its identity. Latvia’s belonging to the West, based on the 
principles of international law and order, is underlined further in this section. 
Russia’s breach of the order which ensures the existence of small states such 
as Latvia is therefore seen as offensive to Latvia at the identity level.  
On the issue narrative level, Ukraine is considered by Latvia as a 
‘brother in pain’, who still fights to get out of Russia’s sphere of influence 
that Latvia managed to do by joining the EU and the Transatlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) in 2004. It is for this reason why the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of Latvia Edgars Rinkēvičs asserted that ‘we won’t forget 
Crimea’ in a joint statement with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Lithuania and Sweden two years after Russia’s 
‘illegal annexation’ of Crimea (Wallström et al., 18.03.2016). Latvia’s 
support to Ukraine has been underlined continuously in annual foreign policy 
debates which are also informative of Latvia’s political discourse towards 
6 As of 1 January 2020, there are 1 768 480 citizens and 216 682 non-citizens in Latvia (PMLPa, 
01.01.2020). More than half of non-citizens — 141 939 people — are Russian by nationality (PMLPb, 
01.01.2020). Not all citizens and non-citizens are permanent residents of Latvia. 
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Russia.7 ‘We will never accept Russia’s action, violating the principles of 
international law and using force against its neighbours’, states Rinkēvičs at 
the beginning of 2019. Therefore, in his words, ‘we have provided all 
possible support to our Ukrainian counterparts both bilaterally and 
multilaterally’, ‘Latvia supports Ukraine’s desire to move closer to the 
European Union and NATO’, and ‘Latvia will consistently support 
Ukraine’s efforts to restore the country's territorial integrity’. For this, ‘there 
is a need for consistent action by all European allies and the US’ (MFA, 
24.01.2019).  
Concerning the structure of the narrative, we observe that Latvia’s 
strategic narrative on Russia in the context of post-Maidan Ukraine evolves 
around certain events:  the annexation of Crimea and the beginning of 
Russia’s offensive in Eastern Ukraine. In the official political narrative, 
Russia is cast as a major threat to Latvia’s security, and Russia’s activities 
are evaluated highly negatively. As a solution, Latvia invites the rule-based 
international order to counteract the illegitimate activities of Russia. The 
conflict drives the narrative, as Russia’s actions are seen as a threat not only 
to Ukraine, but to Latvia itself both at the system and identity levels, 
especially due to the common history Ukraine and Latvia share as a part of 
the Soviet Union. Ukraine’s role in Latvia’s strategic narrative in this case is 
sub-delegated — it is seen as one of many Russia’s steps to the detriment of 
Latvia’s international status as an independent country. Latvia’s (and 
Ukraine’s) future therefore lies in the West—the Western community of 
values and international law is depicted as crucial for Latvia’s (and 
Ukraine’s) existence. In this way, a dichotomy is established between Russia 
as the aggressor and the opponent to the West vs. Latvia, which identifies 
itself as belonging to the West.  
5. Media projection: strategic alignment?
This section outlines our findings on the ‘strategic alignment’ of the 
Latvian-speaking digital news media — Delfi, LSM and Tvnet — with the 
official political narrative on Russia vis-à-vis post-Maidan Ukraine. While 
the media narrative largely aligns with the official narrative on the three 
levels, we find several divergences discussed below. 
7 Since 2011, Latvia’s foreign policy goals are debated in parliamentary debates at the beginning of each 
year, and a Foreign Policy Report, prepared for the debates, serve as a guide to Latvia’s foreign policy 
objectives and priorities.  
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Actors: visibility and emotive framing 
In over half of the articles, Russia is mentioned as a secondary actor, while 
Ukraine plays a major role. The image of Russia is negative in majority of 
the selected articles — in 61 articles out of 73. This evaluation aligns with 
the emotive tone of the official discourse. Russia plays a negative role in 13 
cases out of 17 where it is a major actor; in 34 cases out of 38 where it acts 
as a secondary actor, and 14 out of 18 where it is a minor actor (see Figure 
1).  
Figure 1: Visibility and emotive evaluation of Russia and Ukraine (number 
of articles). 
Source: Authors’s own, E-YOUTH 
Importantly, the emotive image of Ukraine is more nuanced, and, overall, 
more positive. Media depict Ukraine negatively in 13 cases, neutrally in 25 
cases, positively in 23 cases and mixed in 12 cases. Specifically, media see 
Ukraine as a positive or a neutral actor in all 17 cases, where Russia acts as 
a major actor and in most cases (27 out of 38) where Russia acts as a 
secondary actor. However, in the articles with Russia acting as a minor actor, 
Ukraine has a much higher share of negative images than in the two previous 
sets. Ukraine is depicted negatively in 9 and in mixed terms in 5 out of 18 
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that these articles are about Ukraine’s internal divisions, sluggish reform 
process and insufficient anti-corruption measures. 
These emotive patterns show that media narratives on Ukraine and 
Russia in the post-Maidan context are not projected using ‘victim’ and 
‘villain’ dichotomy exclusively. Out of 61 articles, where media identify 
Russia as a negative actor, Ukraine has a positive image in 21 articles, and a 
neutral image — in 21 articles. At the same time media depict Ukraine 
negatively in 7 cases and with a mixed image in 12 cases (see Table 2). So, 
in 19 articles out of 61 there is a negative dimension of Ukraine’s image as 
well.  
















[then] Ukraine Positive 1 1 21 0 23 
[then] Ukraine Neutral 0 1 21 3 25 
[then] Ukraine Negative 1 4 7 1 13 
[then] Ukraine Mixed 0 0 12 0 12 
Evaluation of Russia - 
total 2 6 61 4 73 
Source: Authors’ Own, E-YOUTH 
A more straightforward dichotomy emerges, when we look at the 
dynamics between Russia, on the one hand, and the EU and the United States 
(US), on the other hand (see Table 3). Out of 73 articles the US is an actor 
in 16 articles, while the EU is an actor in 26 articles. Media depict the US 
positively in 11 cases, neutrally in 2 cases, negatively in 2 cases, and with a 
mixed image in 1 case. They show the EU positively in 24 cases, neutrally 
in 1 case and with a mixed image in 1 case. Contrary to this, media describe 
Russia negatively in all Ukraine-related articles, where the US and the EU 
act as actors. 
Table 3: Emotive evaluation of Ukraine in the context of the EU and Russia 
(as a negative actor) and the US and Russia (as a negative actor) 
relationship (number of articles) 
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[and] Russia 
Negative 
11 2 2 1 
[then] Ukraine 
Positive 
4 0 1 0 
[then] Ukraine 
Neutral 
4 2 1 1 
[then] Ukraine 
Negative 
0 0 0 0 
[then] Ukraine 
Mixed 
3 0 0 0 
Source: Authors’ Own, E-YOUTH 
Arguably, this distribution of evaluations suggests that media apply ‘good’ 
vs. ‘evil’ dichotomy to the representation of the Western world (represented 
by the EU and the US8) vs. Russia. The journalists use the system narrative 
of a regional security system, dependent on the ‘shield’ of the US to protect 
against Russia, and identity narrative of conflicting values to describe the 
situation in post-Maidan Ukraine. In this narrative, Russia is a ‘villain’ that 
harms Ukraine and meddles in its internal affairs, stalling reforms. In this 
way, Russia is confronting the Western world. The EU and the US are the 
‘heroes’, safeguarding the democratic and liberal value system of the West 
8 The image of the US as guardian of the Western values is, however, questioned in few articles, targeting 
activities of the US President Donald Trump.  
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and embodying a moral responsibility to take Ukraine ‘under their wings’, 
thus supporting Ukraine’s efforts to get out of Russia’s sphere of influence. 
In this regard, Ukraine is not that much of an actor. It is Russia’s 
confrontation with the West that matters. 
At the issue narrative level projected by the media, it is not important 
how the victim ‘behaves’, as Ukraine is only one among a number of 
Russia’s post-Soviet neighbours, not being capable of fighting off Russian 
forces when it decides to illegally annex their territories. Media depict 
Ukraine positively in 4 cases out of 11, where the US acts a positive actor, 
and Russia — as a negative one. In 4 cases Ukraine has a neutral image and 
in 3 — a mixed one. With the EU, the dynamics is similar. Media depict 
Ukraine positively in 11 cases out of 24, where the EU has a positive image 
and Russia — a negative one, neutrally in 7 cases, negatively in 2 cases and 
with a mixed image in 4 cases. A high number of cases with Ukraine having 
a neutral image suggests that Ukraine figures as a ‘background player’ in 
describing the US and the EU ideological battle with Russia, and, 
hypothetically the role of a ‘victim’ could be played by anyone. For example, 
in the articles about imposing sanctions on Russia, Ukraine does not feature 
as a leading actor.  
A rather high number of articles depict Ukraine having a mixed 
evaluative image in relation to the EU and the US. This adds another 
dimension to the narrative at the issue level. Latvian media do not present 
Ukraine as an unconditional ‘victim’ there. In this perspective, the West may 
be supporting Ukraine in its endeavours to get out of Russia’s influence, yet 
Ukraine is still a country in transition doing its ‘homework’. Several articles 
point to the economic and judicial reforms to fight corruption as a pre-
condition to become a ‘real’ part of the Western world. As such, Ukraine 
enters the narrative about Russia and the West as a country fighting between 
two systems of values. It is aspiring to join the EU and NATO — ‘the 
West’—yet it is unable to carry out reforms, fight corruption and organized 
crime, and ‘bring to justice’ individuals responsible for murders during 
Maidan. Russia embodies the ‘old’ value system, the opposite of the 
‘Western world’ in which Ukraine has found itself trapped in. It is up to 
Ukraine to invest effort to reform itself. The West will help in maintaining a 
discourse against Russia’s aggression, yet the articles with Ukraine having a 
negative or mixed image suggest that Ukraine itself must carry out reforms 
to cut the ties with Russia and join the Euro-Atlantic space. 
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Setting the scene: thematic context 
As discussed above, media narratives evolve around system narrative 
of global order and identity narrative in representing opposing value systems 
at actors’ level. As such, the scene set for the media narrative is international. 
Thematic frames of security and military, and diplomacy and international 
relations dominate, followed by economy, normative issues and Ukraine’s 
domestic politics (see Figures 2 and 3). Russia is evaluated mostly negatively 
across all thematic frames, except for sports. In Ukraine’s case, the 
evaluation is more nuanced.  
Latvia’s media in this study construct Russia’s negative image around 
such events as the Kerch Strait incident9, following it EU and US sanctions, 
upcoming Presidential elections in Ukraine, and the 5th anniversary of the 
Maidan events. Russia’s negative image also emerges in the reports on 
economic issues, including news stories on Russia’s meddling in internal 
affairs of third countries with its corrupt economy leaving a negative imprint 
on these countries. Here, such topics as Russia’s connection to money 
laundering operations and corruption of Ukraine’s high-ranking officials are 
in focus. Hereby, Ukraine’s domestic policy comes into the frame. Russia’s 
negative image appears in the reports on Euromaidan events and Ukraine’s 
pro-European path, corruption in Ukraine, and Russia’s potential meddling 
into Ukraine’s Presidential elections. When normative themes entered the 
reportages, Russia received negative evaluations when publications 
discussed observation of such values as human rights, democracy, freedom 
and liberty, peace, rule of law, good governance.  
In Ukraine’s case, the evaluation is more varied. Latvian journalists 
usually evaluate Ukraine positively in the field of diplomacy and 
international relations. They emphasize the use of legitimate tools of the 
international legal system against Russia to underline Russia’s non-
compliance. Specifically, reports deal with international sanctions against 
Russia or stripping Russia of its seat in major international organisations. On 
the other side, Ukraine gets most of negative evaluations in the reports about 
Ukrainian politicians engaged in illegitimate money flows. In this case, 
money is transferred through the Baltic banks. Another popular topic is 
Ukraine’s inability to comply with the standards set by the EU in the 
aftermath of the Maidan events. 
9 Russia’s capture of three Ukrainian Navy  vessels on 25 November 2018 passing from the Black Sea into 
the Sea of Azov through the Kerch Strait to reach the port of Mariupol. Russia claimed that Ukraine had to 
ask for permission to enter the territorial waters around the Crimea. Ukraine considered the claim 
illegitimate as it did not recognize the annexation of Crimea by Russia. 
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Figure 2: Representation of Russia across thematic frames (number of 
articles) 
Source: Authors’ Own, E-YOUTH 
The latter thematic framework often links to domestic Ukrainian politics, 
where images of Ukraine acquire a number of mixed evaluations. Reporting 
Ukraine’s challenged progress of reforms and stumbling indicators of 
economic growth, Latvian journalists depict Ukraine as a highly polarised 
country that is fighting to belong to the European ‘club’, however, slipping 
back into corruption and mismanagement. Similar framing persists in the 
normative domain. Ukraine is depicted positively when journalists comment 
on its ability to resist Russia’s meddling in its internal affairs. Ukraine’s 
negative evaluation in the field of security and military affairs is usually 
linked to the mismanagement of Ukrainian army, Ukraine’s inability to 
protect and provide help for the civilians on the frontline in Eastern Ukraine, 
and Ukraine’s economic insecurity which stems from large-scale corruption 
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Figure 3: Representation of Ukraine across thematic frames (number of 
articles). 
Source: Authors’ Own, E-YOUTH 
Plots of action: framing conflict and resolution 
Thematic frame analysis shows that many of the elements constituting 
the official political narrative resonate with the media narrative of the 
situation in post-Maidan Ukraine and Russia’s involvement in it. Thus, the 
Latvian-speaking digital media outlets largely align with the strategic 
narrative of the state at the system and identity levels. However, in contrast 
to official political narrative, on the issue level, media narrative is critical not 
only towards Russia but also Ukraine. This section elaborates the roles 
Latvian journalists assign to the actors in the media narrative.  It traces a 
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Russia as an aggressor and Ukraine as a victim of the Russian aggression 
In this plot, Ukraine is cast as a victim of ‘Russia’s armed aggression’ 
(DELFI, 21.02.2019.), especially in the context of the Kerch Strait incident 
and international sanctions. This topic is particularly important for Latvia, 
considering that journalists have also discussed the possibility of the Russian 
aggression in Eastern Ukraine being a prelude to an attack on Latvia 
(Ratfelders, 14.03.2019). Such words as ‘annexation’, ‘occupation’, 
‘seizure’ of Crimea are used frequently to describe the conflict. The EU and 
the US are cast into the roles of defenders of Ukraine, imposing ‘new harsh 
sanctions’ on Russia  (Tvnet, 14.02.2019). These articles also cite a lot of 
numbers to provide evidence (not always referenced) for the price Ukraine 
has to pay for its European choice: numbers of people killed, injured, 
kidnapped and displaced. For Ukraine’s ‘price’ the President Piotr 
Poroshenko is cited: ‘For no one and never the European and the Euro-
Atlantic choice has cost as much as for Ukraine’ (Tvnet, 19.02.2019.). The 
solution in this plot is up to Russia: the sanctions will be maintained ‘until 
the Russian government returns control over Crimea to Ukraine’ (Tvnet, 
28.02.2019). 
Russia as an opponent to the Western world 
In this plot, Russia is a country violating international norms and acting 
unacceptably by Western normative standards. In contrast, Ukraine that 
follows the European ‘path’ is taken under the EU and the US protection. 
Journalists frequently cite high-level EU official supporting Ukraine: ‘this 
type of activity on the part of the European Union will not be tolerated’ 
(Konohovs, 18.02.2019), ‘(w)e are with you. And we want to help you in the 
future’ because ‘a fair Europe without a free and independent Ukraine is not 
possible’ (Markusa, 20.02.2019),  or ‘the EU is side by side and helps’ 
(Kārkluvalks, 04.03.2019). The solution suggested in this plot is united effort 
of the Western world (which Latvia belongs to and Ukraine aspires to be part 
of) against Russia’s international law breaching activities. 
Russia as a perpetrator for the aftermath of Maidan 
In this plot, Ukrainian people are disillusioned about ‘harsh’ reality five 
years after the Maidan events. ‘Thousands of people took to the streets to 
protest against Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych’s efforts to look 
towards Russia not Europe’s way’ (Markusa, 20.02.2019.), but nowadays 
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Ukraine has not moved much further. Russia (via its warfare in the East 
Ukraine, support to corrupt officials and impact on judiciary) is blamed for 
not letting the ‘high’ hopes come true. A suggested solution here is bringing 
to justice those guilty of the murders on Maidan. 
Russia as a meddler in Ukraine's internal affairs 
In this plot, the conflict is about Russia’s interference into Ukraine’s internal 
affairs. Latvian journalists report that Ukraine ‘is already counting that 
Russia will try to influence the [Presidential] elections’ (Cunka, 20.02.2019), 
trying to station its supporters at Ukrainian top positions. Another topic 
concerns religion. The independence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church 
from the Russian Orthodox Church has ‘angered the Moscow church, which 
has shrunken ties with the patriarch of Constantinople’ (DELFI, 20.02.2019). 
Russia’s detention of the Crimean Archbishop Climent of the Ukrainian 
Orthodox Church is seen as an act of revenge. A suggested solution for 
Ukraine is continuation of its efforts to join the Euro-Atlantic space.  
Ukraine as a country in transition between the East and the West 
In this plot, Ukraine comes across as a country which has cemented its 
commitment to the EU and NATO not only at the level of rhetoric, but also 
constitutionally (TVNET, 19.02.2019). However, journalists describe 
Ukraine’s reforms as ‘one step forward, two steps back’, as pre-existing 
structures of power in Ukraine stall full implementation of reforms (Cunka, 
20.02.2019). Ukraine’s economic progress towards European standards is 
also questioned as life has become more expensive, money has devalued and 
people have become less happy overall. So, even if Ukraine is clearly framed 
as a victim of Russia’s aggression that stalls the process of European 
integration (TVNET, 07.03.2019), Ukraine’s own domestic mismanagement 
is often the reason behind the inability to live up to European standards 
(Vingris, 11.02.2019). Therefore, a part of the solution lies with Ukraine’s 
successful implementation of reforms. 
Ukraine as a deeply mismanaged country in a critical situation 
In this plot, journalists have pointed on numerous occasions to the corruption 
scandals plaguing Ukrainian politics (Tvnet, 26.02.2019), the illegitimate 
money flows from Ukraine that also affect the Baltic banking sector (Tvnet, 
21.02.2019), as well as stalling of anti-corruption reforms in Ukraine 
(Cunka, 20.02.2019). The trafficking of military equipment from Russia and 
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selling it for a high price to Ukrainian arms businesses puts a shadow on 
Ukraine’s highest political echelons (Tvnet, 26.02.2019). Media also depict 
the Ukrainian medical and rehabilitation sector in a state of chaos, describing 
those receiving treatment as a result of injuries in the frontline as having 
‘descended into hell’ (Vingris, 19.02.2019). The solution here lies within 
Ukraine and its political willingness to fight corruption. 
6. Concluding remarks
Informed by theoretical models of strategic narratives and cascading 
activation of frames, the article focused on the narrative of the popular 
Latvian-speaking digital news media about Russia in the context of post-
Maidan Ukraine, and specifically - on alignment of media narratives with the 
official strategic narrative. We presumed that media would depict Russia 
negatively and Ukraine positively in order to highlight the difficult situation 
Ukraine finds itself in as a victim of Russia’s aggression. The official 
political narrative has been consistent to underline that at the system level, 
Russia’s behaviour is unacceptable from the perspective of international law, 
which protects smaller and less influential countries such as Latvia and 
Ukraine. Furthermore, the official political narrative describes Russia as a 
threat not only because of the consistent meddling in internal affairs of 
Ukraine, but also Latvia, often contesting the identity narratives of these 
states. Eventually, at the issue level Latvia resonates with Ukraine’s plight 
to belong to the EU and NATO, as it evaluates these organisations as ‘key’ 
to keep Russia away.  
By exploring the contents of 73 media articles, we conclude that 
Latvian reports of Russia in the context of post-Maidan Ukraine in the three 
leading digital news media resonate with the official political narrative. One 
of the main findings relates to the regional security narrative that appears in 
the official political and the media narratives. Despite Latvia’s more than 15-
year-long membership in the EU and NATO and the emergence of new 
global ‘poles’, such as China, the confrontation of Eastern (Russian) and 
Western foreign policy a la guerre froide, as well as the return of the great 
power struggle in the region surrounding Latvia is an ‘umbrella’ theme in 
the observed narratives. Media narrative depicts Russia as an aggressor and 
opponent to the West, thus aligning with political official narrative on a 
systemic and identity levels. However, our analysis revealed that it was only 
the relationship between Russia and the West (represented by the EU and the 
US) that followed straightforwardly the ‘good’ vs. ‘evil’ dichotomy. In the 
media narrative, Ukraine was not depicted as an unequivocally positive 
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actor. The journalists’ depiction of the Ukrainian-Russian dynamics at the 
issue level features negativity towards Ukraine. Though acknowledged as a 
country that aspires to join the EU and the NATO, Ukraine is seen as a badly 
managed country too, still hesitating between the values systems of East and 
the West. 
From the theoretical point of view, such a divergence points to a less 
persuasive power of the official narrative when it comes to reception of it 
both at the domestic and international levels. As discussed in the second 
section, the key point of strategic narratives is ‘to influence the behaviour of 
others’ (Miskimmon et al. 2013, p. 2). The impact and viability of the 
strategic narrative depends on its perception (Chaban et al, 2017). The 
persuasive power of the strategic narrative is higher when there is alignment 
between three phases of the narrative life-cycle — formation, projection and 
reception — and three levels of narratives — system, identity and issue 
narratives. Our study demonstrates that Latvia’s official political narratives 
and media narratives align on a system and identity levels, both boiling down 
to the dichotomy of the ‘battle’ between the West on the one hand, which 
comprises Latvia, the EU and the Euro-Atlantic community of which 
Ukraine aspires to be a part of, and Russia and its geopolitical ambitions on 
the other hand. We conclude that it is potentially the most persuasive part of 
Latvia’s strategic narrative, as formation and projection phases coincide in 
their representation of the strategic narrative towards Russia vis- à-vis post-
Maidan Ukraine, and both official and media narratives align at system and 
identity levels. We thus observe a coherent ‘story’ told to domestic and 
international audiences by official and media ‘narrators’: Russia is an 
aggressor, violating the principles of international law and endangering the 
liberal value system of the West, which Latvia is and Ukraine aspires to be 
part of. 
Arguably, Latvia’s strategic narrative is less persuasive at the issue 
level because at the issue level the ‘narrators’ differ in how they see the post-
Maidan Ukraine. We observe that the journalists take a more critical stance 
towards post-Maidan Ukraine than the official narrative. Coming back to 
Entman (2003), we disclose that certain frames ‘earn acceptance’ by the 
journalists in the media narratives, such as Ukraine being a victim of Russia’s 
aggressiveness and constantly fighting with Russia’s meddling in Ukraine’s 
internal affairs. At the same time, media tell a ‘story’ about Ukraine 
overwhelmed by corruption and unable to carry out economic and judicial 
reforms, which would be the pre-conditions for Ukraine to join the Euro-
Atlantic community. Media narratives thus question the official narratives, 
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which underline Latvia’s unequivocal support to Ukraine’s integration in the 
Euro-Atlantic structures and see it as a solution for getting Ukraine out of 
Russia’s sphere of influence.   
We consider our findings important for several reasons. Media are 
important agents for conveying the information to the general public, and as 
such they play a crucial role in the legitimatisation process of state’s policy. 
Convergence of Latvia’s official political narratives and media narratives on 
Russia and Ukraine in the post-Maidan context at the system and identity 
levels provides a coherent message to the public, having a chance to win 
higher public support for Latvia’s policy towards Russia, for example, 
regarding sanctions. On the other hand, divergences at the issue level hamper 
the persuasive power of the official narrative, providing a room for counter-
narratives to emerge, for example, questioning financial support to Ukraine 
and Ukraine’s integration in the EU. Following the cascading activation 
framing model such a narrative has a chance to circulate not only top-down 
but also bottom-up, especially if there are political actors that pick-up the 
contesting narrative. For Latvia’s official policy and public diplomacy a 
narrative contesting Ukraine’s reforms and its place in the Euro-Atlantic 
community may become a challenge.  
Given the limitations of this study future studies could focus on a more 
comprehensive analysis of narratives on Russia within a longer time period. 
Given an importance of the Russian-speaking news media in Latvia, future 
research can also factor narratives produced by the Russian-speaking news 
media in Latvia. Furthermore, a research on perceptions of strategic 
narratives, formulated and projected on political and media levels would help 
uncover a full life-cycle of narratives of Russian-Ukrainian dynamics in 
Latvia.  
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AGENCY AND THE STRATEGIC NEGOTIATION OF FUTURES: 
EVIDENCE FROM LATVIA 
Abstract 
This paper will argue that the strategic narration of temporality in the process of 
envisioning future state identity narratives can enable a sense of agency. To capture this 
sense of agency conceptually, this paper proposes the concept of movement narratives, 
i.e. strategic narratives that specifically seek to create movement around discursive 
structures to propose alterations to these structures. This paper explores the concept of 
movement narratives in the context of how younger Latvian generations engage in 
‘writing’ the future of identity narratives for their country. It will argue that narratives are 
negotiated, disassembled and assembled toward very specific readings and productions 
of future visions of the Self. In this negotiation, Latvian youth appears to see progress 
ahead for Latvia, one which they are interested in shaping and encouraged by what they 
narrate as agency to do so.
Keywords: agency; identity; ontological security; strategic narratives; temporality 
This paper will argue that the strategic narration of temporality in the 
process of envisioning future state identity narratives can enable a sense of 
agency. Actors can narrate changes to discursive structures that may be 
perceived as limiting while encouraging redescriptions of the future Self. 
While identity narratives may be considered discursive structures, they can 
also be used strategically to negotiate these discursive structures, especially 
at moments of conceptual uncertainty.  
The theoretical approach in this paper seeks to add to discussions on the 
narration of temporality (Jarvis, 2008) and to the scholarship in strategic 
narratives more broadly (Miskimmon et al., 2013). For Jarvis (2008, p. 246), 
“understanding the persuasiveness of … pervasive political discourse fully 
necessitates an engagement with its temporal structuration(s)”. I argue that 
Jarvis’ argument also applies to identity narrative negotiation. To examine 
how claims of temporality link to identity narrative negotiations, I propose 
the concept of movement narratives, which I define as strategic narratives 
that specifically seek to create movement around discursive structures to 
propose alterations to these structures. I examine the concept of movement 
narratives in the context of how young Latvian elites and Latvian online 
media negotiate the future of its country’s identity narratives. 
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Latvia is an excellent case study to gauge the influence of temporal 
claims to identity narratives in moments of conceptual and narrated 
uncertainty. Formerly a Soviet Union country, Latvia joined the European 
Union and NATO in 2004. Much research has focused on Latvia as a Baltic 
state, and its transition from Soviet rule, to the country’s independence to the 
European Union. The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 encapsulated 
the “year of miracles” (Sztompka in Jacobsson 2010, p. 1), ushering the 
Baltic States and Latvia into a new era of their and its national history:  
All of a sudden, it was possible to retreat from Soviet rule, proclaim 
independence, and establish or re-establish themselves as modern, 
Western states. The wheels of history started rolling in a new 
direction. (Ibid.) 
Notwithstanding, the perception of the Baltic States as role models of the 
Europeanisation process (see Johanssen, 2006), questions on identity did not 
fall with the Berlin Wall or did not settle with EU membership. Of 
significance in Latvia’s post-Soviet identity-building process was not only 
the intrinsic tie to territorial integrity and physical borders (see Aalto et al., 
2003; Jurkynas, 2004; Möller, 2007) but also evidenced in its problem-
ridden relationship with Latvia’s Russian-speaking minority (see Cheskin, 
2016). Latvia’s entanglement in “two narratives of the recent past,” in 
“[perennial] conflict with one another” (Kattago, 2010, p. 383), appeared to 
resurface with the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. Was it possible 
that Latvia found itself, once again, in the “waiting room”   of history? 
Further to this, the safety provided by membership in the European Union 
appeared to erode in light of the EU's manifold crises which led some to 
question whether it was only a matter of time that the EU would break apart 
(Hirsh, 2018). International politics has taken many unexpected turns since, 
and it appears that crises define this day and age, creating lasting uncertainty 
around what can be expected state behaviour in the future. In applying the 
framework developed in this paper, I seek to explore how younger 
generations engage in writing the future of identity narratives for their 
country.   
Identity and Movement Narratives: Toward a Narrative Reading of 
Continuity and Change 
In this paper, I reject an essentialist reading of continuity and change in 
reference to identity. While scholarship in IR has long grappled with 
understanding and conceptualising change and continuity in, say, state 
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identity, I argue instead that change and continuity are subject to where they 
are narrated. To be sure, conditions can effectively change that will also 
impact the identity commitments of a given state. Yet, reality and historical 
time are always made of change and continuity co-occurring. Instead, 
explaining change, and indeed what is (inter-)subjectively understood as 
change depends in large parts on how and where actors express change. The 
analytical attention should thus shift to where actors place movement in 
identity narrative commitments through time and space. In the process of 
negotiating change and continuity to a state’s identity, a multiplicity of actors 
(can) seek to partake in the writing process of identity commitment. While 
strategic narrative research has often exclusively focused on the narrative 
cycle as produced by political elites, the concept can be applied to any 
individual or group who seeks to narrate change and continuity to a 
collective’s identity commitments.  
While identity is a contentious issue in IR, especially propelled by the 
advent of constructivist research, I reject an essentialist reading of identity 
and argue that identity narratives are the closest to understanding “identity 
commitments” (Steele 2010, p. 77) by an individual or collective. I, 
therefore, conceptualise identity narratives as collective narratives akin to 
what Clunan understands as “a set of ideas that are generally accepted by any 
group of actors as defining what their collectivity is and the general rules 
under which it operates” (Clunan, 2009). Miskimmon et al. (2013, p. 34) 
clarify that collective narratives “can be identified, even if it is created 
through a process involving individuals in the midst of domestic 
contestation”. Steele (2010, p. 77) mirrors this point by arguing that 
collective narratives “most closely [approximate] the identity commitments 
a state will pursue in international relations”. Identity narratives outline the 
identity commitments of a state, including its external representation as well 
as internal ontologically guiding narratives. 
It follows that identity requires expression by actors who seek to 
assume or speak for an identity (Steele, 2008). Critically, the assumptions 
inherent to this conceptualisation of identity are that (1) identity is a socio-
linguistically constructed and co-produced concept (2) that identity 
commitments can be subject to changes in narrations in their expressions. 
The subjectivity of identity narratives to narrations of change further make 
claims about agency in relation to structure.  
IR has long grappled with questions on how to break the deadlock on 
the agency and structure debate (Wendt, 1987). More generally, this paper 
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argues that the binary reading of agency and structure hinders the fruitful 
analysis of processes that constitute both (see Hay, 2002; Sewell, 2005). The 
“ontological dualism” (Holland and Bentley, 2014, p. 197) has led to an 
“excessively intentionalist and structuralist” (Ibid.) debate in the social 
sciences (see Archer, 1995) and has achieved little in terms of resolving 
problems inherent to this dualism (Hay, 2002). More aptly, I concur with 
Hay (2002, p.120) in that the distinction between structure and agency is 
“purely analytical and should not be reified into a rigid ontological dualism.” 
Where structure and agency are understood as mutually constitutive as well 
as limiting and enabling (Hay, 2002; Bially-Mattern, 2005; Sandstrom et al., 
2010), we can conceive of both structural constraints placed on actors as well 
as actors’ ability to work through these structural constraints and exert 
agency to influence these structural constraints. I argue further that part of 
the difficulty in conceptualising structure and agency rests on their 
understanding without acknowledging the concept of strategic narratives.  
Strategic narratives are “tools that political actors employ to promote 
their interests, values, and aspirations for the international order by managing 
expectations and altering the discursive environment” (Miskimmon et al., 
2013, p. i). Strategic narratives are, therefore, a “conscious product, 
operationalised to secure a specified political purpose or benefit” (Bentley, 
2018, p. 334). 
The purpose of strategic narratives relates closely to identity, system 
and issue narratives through which Miskimmon et al. categorize possible 
strategic narratives (Miskimmon et al., 2013). While I broadly acknowledge 
the analytical usefulness of these three categories, I argue that identity 
narratives are conceptually different from system and issue narratives 
because they are more akin to overarching narrative structures. Strategic 
narratives focus on moments of agency in political actors’ ability and power 
to shape and diffuse certain story worlds about the actors themselves and the 
world in which they engage. Critically, it is vital to acknowledge the tenuous 
nature of strategic narratives: “It is difficult to evaluate what disciplining 
power can be attributed to the narrative itself, as compared to the power 
structures that underlie it” (Price 2012, p. 25). This paper suggests, however, 
that such limitations to not mitigate the need to examine the agency inherent 
to strategic narratives. 
Strategic narratives speak to structures as long-term narratives that 
place constraints on the ability of actors to shape a discursive environment. 
However, they can also explain the ways in which actors can actively forge 
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and shape this discursive environment. The “interaction of strategy and 
context, therefore, serves to shape both the development of that context and 
the very conduct and identity of strategic actors after the event” (Hay, 2002, 
p. 134). In the context of identity narratives, this means that identity
narratives are long-term narrative structures as well as actors can use
strategic narratives as tools. In this way, long-term narratives and short-term
narrations of episodes and events interact and co-produce a complex and
continuously contested environment in the realm of a collective’s identity
(Szostek, 2017; Miskimmon et al., 2013; Clunan, 2009). Long-term
narratives and short-term narrations are not necessarily defined by their
temporal scope but instead by how they are recognised and what they seek
to do. When narratives have reached a “tipping point threshold when a
critical mass of social actors accepts and buys into it as a social fact” (Subotić
2016, p. 615), then narratives can become settled discursive structures. When
narratives become accepted as social facts they designate acceptable
behaviour. At the same time, strategic narratives are tools that can unsettle
existing or create new narrative structures to a strategic end.
I argue further that the interaction of long-term narratives and short-
term narrations of episodes and events is best analytically approached 
through the examination of movement narratives. I define movement 
narratives as strategic narratives specifically crafted to negotiate existing 
narrative structures through time. Movement narratives thrive on the 
encounter of the friction between the known and the unknown. They 
negotiate friction by designing a way out of this friction. Friction here is 
understood as competing narrative structures through which sense is 
achieved. However, as they compete, the sense-making of a given situation 
rests unresolvedly in the space between this friction. Movement narratives 
seek a way out of this friction; they negotiate it.  
Methodology 
For the examination of the case study, I use two data produced in the 
course of the EU-funded policy- and solution-oriented Jean Monnet Project 
E-YOUTH (https://jeanmonnet.nz/eyouth/, 2018-2020). It examines how
younger generations in Ukraine and the Baltic States narrate relationships
between each other, the European Union and the world. Where the Baltic
States are seen as role models of Europeanisation (see Johanssen, 2006), the
project asked how the inter-subjective narration among younger generations
speaks to how young people make sense of themselves and the world they
live in.
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The dataset used in this research is based on media data collection in 
Latvia between 11.02.2019 to 10.03.2019 of three most popular online news 
sources (Delfi.lv; Tvnet; LSM) among younger audiences (see table 1). In 
total, 173 media articles that referenced Ukraine was collected. To be sure, 
the selection criteria for Ukraine excludes a variety of articles that could have 
spoken to Latvian sense-making of identity. At the same time, the prism of 
identity through Ukraine made possible an angle on Latvian Self-
understanding through (international) relations and the ongoing conflict with 
Russia, both of which speak importantly to Latvian conceptualisations of the 
Self (see also Kleinberga and Vizgunova, this issue).  
To substantiate the findings from the media analysis, I further included 
data from 10 elite interviews conducted in February and March 2020 with 
younger (20-30 years) civil society elites. Here I focus specifically on the 
examination of three questions: (1) How would you describe Latvia, yourself 
in relation to your country and what would you like Latvia to be like in the 
future? (2) What role does Latvia have and should take in international 
relations? (3) How would you describe the situation in the world, and what 
do you think the future will look like?  
From both the media data set and the elite interviews, I conducted a 
narrative analysis, with a particular focus on movement narratives. 
Movement narratives can take many shapes and forms. Therefore, a pre-set 
coding sheet for their examination is counter-intuitive to analysing 
movement narratives. I instead examined the data through semi-inductive 
narrative analysis. I code each interview and media data point by grouping 
statements according to the following categories through a text analysis: (1) 
Actors; (2) Identity commitments; (3) Temporal claims; (4) Uncertainty; (5) 
Agency.  
By grouping textual elements into these categories, I identify how 
different narrations of temporality link to the Self and formulation of agency. 
Movement narratives, that is the specific strategic narratives that actors 
deploy to negotiate identity narrative structures, are identified in the coding 
sheets. Critically, media data and interview data are textually different, 
especially where media data has been pre-coded into categories by Latvian 
researchers. However, where identity narrative negotiation is complex, the 
deployment of multiple methods reflects this complex interaction more 
appropriately.  Moreover, it has to be acknowledged that the research sample 
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is limited and the evidence suggested in this paper, should be seen only as 
indicators for future research in this area.   
Where Do We Go from Here? Latvian State Identity and a Fragile 
World in Latvian Online Media 
Latvian media analysis revealed a number of frictions that hindered the 
sense-making of the Self. Strikingly, the media analysis indicated a lack of 
movement narratives to resolve this friction. This concerned in particular, 
narratives of the Self and Latvia’s position in the future. On the one hand, 
the narrative analysis suggested that media outlets considered Latvia to be in 
a good place; a place Latvians had worked hard to achieve. On the other 
hand, Latvia was also portrayed as poor, fragile and still in need of a helping 
hand by international partners and through multilateral cooperation and 
institutions. This friction produces tension because it relates to different 
readings of a state’s purview of agency (Steele, 2008). Crucially, the 
narrations of the Self linked to very different formulations as to the 
possibility of agency, especially in the international arena. Where Latvia was 
portrayed as being in a good place, a more active placement of interests in 
the international arena suggested more scope for Latvian agency in this 
domain, especially through multilateral frameworks such as the European 
Union or NATO. While Latvia’s good position heavily tied to European 
identity narrative commitments and presented Latvia as a European country 
at heart, some uncertainty as to what constitutes the Self still resonated in the 
media data. However, where Latvia was narrated as a European country, the 
media data reflects a more active pursuit of interests and agency to take part 
in influencing European policy. On the flipside, where Latvia was 
understood as being weak and fragile still, the state’s purview of agency was 
less pro-active. In the latter accounts Latvia was presented as a small player 
in the international arena. The narration of the weak Self further linked to 
narrations of caution and warned that Latvia had to be cautious not to be 
pushed aside or off its path of slow but steady development. These accounts 
tied to a generally positive view of the Self while other actors – most 
dominantly Russia – were portrayed as endangering the stability of the Self 
(see also Kleinberga and Vizgunova, this issue). Uncertainty as to the 
fragility of the international order linked crucially to weakening a sense of 
agency. While there is a recurring theme of Latvia as a European country, 
the EU as a powerful player loses out in the wider acknowledgement of US 
and Russian power (Ibid.). The EU here is perceived as a middle man 
between two superpowers, which reflects a recurrence of historical Cold War 
narratives more broadly. 
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Both readings of agency are processual, that is they place Latvia as 
subjects in these processes. However, where in the former Latvia can be an 
active agent in the forging and shaping of these processes, in the latter it is 
merely subject to it with little agency in the process. The uncertainty here, 
constituted an important theme, despite the acknowledgement of progress. 
More generally, this uncertainty was not necessarily referenced in 
relation to Latvia itself, but through Latvia as subject to global uncertainty. 
Both, the international order as well as the European Union were mostly 
portrayed as fragile or as falling apart, which implied that it had become 
more difficult to envisage the future amidst this uncertainty. Fragility in this 
view led to difficulties in assessing expectations and what can be known. As 
I have argued elsewhere (Heinrichs, 2019, p.7), uncertainty constitutes an 
“important theme for narrative sense-making” and how uncertainty is 
negotiated depends on the understanding of the identity of the Self.  
One of the dominant metaphors in the media data was that of politics 
versus culture, which also speaks to questions on the possibility of agency. 
Politics was presented as creating the conditions in which countries either 
strive or fall apart. Culture was juxtaposed to the power of the political 
system. Where Latvians were thus perceived as being culturally European, 
media data reflected more uncertainty about whether the political system was 
sufficiently reflecting this culture. Especially where media data suggested 
Latvia’s weak position in the international arena, a sense of victimhood 
permeated the narrative sensemaking of Latvia’s position in the world.  
Our Generation Will Take Matters into Their Own Hands. Latvian 
State Identity and the Negotiation of Latvia’s Future in Latvian Young 
Elite Interviews  
Whereas the media projected conflicting narratives as to Latvian agency 
in the process of writing its future, young elites were more confident about 
being able to take charge of the process of writing Latvia’s future. The 
confidence to assert agency was crucially linked to how temporal claims 
were made, in particular by narrating process through generational 
narratives. Mostly rejecting the reading of the current global condition as a 
critical juncture, interviewees focussed on processes. This finding is 
particularly instructive, as the processual nature of temporality crucially 
linked to the role of agency in shaping (the outcome) of these processes.  
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Writing a generation of change and the process of becoming 
As argued, generational narratives played a crucial role in the sense-
making of Latvia’s current subject-positioning in those processes that young 
elite interviewees thought they could and had the intention to shape. “I am 
waiting for one or two generations […], so we can start talking about really 
radical things […],” one respondent stated. “We are trying to be what we are 
not, and I want Latvia to be […] more open to ideas” (3). The respondent (3) 
elaborated that:  
“Latvians are very shy, very fearful […]. I greatly respect the older 
generations and older people, but if you lived in the Soviet Union for 
fifty years, and then you have twenty years to try to adapt to a modern, 
open, progressive Europe, well, there won’t be that adaptation […].”  
(Ibid.)  
Another respondent mirrored the idea that a generational change also meant 
the introduction of new ideas and new ways of thinking. They wished for the 
“young[er] generation […] to become more empowered vis-à-vis the older 
generation […] to have a clearer understanding of where we really want to 
move as a country” (5). One the one hand, generations are a seismograph for 
societal change (Schiek and Ullrich, 2011, p. 167) because they have a novel 
access to society and events (Mannheim, 1928). On the other hand, 
generations are bound through their narrated unity, which principally 
connects to research in collective memory (Halbwachs, 1980; Assmann & 
Czaplicka, 1995) and connective memory (Hoskins, 2011). The constitution 
of a generation, I argue here, is thus both subject to processes of collective 
and connective memorialisation, but also subject to the production of this 
generation through narrative, in particular in the attempt to envision a 
societal change in the future.  
The vision for the future rested decisively on temporal narratives that 
focussed on process, not on ruptures. Ruptures are too subject to narration, 
and oftentimes constitute the elements that require the incorporation into 
existing narrative patterns. Ruptures, especially when they are narrated as 
that, carry the potential to serve as compounded spaces for the negotiation of 
identity narratives. Yet, in the absence of narration of rupture, respondents 
focused instead on a process of becoming, from where Latvia had come from 
and where Latvia would go. “Latvia is like a fourteen-year-old child, we have 
to grow very far to go, but we have already gone far” (4). “Of course, it 
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doesn’t happen overnight, it has been quite a short time, but I think we are 
progressing well” (3).  
The narration of generational change is a particularly instructive 
movement narrative because it roots identity narrative structures in 
generations. The movement narrative of generational change thus argues that 
there is not an inherent identity narrative to Latvia that stands apart from the 
generation that produces it. In arguing that identity narrative commitments 
of the future can be changed through generations, the younger generations 
not only narrate changes but they narratively empower generational change. 
The power of placing change in narrative structures rests thus not so much 
on whether this factually creates change but on how it expands the possible 
scope of agency and action for the narrators. In this way, the movement 
narrative of generational change enables narrators to envision the Self as 
different in the future and to seek to enact this future Self.  
Latvia’s future is “progressive” and has “great potential.” 
In the process of becoming, Latvia’s future was mostly envisaged as 
having great potential with a desire for it to be more progressive. “I hope 
[Latvia’s future to be] positive and based on more progressive values than 
on conservative ones” (5; see also, interviews 1 and 3). Latvia was perceived 
as having great potential (1), if it realised and expanded in those areas that 
constituted the main narrative focus points domestically and internationally. 
“And of course, we have very great potential here, well as for Latvia, I think, 
for a relatively educated nation and with many other resources, which I think 
we could use more effectively and compete fairly well.” (8).  
Domestically, interviewees understood change in particular through 
narratives on social and ideological change, which dominantly featured 
themes such as social cohesion and inclusiveness (2; 3; 10). This concerned 
the inner-societal divisions “A big step would be for us to reduce the classic 
‘us vs. them’ policy, which is a matter between Latvians and Russians” (1). 
Further, the future society was informed by policies that dominantly saw  
reforms in the education sector: 
There is a huge lack of systematic solutions […] until we have an 
orderly education system and until we have a health care and social 
support system, the society will be less happy, and that is where we 
should strive, for people wishing to live here. 
(9).  
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Through social cohesion and a generational progression toward unity and an 
educated society, young elites considered meaningful ways through which 
these processes could be shaped. Internationally, respondents unequivocally 
saw Latvia as part of a multilateral world order, deeply embedded in 
supranational institutions. “We must be a part of supranational organisations 
as a small country” (6; see also 1;3;7;8;10). The integration into Europe was 
perceived as one way to increase Latvia’s standing and voice in the world. 
“Because Latvia is cool, but we are small, fragile, weak if we identify with 
a larger community […] – NATO or the EU – we can be bigger and stronger” 
(3).  Especially the notion of a small country linked to sense-making of how 
Latvia’s position could be advanced strategically: “We have to approach it 
like a crafty fox, we are not a big bear that can hold everything. We have to 
be like a fox; we have to be smart; we have to be able to offer something to 
others” (10).  
In the process of envisioning future, Latvia is understood as acting 
within the structural confines of being a small country, yet with agency in 
the process to work through these structural constraints. Most dominantly, 
young elites considered social cohesion and education as central tools for 
realising the great potential they envisioned for Latvia. In this context, 
multilateral institutions were a core feature of this sense-making, despite the 
system narratives that made most commonly sense of the global order as 
uncertain and unpredictable.  
Conclusion: Uncertainty, Will and Hopeful Agency 
I have started this paper with the assumption that change and continuity 
are always dependent on perspective. Conversely, history is always the 
continuous interaction of both. Researchers principally interested in the 
notions of change and continuity should, therefore, focus on where and how 
change and continuity are narrated. On the basis of this assumption, 
narratives construct, order, produce and reproduce reality. Sense is achieved 
through narratives. This can be strategically explored. Narrative structures 
are malleable to strategic use, which also expands on processes of 
envisioning and writing futures.  
As younger generations, in particular, attest to visions of the future for 
the state they live in, I have applied this framework to a short and cursory 
exploration of sense-making by Latvia’s youth. Latvia, like the other Baltic 
states, has been considered a role model of Europeanisation with a clear 
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trajectory and pathway as part of this process.  Yet, how young elites 
make sense of firstly, the media narratives they consume, and secondly, the 
world of which they are part is more complex and multi-layered. Narratives 
are negotiated, disassembled and assembled toward very specific readings 
and productions of future visions of the Self. In this negotiation, Latvian 
youth appears to see a process ahead for Latvia, one which they are interested 
in shaping and believe they have the agency to. 
To be sure, the size of the dataset cannot fully establish a causal 
relationship and can only point to the importance of understanding the 
strategic narrations of temporality for an analytical grasp of narrating 
agency. However, where temporality is a core feature of narrative analysis, 
it can shine a light on how actors react to uncertainty, how they narrative it 
and whether they link agency to temporality and uncertainty. I proposed in 
this paper that the narration of determined and proactive shaping power in 
the future vision for a country enables actors to grasp a sense of agency 
through movement narratives. While uncertainty may initially seem as 
limiting this sense of empowerment, the research suggests instead that 
uncertainty can also provide a groundwork from which actors narrate a more 
creative agency in seeking to overcome this uncertainty.  
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A MODERN EMPIRE AND ITS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: ON 
RUSSIA’S COMMUNICATION WITH ESTONIA1 
Abstract 
Defining the Russian Federation as one of the four contemporary empires (Zielonka 
2012), this article links the imperial paradigm (Parker 2010; Zielonka 2012, 2013, 2015; 
Colomer 2017), social constructs building (Wendt 1992), strategic narrative theory 
(Miskimmon et al. 2013), and soft power-associated public diplomacy instrumentarium 
(Melissen 2005; Nye 2008; Cull 2008, 2009; Cowan and Arsenault 2008) into a single 
conceptual framework to examine public diplomacy by the Russian Federation towards 
the Republic of Estonia. This analysis assumes that Russia understands Estonia as its own 
periphery in imperial terms. However, since Estonia already is an integral part of yet 
another modern empire (the European Union), our article notifies that Russia is left with 
a limited range of effective mechanisms of strategic communication with its Baltic 
neighbours, and Estonia in particular. Respectively, we test the following claim: in order 
to effectively project its strategic identity, system and policy narratives to Estonia, Russia 
prefers using a range of public diplomacy mechanisms rather than other types of 
communicational strategies. Empirically, we engage with eight annual reviews of the 
Estonian Internal Security Service (2012-2019/20).  
Keywords: Soft power, contemporary empires, public diplomacy, strategic narrative 
theory, security, centre and periphery, strategic communication, Russia, Estonia. 
1. Introduction
[Russia’s border] does not end anywhere. 
 Vladimir Putin (2016) 
Russia has chosen to be an adversary and poses a long-term existential 
threat to the United States and to our European allies and partners. 
  Philip Breedlove (2016) 
In an infinite universe, every point can be regarded as the centre, because 
every point has an infinite number of stars on each side of it. 
Stephen Hawking (2016) 
This article’s analytical focus is on the conceptual intersection of the 
strategic narrative theory (Miskimmon et al. 2013; Roselle et al. 2014; 
Chaban et al. 2017, 2019) and public diplomacy studies (Melissen 2005; Nye 
2008; Cull 2008, 2009; Cowan and Arsenault 2008; Chaban and Vernygora 
1 In memory of Johannes Kert (03.12.1959-04.03.2021). 
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2013). We use this theoretical ‘knot’ to explore and explain how the Russian 
Federation (hereafter Russia) communicates with the society of the Republic 
of Estonia (hereafter Estonia). As discussed in the Introduction to this 
Special Issue (see Chaban, Mondry, and Pavlov 2019-20), the trio of the 
Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) continue attracting Russia’s 
interest, and, specifically, in the contexts of post-Soviet geo-strategic 
evolutions on the European continent.  
For Russia, the Baltic region in general, and Estonia in particular, stands 
out due to many factors. Among those are historical understandings (after 
all, the outcome of the Great Northern War became a prerequisite for the 
Tsardom of Muscovy to ‘convert’ into the Russian Empire in 1721) informed 
by stereotypes and perceptions, visions on strategy, geographical proximity, 
religion, social bonds, cultural values, et cetera. From the other side, Estonia 
has been impacted by conflictual communication from Russia since the two 
sides recognised each other in 1920, via the Treaty of Tartu (Ciziunas 2008; 
Stoicescu 2020). In most recent history, Estonia fought the world’s first 
cyber war, when this Baltic Nordic state became a “subject of a new form of 
‘cyber violence’” experiencing a Russia-orchestrated largescale denial of 
service in 2007 (Haataja 2017, 160). Yet, we argue that the Kremlin had to 
‘soften’ (as well as make it more sophisticated) its communicational strategy 
towards Estonia since then. This article questions the motivations behind the 
change in the strategy and the course of actions by Russia triggered by the 
revised strategy. To give a credible answer to these questions, we engage 
with, and test the imperial theoretical paradigm as one of our leading 
explanations.  
Central to our study are the concepts of empire and periphery. Both are 
experiencing analytical revival in the post-Cold War period that has not 
proved to be a critical juncture for establishing a new international system 
(Miskimmon et al. 2013, 1). As for the current international system, it was 
‘cemented’ at the Yalta Conference in 1945 by the concept of the world’s 
five ‘policemen’ (Plokhy 2010) or the permanent members of the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC). However, the UN-bound 
communicational practices were neither genuinely accepted by the 
international community of nations nor fully implemented even during the 
Cold War (Bisley 2012), let alone after the Soviet Union disappeared from 
the political map in 1991. Perhaps unsurprisingly, major powers of the 21st 
century (a somewhat different group of geo-strategic ‘heavyweights’ if 
compared to the world’s ‘policemen’ as defined by the UN) have started 
searching for new communication mechanisms. In this process, they are 
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consciously or unconsciously reviving the imperial paradigm in the field of 
international relations. Relevant literature cited below argues how present-
day major powers attempt to justify the imperial lead objectively, by 
endowing it with analytical relevance.  
1.1. Background and structure 
In this article, we build on the basic points and notions of Zielonka’s 
(2012) seminal work on the modern international system and define Russia 
as one of the four contemporary empires, with the remaining three being the 
People’s Republic of China (China), the European Union (EU) and the 
United States of America (USA). Intriguingly, Cooper (2004) also named 
the same international actors, but in the context of another debate, which is 
beyond the scope of this paper, arguing that Russia and China are more 
inclined to continue with Westphalia-bound interrelations, while the US and 
the EU are searching for a post-Westphalian approach. According to a 
growing body of literature on imperial entities of the present time (for 
example, Motyl 1997, 1999, 2001; Terrill 2003; Zielonka 2006, 2011, 2012, 
2013; Parker 2008, 2010; Gravier 2009; Behr and Stivachtis 2015; 
Vernygora 2016; Vernygora et al. 2016; Parchami 2019; Kasper and 
Vernygora 2020), imperial paradigm is instrumental to single out a few 
specific characteristics of a geo-strategically significant interaction between 
the imperial core and periphery. For some, a modern empire’s periphery is 
represented naturally by its immediate neighbourhood (either formally 
designated by the empire or not). It can also be a far-away locality (and not 
necessarily a former colony of the empire). Nevertheless, as argued by 
Parker (2010, 111), “empires’ extension of domination has not been 
grounded solely in the internal nature of the given empire, but in empires’ 
relationship to the wider environment: the ecological, social or political 
environment; the international system or the global setting.” This factor 
brings an empire-periphery interlinkage right into the epicentre of social 
constructs-building process. In a way, this is where the premises of political 
realism, constructivism-bound debates on identities, and ‘soft power’-
originated postulates have a chance to make a unique analytical intersection 
for the benefit of students of international relations. 
Since, according to Zielonka (2012, 509), an empire can be defined as 
“a vast territorial unit with global military, economic and diplomatic 
influence”, it “must have a record of acting in a way that imposes significant 
domestic constraints on a […] periphery.” Strategic communication wise, 
due to “the unstoppable inertial empire-forming process” (Vernygora et al., 
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2016, 10) and in accordance with a particular situation that may require an 
empire’s geo-strategic ‘change of heart,” an imperial entity can exhibit its 
“inborn inclination” to make use of different typologies in the process of 
delivering its strategic narratives to a peripheral area (Vernygora 2017). A 
given empire’s record of imposing those “significant domestic constraints” 
can be exemplified by a range of communicational practices that the empire 
employs in the process of ‘crafting’ its strategic communication with its 
peripheries – a public diplomacy-driven social constructivism can be listed 
here together with a more-for-more pragmatic functional approach, a 
spillover-framed set of integrative applications and a hybrid warfare 
(Vernygora 2017). Out of the four types of communicational approaches, we 
argue that Russia primarily uses its ‘public diplomacy-prescribed’ 
instrumentarium – these are, according to Cull (2008, 31-32), listening, 
advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy, and international 
broadcasting – for projecting its strategic identity, system, and policy 
narratives, while grounding these narratives in Estonia-focused contexts. 
This claim is to be tested in the article. 
 
Given the context, the main premise here is that Estonia’s membership 
in yet another modern empire (the EU) creates completely different 
analytical ‘setup defaults’. Since 2004, the country is no longer situated in 
what Samokhvalov (2018) described as a “shared neighbourhood” of the EU 
and Russia in Eastern Europe. With Estonia now being a Member State of 
the EU, Russia is arguably left with a limited range of strategic 
communication mechanisms, which can be effectively employed by the 
world’s largest country when it attempts to link with its Baltic neighbour(s). 
Indirectly supporting this statement, Nielsen and Paabo (2015) argued how 
vital for Russia is to employ a ‘soft’ means in regards of Estonia. There is 
also a factor of Western (including EU) sanctions against Russia as well as 
Russia’s retaliatory restrictive measures, which make a substantial difference 
to Russian foreign policy (Korhonen et al. 2018; Müürsepp 2021). With that, 
however, Estonia and its two Baltic neighbours also share common borders 
with Russia and host a considerable number of Russian citizens and Russian-
language speakers, residing in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania on the 
permanent basis. It is, therefore, predictable that significant efforts of Russia-
originated strategic communication (regardless of its type) are directed to 
those two groups within the Baltics. At the same time, if we specify the 
context further, such a situation leads to a range of discrepancies in 
understanding how a particular type of communicational framework (i.e., 
public diplomacy) can be defined in/by Russia and, for example, Estonia.   
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On 1 January 2020, Statistics Estonia confirmed that people who 
declare themselves ethnic Estonians represent the country’s most sizeable 
ethnic group (909,552), while ethnic Russians (327,802), Ukrainians 
(24,897), Belarusians (11,536), Finns (8,297) and Latvians (3,329) represent 
the next five largest ethnic groups. However, there are two other statistical 
indicators, which make the situation rather confusing from the statistics side. 
Estonia is the country of birth for 1,129,934 residents and the country of 
citizenship for 1,128,559 people. The latter two figures are very similar, but 
they can be pushing towards a set of wrong generalisations on the ‘portrait’ 
of the Estonian society. This is because 115,890 residents of the country were 
born in the Russian Federation (not necessarily being ethnic Russians 
though), while Russia is the country of citizenship for 83,989 residents of 
Estonia (not all of them are ethnic Russians either). Moreover, the citizenship 
is not specified in 71,361 cases, and these people are recognised non-citizens 
(so-called ‘grey passport-holders’), a sizeable group of Estonian residents (of 
different ethnicities, including even Estonians) who opted to not apply for 
any country’s citizenship for a number of objective reasons (lack of 
knowledge of the Estonian language, no desire to serve in the Estonian 
Defence Forces, possibility to visit Russia without a visa, other reasons). 
This article starts with elaborating a leading conceptual framework in 
the broadest possible sense. What Russia and Estonia represent now is 
directly coupled with the field’s major debate – on the current international 
system. The next section details Russia’s attempts to interact with the society 
of Estonia, classifying these interactions vis-a-vis the aforementioned public 
diplomacy-associated communicational modes specified by Cull (2008), but 
keeping in mind a range of differences in defining the same modes by 
established Russian scholars and early-stage researchers. Imperial paradigm 
predetermines a variety of security concerns. These are perpetually projected 
by the Kremlin towards the locations that it perceives as its periphery. 
Reflecting on those concerns, the Estonian Internal Security Service 
(Kaitsepolitseiamet, or KaPo) surveys projections by Russia towards Estonia 
and openly reports on the situation to the Estonian public in order to raise 
awareness, while proposing a course of actions for the Estonian government. 
A number of KaPo’s annual reviews (2012-2019/20), which focused 
predominantly on Russia-originated activities towards Estonia, are in the 
empirical focus of this study. Method-wise, the article engages with 
discourse analysis and process tracing (Klotz and Prakash 2008). A 
pluralistic essence of these methods reflects on the article’s observational 
nature when plenty of descriptive material is required and precise causalities 
are sought for. The idea is to give an observation-based interpretation, whilst 
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being in agreement with Neumann (2008, 62) that discourse is about 
maintaining “a degree of regularity in social relations” because it “produces 
preconditions for action.”  
 
Arguably, the data from a national internal security agency may have a 
bias. A public diplomacy action by Russia towards Estonia can be treated as 
‘effective’ for the Russian side, but considered ‘harmful’ by Estonia. This 
in-built bias of the dataset – which we openly acknowledge – does not 
undermine the rationale behind studying this discourse. Aware of a potential 
bias of the Western academia towards Russian public diplomacy efforts in 
general, we widen the insights into the field of public diplomacy and engage 
with a substantial academic contribution by Russia-based scholars. In its 
discussion section, the article revisits its main claim that different elements 
of Russia’s public diplomacy towards Estonia get operationally interlinked 
with Russia’s formulation and projection of strategic narratives.      
 
1.2. Setting definitions  
 
The understanding of terminology used by the KaPo annual reviews 
and other similar official reports issued in Estonia is grounded in the vision 
formulated by Mikk Marran (2020, 2), Director General of the Estonian 
Foreign Intelligence Service: “[t]he main external threats to Estonia’s 
security remain the same,” and that the country is “particularly threatened by 
neighbouring Russia, whose leadership is aggressively and actively opposed 
to the democratic world order.”  In this light, the study draws analytical 
boundaries and detects overlaps in the notion of public diplomacy with the 
concept of propaganda. Some of the definitions considered in this study are 
provided by NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence-issued 
report ‘Improving NATO Strategic Communication Terminology’ (Bolt and 
Haiden 2020). Given the already specified security factor of the empire-
periphery communication, this approach will make the process of employing 
the key notions to be terminologically compatible with the KaPo annual 
reviews.  
 
Respectively, this study understands ‘discourse’ as “accepted positions 
[created and maintained through communication] that constrain debates and 
shape worldviews,” while ‘narratives’ are understood as “morals drawn from 
stories” (Bolt and Haiden 2020, 30). What is essential for this discussion is 
that a narrative can become ‘strategic’ when states attempt to use it to “sway 
target audiences” (Roselle et al. 2014, 74). It makes it distinct from ‘narrative 
strategies’ and perfectly fit for framing up a discussion on public diplomacy, 
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which can be described as “an international actor’s attempt to advance the 
ends of policy by engaging with foreign publics” (Cowan and Cull 2008, 6), 
while focusing on engagement “with those outside government” (Dasgupta 
2011, 54). Linking public diplomacy definition to strategic narrative concept 
gives an opportunity to identify the role “the strategic narratives play in 
shaping behaviour in an observable way” (Miskimmon et al. 2013, 142). This 
may lead to a more prominent role for a government – including a foreign 
government – in information guidance when it comes to international 
relations and foreign policy.  
 
2. Theoretical Framework  
 
It could be argued that for any big power that undergoes the process of 
solidifying its geo-strategic relevance, it is challenging to follow President 
Theodore Roosevelt’s advice to communicate (speak) softly – a ‘big stick’ 
of power is with you all the time, and your ambition is to extend your 
influence. Offensive realist Mearsheimer (1990), in his ‘Why we will soon 
miss the Cold War,” advocated for keeping the international system to be run 
by a group of “more equal than others” (Orwell 1944). In contrast, social 
constructivism (for example, Wendt 1992, 1995) argued for a possibility for 
power politics to be institutionally transformed with almost no harm for 
international security. What makes this debate even more complicated is that 
a big power has many names, and this fact can easily spawn a reason to 
antagonise one political theory against another one. To illustrate the point, in 
his seminal After Hegemony, Keohane differentiated between a hegemony 
and an empire, noting that “unlike an imperial power, [a hegemony] cannot 
make and enforce rules without a certain degree of consent from other 
sovereign states” (1984, 46). Almost instantly, Keohane (1984, 49) gave 
away a prediction that “neither the Europeans nor the Japanese are likely to 
have the capacity to become hegemonic powers themselves in the 
foreseeable future.”    
 
2.1. The absence of what was designed in 1945  
 
Those academic claims and predictions were being made at a time when 
(apart from random and predominantly American ‘prophecies’ on chances 
for the political West to ever see the USSR to collapse, e.g., Kennan (1947) 
or Brzezinski (1969)), there was no solid theoretical concept that would be 
seriously forecasting the Soviet Union’s disappearance from the political 
map. On the European side, even Jean Monnet (1978) treated the Soviet 
Union as a geo-strategic as well as monolithic given that was to stay. A life 
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after or without the Yalta Conference-produced international system 
sounded like an improbable science fiction between the 1940s and the 1980s.  
 
Simultaneously, numerous examples revealed that the UN-bound 
communicational patterns and permissions were becoming incongruous and 
even meaningless. In 1945, during the United Nations Conference on 
International Organisation, Andrey Gromyko (as cited in Bisley 2012, 72) 
was pushing for the universal acceptance of a nearly metaphysical belief: “If 
the problem of peace is to be solved, there must be mutual trust and harmony 
among the greatest world powers, and they must act in harmony.” 
Objectively, this vision has never been delivered by the UN-bound 
international system. Moreover, some of the “more equal than others” – 
specifically, post-Suez Britain and France (McCourt 2009; Sorlin 2019) – 
who were assigned in 1945 a special role of being two of the world’s ‘five 
policemen,” stagnated in understanding their veritable geo-strategic 
relevancy. The Yalta international system was further undermined by the 
1971 Beijing-Taipei swap at the UN. On top of that, as argued by Bisley 
(2012, 79), “the most important relationship in post-[WWII] international 
security was not part of the UN Security Council’s business.” Evidently, 
Bisley meant the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United 
States. By the 1970s, the two super-empires (‘major powers,” ‘hegemonies,” 
or whatever the name theoreticians used) were comfortable in 
communicating with the rest of the world through monologues, while 
inventing a Cold War variation of the latent G2. According to social 
constructivists, “shared understanding (or intersubjectivity) form[ed] the 
basis of […] interactions” (Theys 2017, 36). Both the USA and the former 
USSR understood well the other side, not expecting any positive surprises 
from the counterpart. Nevertheless, that real or perceived stability was 
anything but a virtue of Yalta and its communicational practices. We argue 
these practices had never been translated into actual international relations, 
gradually cobbling the path for the revival of empires in search for a new 
international setup.    
 
For Europe, “the foreseeable future” (in the parlay of Keohane 1984) 
arrived to the continent in the politico-economic form of the EU in the 
beginning of the 1990s. However, it was not the main tiding for the failing 
UN-based international framework. By then, the Soviet Union was already 
history, with many countries, including Estonia, having successfully made 
their international comebacks via regaining independence. An additional 
issue relevant to the context was directly linked to the Russian Federation, 
one of the sixteen titular ‘pieces’ that had ever constituted the Soviet imperial 
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‘puzzle’. Even though, as argued by Pain (2009, 61), Russia exemplified a 
struggle to either become a “political civic nation project” or “a neo-imperial 
project”, it had to wait until President Vladimir Putin’s ‘arrival’ to clarify 
that the country’s imperial intentions had not substantially changed since 
1721. President Putin (2016) once noted that “[Russia’s border] does not end 
anywhere.” An imperial way of acting (and an empire-based international 
system) is taking place against particular features specified by Zielonka 
(2013, 10): “[b]orders within the system are fuzzy and there is disassociation 
between authoritative allocations, functional competencies and territorial 
constituencies.”  
 
In terms of global strategic communication, the Soviet Union’s 
dramatic derailment and then disappearance puzzled the field of political 
science. Unlike “[t]he end of global wars in 1918 and 1945 proved to be 
critical junctures […] to construct new international orders” (Miskimmon et 
al. 2013, 1), the Cold War’s finale did not provide for any meaningful leads 
on how to interact in the post-Yalta international environment. Katzenstein 
and Sil (2004, 21) pointed it out that “[t]he totally unanticipated end of the 
Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union […] generated not re-
examination of whether and why theories drawn from the major research 
traditions had proven inadequate.” These scholars argued that “[i]nstead, 
these events yielded another round of ad hoc explanations and bold 
predictions that essentially served to protect the natural worldviews 
embedded in each of the traditions.” 
 
2.2. The arrival of a new approach: Soft power, public diplomacy, 
discourses and narratives 
 
Using Lotman’s expression, the field kept driving “deep into a 
Procrustean bed of concepts” (2013, 41), without finding a new set of 
explanatory approaches and an analytical tool set on a) how to analyse 
interactions between different major actors and their perceived as well as 
actual peripheries in the new reality and, b) the nature of their 
communicational linkages established in the absence of the Cold War-
originated theoretical ‘stability’. One of the intellectual challenges to the 
discipline’s stagnation came from Nye (2004, 2008) and his notion of ‘soft 
power’. The concept proved to be productive to theorise the phenomenon of 
‘public diplomacy’ (Nye 2008, 96), since culture (“in places where it is 
attractive to others”), political values (“when it lives up to them at home and 
abroad”) and foreign policies (“when they are seen as legitimate and having 
moral authority”) can be effectively projected. Theorising further on public 
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diplomacy, Cull (2008, 2009) offered a hierarchical structure to understand 
it, distinguishing its five elements: listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, 
exchange diplomacy, and international broadcasting. Significantly adding to 
the conceptual understanding of the process, Klyeva and Tsetsura (2015) 
argued the dualistic nature of soft power, which can generate (or even 
represent) both enabling and disabling environments. 
 
At the same time, there are two crucial theoretical additions to the 
debate on the soft power-public diplomacy interlinkage, and they are 
associated with contemporary empires and strategic narratives. On the one 
hand, Zielonka (2006, 2012, 2013) pointed to the terminological confusion 
existing between the notions of ‘hegemony,” ‘empire’ or ‘power’ and made 
an analytical breakthrough in regards of ‘rehabilitation’ of imperial 
paradigm. In the context of Russia, for example, Zielonka (2012, 511) argued 
that the country’s “prime interests” are focused on “recovering from the 
Soviet collapse”, its “key sources of power” are represented by “energy and 
the military”, and the essence of its imperial “civilising mission” is framed 
around “ensuring stability and security.”  
 
On the other hand, as argued by Miskimmon et al. (2013, 143), 
“[s]trategic narratives are central to the identity of its actors and the meaning 
of the system”, and this argument analytically interlinks a country’s strategic 
identity, system and policy narratives in the context of building sustainable 
long-lasting relationships. In a way, it was a very timely scholarly 
‘assistance’ for Wendt (1992, 398), so his colossal argument – “[i]dentities 
are the basis of interests” – can have a new life. The analytical cornerstone 
here is “the narrative of your state [that] comes to constitute an important 
part of the identity of another state […] [and] this will shape its behavior” 
(Miskimmon 2013, 143). 
 
In continuation, Roselle et al. (2014, 71 and 74) proposed the next step 
in theorising ‘soft’ power, arguing that “[s]trategic narrative is soft power in 
the 21st century” and recognising a big challenge in identifying “soft power 
resources” and “the processes through which soft power operates” as well as 
understanding “under what conditions soft power resources can be used to 
support foreign policy.” The point was that a “chaotic world” is to appreciate 
some assistance from a soft power-originated communicational side. More 
notably, according to Roselle et al. (2014, 74),  
 
[s]oft power resources – culture, values, or policies, for example – may 
be attractive because they fit within a preexisting or developing 
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personal narrative. Strategic narrative, then, directly addresses the 
formation, projection and diffusion, and reception of ideas in the 
international system. 
 
The scholarship of strategic narrative states that “the post-Cold War 
international system opens space for significant contestation over narratives” 
(Roselle et al. 2014, 77). Arguably, there is a distinct link between a) a 
striking and deliberately crafted similarity of “Comrades! Citizens! Brothers 
and sisters! Men of our army and navy! I am addressing you, friends of 
mine!” (Stalin 1941) and “Dear citizens of Russia, dear friends! Today, I am 
addressing you, all of you, because you have entrusted me with the highest 
office in the country” (Putin 2000) and b) a Russian strategic narrative that 
“Russians and Ukrainians constitute one nation and that the countries should 
find a way to integrate” (Putin 2019). Mearsheimer (2014) with his ‘Getting 
Ukraine wrong’ had already pushed for that case anyway, but on the strategic 
narrative theme, Putin “has been able to achieve narrative continuity” 
(Miskimmon et al. 2013, 259). For Müürsepp (2021), Russian foreign policy, 
on the general level, is associated with the following strategic narratives-
forming themes: a) Russia’s direct ‘communication’ with the United States; 
b) Russia’s prime-level place in the UN-based international system that 
needs to be maintained, and c) Russia’s particular attitude and approach to 
the so-called “ближнее зарубежье” (‘near abroad’) that does not need to be 
defined too precisely.  
 
Arguably, the narrative considerations are of direct relevance for 
Estonia. The key narrative projections can be traced from both Vladimir 
Putin’s speech delivered at the 2007 Munich Security Conference and his 
article ‘Russia in the Changing World’ published in 2012. Had they been 
accounted for by the EU’s political elites, they would have been less 
surprised by the fact that Russia, especially in 2012-2013, understood the 
EU’s Eastern Partnership Programme as a competing empire’s attempt to, 
using Putin’s terminology, oust “the bear” out of “the taiga” (Putin 2014; 
Vernygora et al. 2016). More so, let alone the allegedly ‘disputed’ 
neighbourhood that includes countries like Georgia, Moldova or Ukraine, the 
Russian Federation still has plenty to say in imperial terms towards Estonia, 
Finland, Latvia, and Lithuania, which are already integral parts of the EU. 
Such situations are not unique – as argued (Zielonka 2012, 518), “[b]oth 
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2.3. Russia and its ‘spiritual shackles’ of influence  
 
Public diplomacy is not a know-how of modernity. It has been practiced 
in other historical periods, yet in today’s international relations it is 
remarkably heightened in importance (Belonosova 2020). And while it is 
still a challenge to provide a single-cut understanding of the phenomenon, a 
relative consensus emerged among many scholars who point to the initial 
interplay between a government and a foreign public as a basis for analysing 
its effectiveness in the field. In general, not much has changed principally, 
and public diplomacy of the 21st century, as noted before, still focuses on 
engagement with a foreign civil society to mobilise support. However, there 
is a booming theme on new features of public diplomacy. For example, 
Frangonikolopoulos and Proedrou (2014) already talk about a new version 
of the old phenomenon that appears in the form of “strategic discursive 
public diplomacy”, which ‘look after’ grand-debates on development and 
growth, climate change and even nuclear proliferation-associated issues. 
Complementary to the discussion, Graz and Hauert (2019) note the 
importance of civil society organisations in the process of developing 
international standards. In short, for the current environment of international 
relations, the process can be driven by countries or, with an increasing 
visibility, different organisations, including even non-governmental 
arrangements. Evidently, the Russian Federation can be considered a prime 
example of the former rather than the latter when it comes to its interactions 
with the Estonian society.  
 
Lebedeva (2021) argues that the 9/11 events became a catalyst for the 
Russian Federation to start developing its own distinct public diplomacy, 
since the USA turned its attention to it as well. However, while searching for 
a productive adaptation of its post-Cold War imperial civilising mission for 
the modern time, Russia has managed to create a range of atavistically 
archaic “скрепы” (can be loosely translated as social ‘clams’/ ‘stapes' or 
‘spiritual shackles’), which are evidently as well as extensively applied by 
the Kremlin in the process of projecting strategic narratives, utilising the 
country’s old public diplomacy-related toolkit. The efforts are jointly carried 
out by many state or state-associated agencies ranging from 
Россотрудничество (the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of 
Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International 
Humanitarian Cooperation or Rossotrudnichestvo), Фонд ‘Русский Мир’ 
(The Russkiy Mir Foundation), Россия Сегодня (Rossiya Segodnya), RT 
(formerly Russia Today) to name a few.  
 
 ON RUSSIA’S COMMUNICATION WITH ESTONIA  71 
After the collapse of the USSR, Russia tries spreading its soft power to 
the ‘near abroad,” but the process does not seamlessly lead towards 
enhancing the country’s attractiveness among its closest neighbours (Cwiek-
Karpowicz 2012). Characteristically, Russia’s communication with the  
Estonian society is ‘sharpened up’ towards the so-called соотечественники 
(compatriots), whom Russia engages during its own socio-strategic 
‘exercises’ (‘Соотечественники и военно-мемориальная работа’ 2021), 
while, as it was described by Kallas (2016, 2), “claiming the diaspora.” Many 
in Estonia would argue that such a situation poses a threat to the country’s 
integrity, becoming pivotal for considering local security provision. Thus, a 
detectable countermeasure – for example, Integrating Estonia 2020 
(‘Estonian Government approved integration goals until 2020’ 2018) – may 
directly or indirectly ‘argue’ on Russia-originated public diplomacy 
mechanisms being noticeable or not.  
 
Overall, considering the aforementioned generalisations and a relative 
stability of societal interconnections within Estonia, it is worth testing this 
article’s main claim that Russia prefers channelling its communication with 
Estonia through public-diplomacy-bound mechanisms, all in order to project 
its strategic identity, system, and issue narratives. The general push, as 
argued by Saari (2014, 54), comes from the two distinct features of Russia’s 
public diplomacy objectives associated with Russia’s vision of empire’s 
immediate periphery – “the post-Soviet states are a priority” and the Baltics 
“continue to be included in the post-Soviet category despite being EU and 
NATO members.” These conceptualisation of the public diplomacy 
correlates with the interpretation of imperial paradigm and its understanding 
of periphery discussed above.  
 
3. Russia communicating with the Estonian society: when terminological 
consistency is not important   
 
Once Rawnsley (2015) noted that “the success of soft power […] 
depends on communication via public diplomacy to make sure ideals, values, 
policies and behaviour are attractive to a target population.” In the particular 
case of Russia, as confirmed by Burlinova (2020, 5), “there is a conceptual 
confusion and often there is no understanding at all of which projects belong 
to the sphere of public diplomacy (сфере публичной дипломатии), and 
which – to the communal/societal (общественной).” Intriguingly, the fact 
that the Russian side makes a distinction between ‘public diplomacy’ and 
some kind of ‘communal/societal diplomacy’ does not assist in clarifying the 
aforementioned terminological confusion. More concretely, for the so-called 
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‘communal/societal diplomacy’ to be conceptually different from what Cull 
(2008) describes as “exchange diplomacy”, it should have absolutely nothing 
to do with the Russian state, but it is evidently not the case. Speculatively, it 
could be argued that Russia immensely benefits from this terminological 
vagueness and, most probably, opts to maintain such confusions.   
 
At the same time, Burlinova (2020, 8) underlined that, within the 
Russian context, “public diplomacy is not perceived as a system of 
institutions, but is defined as one of the areas of work along with cultural and 
humanitarian cooperation, communal/societal diplomacy and strategic 
communications”, being focused on “specific target audiences” such as 
“representatives of political and business elites, the media community, the 
civil sector, young leaders, experts.” While the latter definition directly 
interlinks public diplomacy practices with the particular groups that are to be 
targeted, it is still difficult (if not impossible) to imagine a situation where a 
Russia-originated public diplomacy initiative can be precisely focused only 
on those high-profile decision-makers and decision-shapers, without 
attempting to capture attention of ordinary public. For example, a 
distinguishing analytical line can hardly be found between the Russian 
version of public diplomacy and the so-called гуманитарное 
сотрудничество (humanitarian cooperation), which, according to Klyueva 
and Mikhaylova (2017), has plenty to do with the protection of the interests 
of peripheral compatriots living abroad as well as their consolidation into a 
united community and establishing partnerships with the imperial centre on 
culture, education and science. Considering the region in focus, as argued by 
Saari (2014, 57-58), the Russian policy “stands on four pillars”, namely 
media policies, NGO diplomacy, political involvement, and cultural 
diplomacy. All of these pillars are seen ‘living’ within the previously 
specified elements of public diplomacy, and this fact assists in bringing the 
Russian Federation’s conceptual understanding of the phenomenon’s 
classification closer to what Cull offered in 2008. In any case, as Glebov 
(2018) noted, public diplomacy, be it of Russia or any other actor, represents 
a powerful tool placed under foreign policy’s strategic communications 
scope, where it stands along with public relations and information 
operations.  
 
3.1. Who is the Estonian Russian speaker?  
 
Out of Estonia’s total population of 1,328,976 people (‘Population 
figure’ 2020), the country’s Russian-speaking communities are diverse. The 
profile of these communities in each case is determined by different waves 
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and kinds of migration (deportations and directed migration of labour force 
included), generational shifts, geographic areas, professional background 
and many other factors (Kirch and Tuisk 2015). On the side of intra-societal 
communication, since the mathematics insist that about 85 per cent of the 
country’s population are Estonian citizens, it can only mean that any 
representative of this societal cluster has the Estonian language proficiency 
to be at the B1 level at least (‘Examinations and Tests’ 2021).             
 
Considering the above, when it comes to an attempt to communicate 
with Estonian ‘Russian speakers’ (especially, when this vaguely determined 
group is to be virtually placed in the same ‘basket’ with Estonia-based 
Russian citizens), there can be a problem of misidentification of whom a 
message should be directed to. Ideally, from the scientific perspective, these 
people would never be analytically ‘unified’ into one group – they belong to 
different ethnicities, hold different citizenships and have different levels (if 
any) of socio-political association with the Russian Federation. Moreover, 
their attitude to Russia may vary from extreme glorification to extreme 
antagonism, and they can hardly be precisely counted even in such a 
relatively small society as of the Republic of Estonia. Nevertheless, as noted 
by Klyueva and Mikhaylova (2017, 130), when it related to the Russian 
Federation’s foreign policy, “[t]he strategic use of the Russian language and 
culture […] aims to foster pro-Russian sentiments among the Russian-
speaking communities, Russian Diasporas and compatriots living abroad.” 
In a significant addition that still does not quite clarify the differences 
existing between these three societal groups, the same scholars argued that 
the notion of a “compatriot would then extend to many generations of 
individuals with Russian ancestry, including those defined above as the 
Diaspora, who may not or no longer identify as Russian and whose 
connection to the Russian language and culture is potentially conflicted” 
(Klyueva and Mikhaylova 2017, 131).  
 
Therefore, this article understands Estonia’s Russian-speaking 
communities as being intentionally generalised by Russia into a single quasi-
group for the purpose of strategic communication. On the Estonian side, 
however, as KaPo (2012, 5) noted, Russia-originated compatriots policy 
makers understand that the fact of “[t]reating Russian-speaking diaspora as 
compatriots who are loyal to Russia” and the fact that “Estonia’s wish to 
integrate its Russian-speaking population into the Estonian society” 
represent “competing concepts.” The main security concern for Estonia here 
is about constraints-imposing activity – “[t]he success of Russia’s 
compatriots policy is dependent on the segregation of the Russian-speaking 
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population within its country of residence” (KaPo 2012, 5-6). As argued by 
Miskimmon et al. (2013, 256), “[i]t is imperative for foreign policy makers 
to try to persuade their international rivals of the validity of their narrative”, 
therefore “the era of communication power opens up opportunities for 
practitioners of public diplomacy to reach beyond elite circles and reach 
overseas publics.” Thus, let us now see how Russia communicates with the 
Estonian society.  
 
3.2. Advocacy, or “Друзья […], прекрасен наш союз!” [“Friends, 
beautiful is our union!”]  
  
Advocacy, as an element of public diplomacy, is analytically blurry 
and, thus, it is not an easy task to measure its direct effectiveness. Cull (2009, 
18-19) defines it as “an actor’s attempt to manage the international 
environment by undertaking an international communication activity to 
actively promote a particular policy, idea or that actor’s general interests in 
the minds of a foreign public.” Advocacy can be considered an integral part 
of the communicational process, because, as a rule, it can hardly be found as 
‘working alone’. Instead, it is usually integrated into every other element of 
public diplomacy (especially when it comes to international broadcasting) 
and informs different types of monologues on myriads of topics.  
 
As for Russia on a concrete example of advocacy in Estonia, KaPo 
(2018, 8) detected, it “approved its new migration policy doctrine”, but its 
“State Programme for Voluntary Resettlement in Russia has not proved 
popular in Estonia” and “[t]he Kremlin’s attempts to boost its attractiveness 
have failed.” the Estonian society was advised by KaPo (2018, 8) that the 
advocated programme, among other things, intended “to extend the legal 
consequences of the Kremlin’s policy of division to the inhabitants of the 
formerly Soviet-occupied Baltic[s].” However, as noted by KaPo, since 
“such efforts by the Kremlin have not met with much success over the past 
few decades, it is in its interest to keep using a vague concept of Russian 
compatriots to justify its interference in the internal affairs of other 
countries.” However, even the Russian Ambassador to Estonia, Alexander 
Petrov, commented that Estonian Russians almost are not interested in 
resettlement – in 2018, there were only 17 people who expressed interest, 
but there is some noticeable interest in applying for Russian citizenship, with 
“more than 500 residents of Estonia hav[ing] received Russian citizenship” 
in 2019 (‘Russians in Estonia not very interested in resettling, ambassador 
admits’ 2019). Another example of advocacy, as argued by KaPo (2016, 10), 
was on “using alternative interpretations of World War II in an increasingly 
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aggressive manner” when “[t]he Immortal Regiment parade held in Tallinn 
on 9 May 2016 showed that revanchism and the display of provocative 
symbols are more important than celebrating the anniversary of the end of 
the war and commemorating fallen soldiers.” What is the system in place for 
advocating such programmes?  
 
Even though conventional cabinet diplomacy may not pay in 
attractiveness, unable to deliver into masses and is restricted to a circle of 
finely groomed professional diplomats, evidently, the initial steps to 
communicate with the Estonian society ‘on the ground’ are arranged to be 
made by the Embassy. After all, the Coordination Council of Russian 
Compatriots (CCRC), which is an umbrella organisation for Estonian non-
governmental establishments that are interlinked with the Russian 
compatriot policy, “act[s] under the guidance of the Russian [E]mbassy” 
(KaPo 2013, 5) and the Embassy “have a decisive say in who belongs” to the 
CCRC (KaPo 2012, 6). In one of its more recent reviews, KaPo (2018, 7) 
claimed that the CCRC had “no real representative function or direct ties 
with local minorities”, being essentially “a virtual non-entity.” The Russian 
Federation uses diplomatic missions in its immediate ‘near abroad,” 
assigning them with tasks of running the CCRC’s annual events, 
coordinating the agenda of an extensive network of institutions 
implementing policy abroad (Bulakh et al., 2014, 38). Indirectly supporting 
imperial paradigm, KaPo (2015, 6) suggests that “the near abroad” policy is 
based on “the idea that a good neighbour is a controlled neighbour”, which 
is distinctly imperial in its geo-strategic nature.  
 
Structurally, the CCRC is tied in a solid power hierarchy, while 
administering movement of people whom Russia treats as compatriots. The 
first level of engagement comes in civic organisations of host countries, 
further expanding to national coordination councils. Davydova-Minguet 
(2018) specified that the upper level of the structure is called World 
Coordination Council. Advocacy-wise, the CCRC is notorious in Estonia. 
As Kallas (2016, 10) argued, the movement’s establishment in Estonia in 
2007 was a reflection on “a gap [existing] between [Moscow’s] political 
ambitions and the realities of the compatriot movements on the ground”, but 
the “movement was […] paralysed by a series of rivalries, favouritism and 
corruption scandals almost from its inception.” The blunders in the work of 
the local branch were spotted to be crucial. KaPo (2013, 6) reported that 
“[c]orruption is common given the lack of transparency in the financing of 
the Russian compatriot policy”, because “[t]here is no shortage of interested 
parties who would like to access a piece of the Russian national budget.” The 
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observational process introduced the KaPo to “the jargon of Russian 
officials” that was referring to either распил (“the slicing-up”) or откат 
(“kickback”). If the former is relatively self-explanatory, the latter is related 
to the fact that “money is always limited, but the number of people looking 
for an easy income from the funds is always high” – therefore, “a patron must 
be found from among the officials in Moscow”, and, in return for approving 
the allocation of the funds the patron receives some money back (KaPo 2013, 
6).  
 
In April 2011, RT reported about Russia’s plans to establish a fund to 
protect Russian compatriots abroad and quoted the then President Dmitri 
Medvedev stressing that “protecting the rights and interests of Russians 
living abroad would remain a priority for Moscow.” Later, the Fund for the 
Legal Protection and Support of Russian Federation Compatriots Living 
Abroad was created, and its aim was to preclude what was perceived as 
offences against the rights of the Estonian Republic’s multi-faceted minority 
of Russian-speakers or Russian citizens living in the country. More 
specifically, as KaPo (2012, 6) detected, Konstantin Kosachev, a high-
profile Russian politician who is currently Deputy Chairperson of the 
Federation Council where he also chairs the body’s Foreign Affairs 
Committee, declared that “Russian compatriots could develop into the main 
link between Russia and the local civil society and elites”, shifting “from the 
consolidation stage over to the stage in which they legitimise themselves as 
influential civil society players who play a role in local power structures and 
decision-making.” The same KaPo’s review (2012, 7) singled out some of 
the Fund for the Legal Protection’s activities – for example, it decided to 
issue “financial support to the Estonian resident Anton Gruzdev so that he 
could compensate the material damages that he caused in Jõhvi in 2007 in 
the course of mass unrest.” Furthermore, the organisation financed the 
participation of activists of Мир без нацизма (World without Nazism) on 
OSCE-organised conferences (KaPo 2012, 7).  
 
2.2. Who do you listen to…in exchange?   
   
In a similar fashion as with advocacy, listening is no less vague in terms 
of its measurability, but its importance for public diplomacy can hardly be 
underestimated – it deals with collecting opinion of the public in focus. For 
Cull (2009, 18), this part of public diplomacy represents “an actor’s attempt 
to manage the international environment by collecting and collating data 
about publics and their opinions overseas and using that data to redirect its 
policy or its wider public diplomacy approach accordingly.” Moreover, as 
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Di Martino (2020, 133) argued, it was with the help of listening public 
diplomacy was able to be distinguished from propaganda. Defining exchange 
diplomacy, Cull (2009, 19) talked about an actor’s “attempt to manage the 
international environment by sending its citizens overseas and reciprocally 
accepting citizens from overseas.”  
 
In the context of Russia’s communication with the Estonian society, 
there is not much of an ‘overseas’ factor in place; instead, there is a strong 
evidence that the listening is tightly interlinked with the exchange diplomacy 
– the latter simply represents a means to achieve perfection of the former. 
Who does the Russian Federation listen to in Estonia, and, considering the 
context, how does it do it? KaPo (2013, 14) maintains the argument that 
“[t]he main strategic target of Russian military intelligence is NATO, the 
political and military planning of the alliance, its classified information, and 
the people who can access that information.” As reported (KaPo 2019/20, 
25), in the last decade, “20 people have been convicted of criminal offenses 
related to intelligence activities against Estonia”, including “traitors and 
those who have simply worked for the Russian special services against 
Estonia.” Those people represented the first and the smallest group to whom 
the Russian side was listening.  
 
The second group of people are associated with the eastern fringe of 
Estonia, more specifically – the City of Narva, a border town where both the 
EU and NATO end their geographic presence. Intriguingly, Ivangorod, a 
Russian town on the other side of the border, used to be known as Jaanilinn, 
being an internationally recognised part of Estonia until 1944, when it was 
‘attached’ to Russia during the second Soviet occupation of the country. 
Narva is Estonia’s third most populous city of 58,610 residents, but it also 
has disbalanced ethnic and citizenship compositions (‘Narva in digits’ 2018). 
On 1 January 2018, ethnicity-wise, Narva hosted 48,535 ethnic Russians (83 
per cent), 2,114 Estonians (4 per cent), and 1,393 Ukrainians (2 per cent). At 
the same time, citizenship-wise, 27,951of Narva residents hold Estonian 
passports (48 per cent), while 21,134 of them are Russian citizens (36 per 
cent). Even though Estonian political elites tend to downscale the issue, 
addressing it in a very mild manner – for example, President Kersti Kaljulaid 
(2018) once noted that “Narva is of course very special, but it is an average 
Estonian city in the best sense of the word” – but this particular locality is 
where the Kremlin is very active on listening and exchange. As KaPo 
reported (2016, 8), at the Russian State Duma elections, a high-profile 
Russian politician Konstantin Zatulin “from the distant city of Sochi set up 
his candidacy in a minor electoral district, and visited the Estonian town of 
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Narva during his campaign”, stating “in connection with his Estonian visit 
that it was common practice in Estonia to repress representatives of the 
Russian-speaking community, that Estonia maintains a Russophobic stance 
in its internal and foreign policies, and has discontinued the broadcasting of 
Russian TV channels at the national level – all false statements that suit the 
Kremlin.” The same review (KaPo 2016, 11) had a picture of the Mayor of 
Narva signing a friendship agreement in Kingissepp (formerly Yamburg, a 
town in the Leningrad Oblast, about 20 km east of Narva), and a 
representative of the Russian town was wearing the controversial ribbon of 
Saint George during the ceremony.   
 
The third group is much broader, and the observed methodology on 
listening to them is more sophisticated, often being interlinked with the other 
public diplomacy mechanisms. It is youth.  KaPo (2017) marked several new 
formats to introduce youth to a broader compatriot movement: in 2017, the 
World Games of Young Compatriots were held (initially launched in 2015 
as a common undertaking of the Ministry of Sport, Ministry of Education 
and Rossotrudnichestvo, held in Kazan, Tatarstan), the 3rd World Youth 
Forum of Russian Compatriots ‘Destiny of Russia: Yesterday, Today and 
Tomorrow’ (held in Sofia, Bulgaria), and 19th World Festival of Youth and 
Students (held in Sochi). All these events were meant to serve patriotic 
(Russian) upbringing, consolidation of foreign youth and teaching or, at 
least, introducing the ‘correct’ language, culture and history. Considering the 
reception of these messages, the numbers of attendees were modest. In 2019, 
an event organised in Bulgaria, managed to gather only 130 participants and 
it became the largest of its kind in history (‘Fifth World Youth Forum of 
Russian Compatriots Opens in Sofia’ 2019). Moreover, there were two youth 
forums, BaltFest and My Baltics which took place in 2017 in Estonia. Both 
were organised by peer efforts from the Russkiy Mir Foundation and the 
Russian Embassy in Tallinn. BaltFest managed to gather 40 youngsters 
(KaPo 2018). Russia’s urge to foster Russia-related youth living in foreign 
countries was implemented in 2013 by inviting them to athlete camp ‘Soyuz’ 
devoted to the Soviet Union’s victory in WWII. The event was attended by 
schoolchildren from one of Maardu schools (KaPo 2013).  
 
2.3. Cultural diplomacy à la Russe 
 
Cull (2009, 19) gives yet another classic definition, treating cultural 
diplomacy as “an actor’s attempt to manage the international environment 
through making its cultural resources and achievements known overseas 
and/or facilitating cultural transmission abroad.” Language and culture are 
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strategic assets for states, thus some of them create cultural institutions, such 
as the British Council, King Sejong Foundation, Goethe Institute and 
Confucius Institute to project their messages globally. Russia established its 
own analogue of such organisations to promote the Russian language studies, 
the Pushkin Institute. 
Klyeva and Mikhaylova (2017, 128) acknowledge that “culture as an 
axis of propaganda has long been an essential component of the Soviet 
information efforts,” but they argue that Russia’s approach is to treat the 
phenomenon of cultural diplomacy as humanitarian cooperation 
(гуманитарное сотрудничество). Remarkably, this element of public 
diplomacy enjoys plenty of normative ‘attention’. As argued (Klyeva and 
Mikhaylova 2017, 129), there are three main normative documents on the 
subject: the Cultural Diplomacy Conception (2010), the Russian Foreign 
Policy Doctrine (2013), and the Charter of the Federal Agency for the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and 
International Humanitarian Cooperation (2008).  
Arguably, today’s Russia builds its cultural diplomacy as a prototype 
of the Soviet one (Terry 2018, 29). Often this idea is proven with Russia’s 
revitalisation of Soviet-made institutions, referring to Rossotrudnichestvo 
together with its cultural policy. Language and culture became intertwined 
with the Russian identity (Klyeva and Mikhaylova 2017). Another powerful 
source is religion and ‘spirituality,” which is ‘managed’ by the Russian 
Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (the latter was revived by 
Joseph Stalin in 1943). Since 1991, the Estonian context was always on the 
strategic radar of the Russian Orthodox Church – Patriarch Alexy II who was 
in charge of the Patriarchate from 1990 until 2008, was born in Tallinn, a 
little more than a decade before Estonia was occupied by the USSR. Terry 
(2018, 42) argued that, due to the close cooperation between President Putin 
and the Church, the latter became yet another state institution dealing with 
foreign relations, being institutionalised as a special body responsible for the 
cultural side of public diplomacy and cooperation with outer public.  
Indeed, Russian cultural diplomacy is a business of many: there are 
overlapped competences between the country’s Ministry of Culture and 
Education, Rossotrudnishestvo, Foreign Ministry, and the Russkiy Mir 
Foundation. In the former Soviet Union, however, there was a more distinct 
structure designed for the process. Thus, Russian Association for 
International Cooperation (RAIC or, sometimes, RAMS) was established to 
coordinate the work of non-governmental organisations within the scope of 
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Russian public diplomacy in the near abroad and in the West. These days, as 
per Klyeva and Tsetsura (2015), RAIC/RAMS consists of 96 public 
organisations among which are Russia-Germany Society, Russia-Japan 
Society, Society of Russian-Chinese Friendship, Society of Russian-
Armenian Friendship, Association of Friends of France and some other 
establishments.   
The Russkiy Mir Foundation as a strategic agency was established by 
President Putin on 21 June 2007, and its work was declared to be devoted to 
“promoting the Russian language as Russia’s national heritage and a 
significant aspect of Russian and world culture, and supporting Russian 
language teaching programs abroad” (‘Decree of the President of the Russian 
Federation on the establishment of the Russkiy Mir Foundation’ 2007). It is 
a well spread organisation, which has 49 centres around the world, including 
in Estonia (‘Russian Centers of the Russkiy Mir Foundation’ 2020). As Terry 
(2018) articulated in her report, the Foundation was rather more politically 
biased and pressurised for more language right for the society in Ukraine 
than, for example, in Germany. Vyacheslav Nikonov, one of the top state-
level Russian strategists and the grandson of Vyacheslav Molotov, is the 
organisation’s Chairman of the Management Board. This fact in itself 
underscores the significance of cultural dimension in the whole scheme of 
Russia’s strategic communication-building practices.  
When it comes to the Russkiy Mir Foundation in Estonia, it appears that 
the Pushkin Institute is the full executant acting in its name. Positioning itself 
as an “educational, licensed institution of the Republic of Estonia,” Pushkin 
Institute (2020) notes that its local Russian centre enables it to act in multiple 
roles: informational, educational (Russian language study materials), 
creative (provides many opportunities to create cultural content), and 
communicative (formation of communication patterns). Since 2005, the 
Russian Language School has been operating at the Pushkin Institute, where, 
according to a special program, children are taught Russian language and 
literature, culture and history of Russia (Pushkin Institute 2020). Some of the 
formats arranged or co-arranged by the Pushkin Institute represent security 
concerns for Estonia. For example, KaPo (2018, 8) reported about a “joint 
programme of the Russian Embassy in Estonia and the local Pushkin 
Institute,” which “offers young people living in Estonia the opportunity to 
study at Russian universities and is financed by Rossotrudnichestvo,” 
“designed specifically for Russian-speaking young people living in 
expatriate communities and seen by the Kremlin as future carriers and 
promoters of the idea of the ‘Russian World’ in their home countries.” 
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Another important organisation that is directly involved in Russian 
culture promotional activities is the Russian Cultural Centre (Vene 
Kultuurikeskus) in Tallinn. In 2001, the Center was transferred under the 
authority of the Mayor of Tallinn and became a municipal enterprise (‘О 
Центре русской культуры’ 2020). Objectively, this particular institution, 
can hardly be treated as being or gradually becoming directly associated with 
Russian public diplomacy. Structurally and content-wise, it appears to be 
searching for its own niche in the Estonian cultural space. The Centre’s 
activities revolve around classical theatrical performances as well as festival 
hosting and arranging, and the organisation visibly appears to be striving to 
represent the Russian culture of Estonia. Despite culture and language being 
named as strong anchors by Klyeva and Mikhaylova (2017), Kallas (2016) 
argues that Estonian Russians have already generated their territorial 
identification, naming Estonia their homeland. The younger generation 
raised in Nordic culture, may particularly dissociate from the Russian society 
since they do not know life there. For some, the identity may be described as 
‘in between’ (Parshukov 2017, 39), neither purely Russian nor Estonian.  
2.4. International broadcasting 
As an integral element of public diplomacy, international broadcasting 
can be characterised as a method of communication, which enables 
translation of national soft power imperatives to foreign publics with the help 
of communication technologies. In other words, according to Cull (2009, 
21), the phenomenon reflects a situation when an actor attempts to manage 
“the international environment by using the technologies of radio, television 
and Internet to engage with foreign publics.” In addition, Ryzhova (2019, 
15), while focusing on RT in the context of strategic narratives found in the 
Russian news media portrayal of Sweden, argued that, because of its tangible 
gains, some countries tend to prioritise international broadcasting over other 
ones.  
Possibly, one of the most noticeable examples when international 
broadcasting was used by Russia in the Estonian context can be traced from 
2011. As KaPo reported (2012, 9), “[w]ell before the official results of the 
[population] census became available, the news portals regnum.ru and 
newspb.ru tried to gain the upper hand by writing about census results that 
supposedly indicated that the Estonian population was dying out.” Since 
those news items did not generate any social turbulence in Estonia, one of 
the top-TV channels in the Russian Federation (Rossiya/Россия) “made a 
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news story on the census” which was authored by Jekaterina Zorina, “who 
became well known in Estonia thanks to her unique take on the events that 
took place in Estonia in April 2007” (KaPo 2012, 9). Two years later, KaPo 
felt obliged to notify Estonia that the situation was to get more serious. In its 
review, KaPo (2014, 8) reported on “the establishment of the Russian state 
information agency Rossiya Segodnya (Russia Today) in 2013” and that it 
“was preceded by the launch of the English-language TV channel RT […], 
part of the information agency Rossiya Segodnya”; immediately after there 
was a note about “[a] new project […], the multimedia channel Sputnik” that, 
as argued, “has the ambition of broadcasting multimedia content through 
radio stations, websites and press centres in 34 languages, including 
Estonian.” 
Simons (2018, 208) argued that media is at the forefront of an 
information war that is taking place between Russia and the political West. 
Russia strictly controls media climate domestically, but it also managed to 
build and promote the concept of RT, with its extensive apparatus and global 
outreach, with an auditorium of about 700 million people that ‘consume’ pro-
Kremlin narratives (Shukhova 2015, 74). In the ‘far abroad’ (дальнее 
зарубежье), it evidently hits two goals: it acquaints the people of a foreign 
country with Russia’s position on world affairs, reflecting advocacy element 
and gaining attention as a short-term goal; and traps people with catchy 
airing (using conspiracy theories), which further sway perceptions of 
audience.  
In Estonia, media market has been traditionally liberal and market-
oriented, which paved the way for Russian TV networks through a cable or 
satellite connection. However, the background in which Russia operates with 
its outreach is important, since Estonians and non-Estonians often ‘live’ in 
different information spaces, often with contrasting content (Bulakh et. al. 
2014, 51). Estonians, whose language of daily communication is Estonian, 
are prone to use Estonian language and English-language media, trust 
Estonian Public Broadcasting (ERR), Estonian language TV channels and 
online news reporters (‘Monitoring Integration in Estonia’ 2017). However, 
there is an ambivalent situation concerning the use of media by Russian 
speakers, and this factor has been extensively exploited by Russia. KaPo 
(2014, 9), while describing the process of launching the Baltnews media 
brand in the Baltics, noted that the project was “funded by Rossiya 
Segodnya” and that the baltnews.ee website would be “led in Estonia by 
Aleksandr Kornilov, a member of the local Coordination Council of Russian 
Compatriots and head of the propaganda portal baltija.eu.” Later on, the story 
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became even more compelling as KaPo (2016, 9) specified that “[t]he 
activities of the Baltnews propaganda portals […] are coordinated by several 
employees of Rossiya Segodnya” who “effectively manage the work of the 
entire portal and the topics it covers,” with the same Alexandr Kornilov 
receiving “transfers of 11,400 euros every month from tax-free companies.” 
In a significant addition, as detected, “[t]he aforementioned coordinators also 
regularly communicate recommended topics to the offices of Sputnik, the 
official sub-division of Rossiya Segodnya”, and the latter “obliges the 
Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Baltnews portals to cooperate with the 
Sputnik offices and to support and repeat the news they publish” (KaPo 
2016, 9). On the Estonian side, the Russian-language Estonian channel 
ETV+ was launched in 2015, and this case deserves a separate study in the 
context of Russian public diplomacy. Apart from that, the country’s major 
media sources – Postimees and Delfi – provide for both Estonian and Russian 
language-based editorial teams, and this factor is often reflected in different 
contents produced by the two different editors in each case. When it comes 
to radio stations focused on Estonian Russians, it is worth mentioning Raadio 
4 owned by ERR.  
In a way, all these developments assisted the field in the process of 
collecting plenty of unique data on how the Russian Federation is 
channelling through its strategic messages to Estonia and its society. 
Evidently, Russia, when it comes to Estonia, is inclined to engage the whole 
spectrum of public diplomacy-associated mechanisms, since other types of 
communication cannot be used for different reasons. Even though, as KaPo 
argued (2019/20, 20), recently, “the Kremlin’s politics of division was 
dominated by a lack of ideas and resources,” that does not stop the world’s 
largest country from attempting to project its strategic narratives 
internationally and, particularly, to the localities that Russia considers its 
periphery. During the following discussion, an attempt will be made to link 
Russia’s imperial paradigm, main strategic narratives, and communicational 
methods used in the context of Estonia.     
4. Discussion and conclusion
As Roselle et al. (2014, 79) argued, “[t]he challenge – and the promise 
– of studying strategic narratives lies in the conceptual underpinning that
invites the use of multiple methodologies to inform our understanding of
influence in the world today.” This article tackled the argument that the
Russian Federation, while trying to make practical sense out of its imperial
geo-strategic aspirations, endeavours to project its strategic identity, system,
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and issue narratives via public diplomacy-associated modes of 
communication, when it comes to the Estonian society. The imperial 
paradigm brought its centre-periphery linkage to the conceptual framework. 
After all, as Zielonka (2012, 505) argued, “concept of empire is certainly not 
perfect, but […] its use can be quite revealing.” 
Firstly, Russia still treats Estonia as its periphery. Secondly, the world’s 
largest country never denies its intentions to take a decisive part in the global 
geo-strategic redesign, since the Yalta international system has become 
history. Thirdly, on the Estonian side, Russia’s communication with the 
country’s society openly brings myriads of serious security concerns, giving 
the KaPo to reflect on those in the agency’s every single annual review. 
Fourthly, due to the fact that the structural elements of public diplomacy are 
largely defined by the Russian state differently, if comparted to the Western 
school of political science, this article detected a range of obvious 
terminological confusions existing in the field. This is where the 
instrumentarium of strategic narrative theory can be considered analytically 
determinant to link public diplomacy elements in their empirical association 
with strategic identity, system, and issue narratives.  
In general, Russia, as any other major power (not to mention one of the 
four imperial entities of the contemporary), exhibits a formidable range of 
mechanisms when it comes to strategic communication. With Estonia which 
(together with Latvia and Lithuania) arguably represents a special case in the 
context of Russia’s behaviour in what it treats as its periphery, the Russian 
Federation has to adopt a softer approach as compared to Ukraine, for 
example. In the current Russia-Ukraine interactions, the Russian side opted 
to launch a hybrid war (Rácz 2015) to communicate its strategic narratives 
to the Ukrainians. As this article demonstrated, while remaining a powerful 
actor and possessing an astonishing range of possibilities, Russia lacks a 
comprehensive approach in linking its public diplomacy mechanisms with 
what it attempts to project as the country’s strategic narratives.  
Remarkably, both listening and exchange diplomacy (these two 
elements are detected as being closely intertwined in the context of Russia’s 
communication with the Estonian society) as well as international 
broadcasting are not engaged in solidifying the Russian Federation’s 
strategic identity narrative. However, with its ‘combo’ of listening and 
exchange practices, Russia strives for achieving a common-for-theory goal, 
which is “to see public diplomacy responding to shifts in international 
opinion” (Cull 2009, 18). In this communicational framework, the Kremlin 
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is evidently combining the ‘near abroad’ strategic theme with how Russia 
would like to interact with the United States. In his widely cited Munich 
Speech, President Putin (2007) expressed his dissatisfaction with how 
NATO (understanding this organisation as something that almost entirely 
depends on the USA and its position) managed to be enlarged right through 
to Russia’s borders: 
It turns out that NATO has put its frontline forces on our borders, and 
we continue to strictly fulfil the treaty obligations and do not react to 
these actions at all. I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not 
have any relation with the modernisation of the Alliance itself or with 
ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious 
provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. 
Therefore, since the idea is about “convincing others and consider changing 
course themselves” (Miskimmon et. al. 2013, 143), Russia’s special attention 
to Narva and particular exchange practices (be it arranged in Russia or 
elsewhere) are indeed about one of the most stable strategic narratives of 
Russia that does not seem to be disappearing any time soon – the country’s 
geo-strategic discomfort with the fact that the Baltics joined the EU and, 
especially, NATO without asking for Russia’s permission.     
Advocacy, which has a distinct ‘active’ self-promoting connotation, is 
ignored in the process of effective projecting Russia’s policy narratives – 
instead, the Russian side is predominantly using listening that is ‘passive’. 
Nevertheless, Russia’s advocacy activities in Estonia are directly linked with 
a particular theme, out of which the Kremlin is formulating and projecting 
its policy narratives on the peripheral ‘near abroad’. This theme was clearly 
voiced by Putin (2012) when he was about to start his third presidential term: 
We are determined to ensure that Latvian and Estonian authorities 
follow the numerous recommendations of reputable international 
organisations on observing generally accepted rights of ethnic 
minorities. We cannot tolerate the shameful status of ‘non-citizen’. 
How can we accept that, due to their status as non-citizens, one in six 
Latvian residents and one in thirteen Estonian residents are denied 
their fundamental political, electoral and socioeconomic rights and the 
ability to freely use Russian? 
This is the situation when the demanding tone of communication helps in 
arguing the case on setting out a particular policy of Russia towards Estonia. 
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In general, Roselle et al. (2014, 76) claimed that this is the case when 
issue/policy narratives are formulated on “why a policy is needed and 
(normatively) desirable, and how it will be successfully implemented or 
accomplished.”  
On cultural diplomacy, since it involves the Russian language 
promotion, it can be easily misinterpreted as being contextualised with 
strategic identity narratives only. However, this part of public diplomacy is 
more sophisticated. When Parker (2010, 127) noted about “[a]n irony of 
arguing for the prominence of empire in geopolitics”, he was trying to make 
a point that “it is so often a form of geopolitics which dares not to speak its 
name.” Putin’s strategy-defining article (2012) proved that point with 
precision:  
Russia has a great cultural heritage, recognised both in the West and 
the East. But we have yet to make a serious investment in our culture 
and its promotion around the world. […] Russia has a chance not only 
to preserve its culture but to use it as a powerful force for progress in 
international markets. The Russian language is spoken in nearly all the 
former Soviet republics and in a significant part of Eastern Europe. 
This is not about empire, but rather cultural progress.  
At the same time, one may argue that Russia’s cultural diplomacy-driven 
communication, while being imperial in nature, supports a particular 
strategic system narrative about the world’s largest country’s place in the 
international system. In a way, the citation above is only a continuation of 
what the Russian President noted in 2007, in Munich: “Russia is a country 
with a history that spans more than a thousand years and has practically 
always used the privilege to carry out an independent foreign policy.” 
Therefore, Russkiy Mir as a concept has never been about identity – it has 
always been about what Russia perceives as a just international system.  
This article, while building a platform for linking the imperial 
paradigm, the theoretical nature of public diplomacy-bound mechanisms and 
strategic narrative theory, aimed to trace multiple dimensions of Russia’s 
communication with Estonia. As a bonus, it can provide for a possibility to 
academically ‘craft’ a message on the effectiveness of Russian public 
diplomacy in the Republic of Estonia. This research exposed numerous cases 
of divisive underground projects and networks featured by speculations, 
weaponised use of funds, corruption, connections of (the core imperial centre 
in) Russia with (peripheral) Estonian political circles – these factors made 
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Russia losing its credibility before the Estonian society in general. Since this 
research brought a more nuanced understanding of the situation, it could be 
a good chance for the two sides to eventually start reconciling the differences 
and move on as partners. If only… 
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DO ATTITUDES TOWARDS RUSSIA MATTER IN THE COURSE 
OF EUROPEANISATION? ANALYSING PERCEPTIONS OF 
YOUTH IN POST-MADAIN UKRAINE 
Abstract 
Ukraine is often perceived as a geopolitical frontier between Russia and Europe, which 
has been equally reflected in the multitude of its identities and political changes. While a 
number of historical events in Ukraine led to different perceptions of Russia, Ukraine 
post-Maidan follows a trend of de-Russification in which the paths of Poland and post-
Soviet Baltic States (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia) serve as an example to follow. This paper 
investigates how Ukrainian decision-makers and, specifically, the younger generation of 
Ukrainians see their future in the context of this shift. The focus is on whether Ukrainians 
see the Ukraine’s course for Europeanisation post-Maidan as a critical juncture and 
whether the relations between Russia and the Baltic States may be paralleled to Ukraine’s 
case.  
The paper explains how the path dependent approach fits perception studies with regard 
to the ideational change, as reflected in public attitudes. The findings of the paper reveal 
the importance of studying the context and dynamics of change during the critical juncture 
and particularly the counterplaying effects of positive and negative feedbacks for 
reinforcing the chosen path. In Ukraine’s case, the change in attitudes towards Russia 
became a result of political processes rather than a deeper ideological change. However, 
some elements of this change appear to be established for a long run, particularly, the 
need for a more realistic approach in dealing with Russia.  
Key words: Ukraine, Russia, Maidan, perceptions, Baltics 
Introduction 
Ukraine is traditionally perceived as a state locked in between Europe 
and Russia in terms of identity, culture as well as geopolitically (D'Anieri, 
2012; Kuzio, 2000). While being a topic of historical research, this issue 
repeats itself in the course of Ukraine’s political debates, prompting the 
recrudescence of local regionalism and internal divisions, closely tied to 
Ukraine’s foreign policy choice (Prizel, 1998).  
Although Ukrainians’ preferences in this sphere have been unstable, 
public attitudes change even more drastically with every political shift in the 
country. Such changes are most visible in the aftermath of Ukraine’s 
‘democratic revolutions’. While Ukrainians appeared to be reconsidering 
Ukraine’s traditional geopolitical ties with Russia after the Orange 
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revolution, the share of Ukrainians who view Russia as a foreign policy 
priority has dropped below its 2000 level in post-Maidan Ukraine:  
  
Figure 1. The results of opinion poll, ‘What foreign policy direction should be prioritised 
for Ukraine?’ (dynamics, 2000–2016) 
 
Source: Razumkov Centre (2012: 73; 2016: 7)  
Notes: Since 2014 these polls exclude Crimea and the territories of Donbas where the 
anti-terrorist (ATO) operation takes place. 
 
Moreover, the attitudes towards Russian authorities worsened even in 
Eastern Ukraine, which has been traditionally viewed as Russia–oriented: 
almost half of respondents in Donbas could not clearly state their opinion 
about Russian authorities (figure 2 below). Despite this may result from 
somewhat cautious attitude among local people in the course of the ongoing 
conflict, and neither these polls include Crimea or those territories of Donbas 
that are beyond the control of the Ukrainian army, these polls still indicate 
an overall change in the attitudes of Ukrainians towards Russia.  
 
Russia’s loss of attractiveness, however, has happened over time (figure 
1). The peaks and drops in its support changed in the course of a number of 
events. Such events as Yeltsin’s military attack on the Russian Parliament in 
1993, the two Russian-Chechnya wars, and the 2008 Russian war with 
Georgia strengthened Ukraine’s overall perception of Russia as of ‘a 
negative ethno-cultural and territorial “other”’ (Kuzio, 2001: 357). 
Meanwhile the Russian-Ukrainian conflict over island Tuzla in 2004, the gas 
wars of 2006 and 2009, and, most importantly, the Crimean crisis and the 
war in Eastern Ukraine paved a rift between the parties. Year 2014 became 
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Ukrainians concerned Russia in positive terms and significantly fewer, 21 
per cent, viewed Russian authorities in such manner. Yet whether this change 
in attitudes is permanent remains a debated issue. 
Figure 2. Ukraine’s public attitude towards Russian authorities, distribution by macro-
regions, %, 2016 
Source: Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), by Paniotto (2016) 
Notes: Excluding Crimea and the ATO territories of Donbas. 
While the decline in Russia’s positive perceptions among Ukrainians 
seemed definite in 2014, already in 2019, more than half of Ukrainians have 
viewed Russia in a more positive manner (figure 3). Therefore, public 
opinion polls are helpful but not accurate in explaining public views about 
international actors. Some polls, such as the one in figure 1, allow a 
comparison of various political actors in terms of their importance to 
Ukraine, yet even these polls do not reveal the reasons behind the change of 
public attitudes, including the possibility that, in Ukraine, attitudes towards 
Russia may be in a counterbalance with those of the European Union (EU).  
Figure 3. The results of opinion poll, ‘How do you feel about Russia in general?’ 
Source: KIIS (2019) 
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While the importance of Russia as a priority direction for Ukraine’s 
foreign policy has been reducing over the years, the opposite has been true 
for the EU. Its support had been steadily growing since 2010 and peaked at 
52.2 per cent in 2014 (figure 1). Moreover, the very Ukrainian crisis that had 
begun with the Maidan revolution and poured into the Donbas War has 
derived from Russia–EU competition in Ukraine (Sabatovych, 2019, Ch5; 
Smith, 2015). Consequently, Russia’s perceptions in Ukraine can be 
explained both by the policies it pursued with Ukraine and its declining 
importance due to Ukraine’s convergence with the EU in the course of 
Europeanisation.   
Europeanisation refers to the processes of constructing common 
European identity (Featherstone, 2003) and/or incorporating European 
norms into domestic political structures of Europeanising states (Cortell & 
Davis Jr, 1996). Such states either follow the path of European integration 
or accept EU norms while remaining outside the EU. Among post–Soviet 
states only Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia became members of the EU, while 
Ukraine joined the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2004 and its 
initiative, Eastern Partnership (EaP), in 2008 without a promise of 
membership.  
After the Maidan revolution and subsequent conflict with Russia, 
Ukraine made a strong political shift by declaring the break with its Soviet 
past, which is closely tied to Russia in post–Maidan political discourse. As 
the president of Ukraine Poroshenko declared in June 2017, Ukraine's 
acquisition of a visa-free regime with the EU was the ‘final’ farewell to the 
‘Russian Empire’, signifying that Ukraine would ‘never return to the Soviet 
Union’ (Poroshenko in Ukraїnska Pravda, 2017).  
Thus, the Maidan revolution symbolised a turning point in Russia–
Ukraine relations, wherein post-Maidan Ukraine sought a quick and definite 
Europeanisation by signing the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement in 2014 
and following the example of those post–communist states that became 
members of the Union. In this context, comparing Ukraine to the Baltic states 
makes sense, because strong anti-Russianism in those countries became a 
driving force behind their pro-Western stances and, as a result, quick 
convergence with the EU straight after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
(Petrovic, 2013: 7). 
This paper investigates how Ukrainians’ attitudes towards Russia have 
changed post Maidan and, specifically, whether these attitudes have become 
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decisive in Ukraine’s Europeanisation course. The objectives of this paper 
are as follows: 
1. To investigate the dynamic of Ukrainian attitudes towards Russia
post Maidan. 
2. To examine whether this change in attitudes has become irreversible
for the Ukraine-Russia relations. 
In order to achieve these objectives, the paper adopts the path 
dependence approach as the theoretical base behind the mechanism of 
institutional change and its reproduction. The paper then draws on the 
methodological challenges of the research. In the third section, the paper 
describes Russia’s perceptions in the context of EU-Ukraine relations. In the 
fourth section, Russia’s image is discussed against the background of 
Ukraine’s cooperation with the Baltic states (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia). 
Finally, this paper concludes by comparing the dynamic of Russia’s 
perceptions in the context of Ukraine’s future Europeanisation.  
Theoretical framework 
This paper offers to use path dependence as the main theoretical 
approach for the case. Traditionally, this school of historical institutionalism 
focuses on significant institutional change, but it may also advance 
perceptions studies by explaining the mechanism of change in public 
attitudes. On the one hand, perceptions tend to be rather stable because 
people do not change their cognitive maps overnight. Yet on the other hand, 
rapid changes in public attitudes — such as those discussed in the 
introduction to this paper — also take place (figures 1-3). This strong — if 
not sudden — change can be explained by the path dependence approach 
and, potentially, by such marker of an institutional change as ideology.  
Similar to a balance achieved between “slow moving” (culture, 
religion) and “fast moving” (political) institutions (Roland, 2004), 
perceptions are formed on the base of ‘slow’ ideological and cultural context 
and are affected by events and processes (Weber, 2010). While ideational 
change represents a key feature of an institutional change in the path-
dependent process (Hogan & Doyle, 2007), the same may explain the causes 
behind the change in public attitudes. Presumably, change in basic values 
and beliefs may produce a paradigm shift, which makes the core of the path 
dependence analysis. Yet when examined on the base of public opinion polls, 
perceptions may point to public reaction towards ongoing political events 
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and processes rather than an actual ideational change. In this context, 
Ukraine’s ‘farewell’ to Russia post Maidan may be explained both either as 
a marker of a deeper ideological change in society or simply as a temporary 
change of attitudes in light of the ongoing political conflict. 
For example, when concerning ‘slow’ cultural context as opposed to the 
events analysis of Ukraine’s perceptions about Russia, we can refer to public 
opinion polls concerning values. In one case, more than 40 per cent of 
Ukrainians considered history and traditions as something common with 
Russia, while associating the rest of values almost equally between Russia 
and ‘the West’ (figure 4). As such, Ukrainian respondents seem to associate 
their country as something between Russia and the West in terms of values. 
In another poll, however, Ukraine was contrasted to Russia. As a result, more 
than half of Ukrainian respondents associated Russia with ‘dictatorship’, 
‘cruelty’, and ‘aggression’; yet a third of them perceived Ukraine in terms of 
‘democracy’, ‘freedom’ and ‘humanity’ (figure 5). While the first poll points 
to that Russia is of a significant importance for a deep, societal level of 
Ukrainian ‘self’-perception, the second poll indicates a change towards 
portraying Russia as a more aggressive ‘other’. The question remaining 
though is how to define whether this deep, ideological change has taken place 
in this case? 
Figure 4. Values that Ukraine presumably shares with Russia (chart to the left) and 
the West (chart to the right), 2014 
Source: retrieved from IFES (2014). Notes: Excluding Crimea and the ATO 
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Figure 5. Results of the opinion poll, ‘What country, Ukraine or Russia, do you 
associate the following terms with in the first place?’ 
Source: Razumkov Centre (2018) 
Notes: Excluding Crimea and the ATO territories of Donbas. 
Path dependence offers several solutions, the key factors behind which 
are focus on the context and dynamics of the change. First, path dependence 
implies that individuals may change the course of history during critical 
junctures (or turning points), when ‘the structural (that is, economic, cultural, 
ideological, organisational) influences’ (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007: 343) 
become weak to the extent that actors can literally change the course of 
history (Mahoney, 2001). The downfall of the Russian empire in 1917 as 
well as the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 are clearly such turning 
points as they have caused radical institutional changes to and from 
communism, setting new developmental paths for Russia and Ukraine 
(Sabatovych, 2019: Ch3). Against these historical events, the Maidan 
revolution is not equally impactful in terms of the scale of the crises and/or 
institutional change; yet it can still be crucial for strengthening the perception 
of Russia as ‘other’ in the context of Ukraine’s choice for Europeanisation. 
Importantly, Ukraine’s focus on Europeanisation and, specifically, 
expressed desire to deliberately adopt European values (democracy, human 
rights, equality, solidarity, etc., as defined in normative power Europe) may 
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However, applying the path dependence framework is still problematic 
due to the lack of consensus over its several concepts. For example, while 
deciding whether a critical juncture represents a sequence of events or is 
dependent on initial conditions, Collier and Collier (2002) conclude that the 
antecedent conditions lead to a crisis, through which a critical juncture 
occurs. Yet they also treat antecedent conditions as ‘a base line’ against 
which the critical juncture and the legacy are assessed’ (30). A similar 
situation concerns legacies, since scholars believe that, on the one hand, old 
legacies partially reproduce themselves in newly established institutions but, 
on the other one, none of them ‘last forever’ (35). This paper attempts at 
addressing these dualities empirically by tracking the sources of change in 
Ukrainian attitudes towards Russia as well as the strength of this change. In 
such a manner, the paper investigates what factors in Ukrainian perceptions 
became the antecedent conditions and how they affected the perceptions of 
Russia post Maidan. 
The ideal model of path dependence implies that by adopting particular 
institutions or policies actors focus on a specific institutional choice, paving 
a mechanism for its reproduction and, later on, self-reproduction (Mahoney, 
2000: 510-511). Meanwhile, other scholars (Pierson, 2000) point to the 
importance of ‘positive feedbacks’ and ‘increasing returns’ for this change, 
meaning that the increasing number of individuals who benefit from this 
change prevents them from reversing the change (255). The latter is echoed 
by the ideas of an institutional ‘lock in’ by prevailing supporters of the choice 
(Page, 2006), or a tipping point, ‘at which the cumulative cause finally passes 
a threshold’ (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007: 351), thus enforcing the 
institutional change. Moreover, in some cases ‘negative feedbacks’, or 
‘negative externalities’ may even reverse the whole set of ‘increasing 
returns’ and bring the institutional system back to pre-‘path-dependent’ 
equilibrium (Page, 2006), while in others it may develop a reactive sequence, 
where ‘each step in the chain is “dependent” on prior steps’ (Mahoney, 2000: 
509). 
In the context of Ukraine’s post-Maidan ideological change this implies 
two scenarios for a change in public attitudes. One implies that the actors 
benefiting from the change will reinforce the choice of European vector as 
the right one for Ukraine and the public will generally accept it. Another 
scenario implies that ‘negative feedbacks’ towards this choice will reverse 
public attitudes towards the pre-Maidan equilibrium. Considering the 
recently observed trend on somewhat ‘warmer’ perceptions of Russia on 
Figure 3, the previous change that seemed definite can be potentially 
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reversed. Furthermore, as the volatile dynamic of public attitudes on Figure 
1 reveals, the second scenario would imply that the post-Maidan change in 
public attitudes may not be path-dependent and even represent a punctuated 





Since this paper aims to investigate a seeming ideational shift in post-
Maidan Ukraine, it applies thematic content analysis of elite interviews in 
dynamic in order to receive a more detailed portrayal of Ukrainian attitudes 
as an explanation to the findings of public opinion polls (figures 1-3). The 
paper also uses narrative analysis within the themes of Ukrainian perceptions 
to point out differences and examples. Such approach overcomes the key 
methodological limitation of public opinion polls — the lack of detail and 
explanatory power. The paper therefore analyses interviews with Ukrainian 
civil society, media, and political elites as primary sources of information.  
 
The first group of interviewees includes twenty representatives of 
political and media elites (in an equal distribution and coded respectfully 
‘Рol’ and ‘Media’), interviewed between November 2016 and March 2017 
in the course of the C3EU project. These were deputies, representatives of 
parliamentary committees and ministries, local councils as well as 
newsmakers (journalists and reporters) of various political affiliations. Most 
interviews took place in Kyiv, with a third of them in Central (Cherkasy) and 
Eastern Ukraine (Kharkiv).  
 
The second primary source of information concerns ten interviews with 
civil society, political and media elites (coded respectfully ‘Youth_cs’, 
‘Youth_p’, and ‘Youth_m’), collected in Kyiv between December 2019 and 
April 2020 in the course of the E-YOUTH project. The selection of 
interviewees for this project also included parliamentarians and news-
makers. However, both projects had different focus, which posed several 
limitations to this paper.  
 
C3EU interviews concerned perceptions of the EU in Ukraine, while E-
YOUTH focused on perceptions of younger Ukrainians about cooperation 
with post-Soviet Baltic states. Therefore, the questionnaires and 
demographic of the interview sets are different. While C3EU had no 
limitations with regard to the age of interviewees, E-YOUTH included only 
young people not older than thirty-three. Moreover, none of the projects 
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focused on Russian perceptions per se. The C3EU questionnaire elaborated 
upon the image of the EU in Ukraine across such themes as international 
roles of the EU, partnership with Ukraine, diplomacy and conflict resolution, 
while the E-YOUTH questionnaire focused on Ukraine’s cooperation with 
the Baltic states in the context of EU-Ukraine relations with a limited number 
of questions devoted to EU-Ukraine cooperation. However, these limitations 
have become advantageous to this paper.  
First, the aim of both projects was to receive the most diverse 
perceptions across various topics. With this purpose, C3EU and E-YOUTH 
questionnaires contain thirty-three and twenty-one open-ended questions 
respectively; each interview lasted in average an hour. As a result, obtained 
data is extremely rich and diverse. Furthermore, the semi-structured 
character of interviews allows a balance between the structure of responses 
and the freedom of respondents to talk about the topics that they found most 
important to them. Consequently, responses contain a number of explicit 
elaborations upon Russia.  
Finally, the different focuses of interview datasets further assisted the 
research purposes of this paper. Although the below analysis does not cover 
opinion of a broader public, the target group of interviewees –political and 
media elites – are making political choices about Russia and/or present them 
to the public. Furthermore, the three-year gap between interviews provides a 
glimpse into the dynamic of Ukrainian attitudes towards Russia. Finally, the 
E-YOUTH dataset focuses specifically on youth perceptions and allows a
speculation about the future of Ukrainian perceptions.
For this reason, the logical fashion of the paper presents elite attitudes 
in two blocks: the first one describes the image of Russia in relation to the 
EU, while the second one reveals the parallels between Ukraine and the 
Baltic states, as perceived by Ukrainian elites. In both cases, the coding 
categories included “Russia,” “Soviet,” “the USSR,” and their derivative 
words concerning Ukraine’s official approach towards retreat from the 
Russian imperial and Soviet past. 
A Turning Point, Conflict and the EU. The Main Themes of Russia’s 
Images in the Context of EU-Ukraine Cooperation, 2016-2017. 
Considering the key role of Russia in the Crimean crisis and the ongoing 
conflict with Ukraine, the dominant theme in the perceptions of the 
Ukrainian elites is the conflict (Media6) itself. Russia is described as an 
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‘initiator’ of the conflict, an ‘actual aggressor’ (Pol6, Pol5), or an ‘enemy’ 
(Media3, Media9, Pol1). While Ukrainian elites name Russia one of the key 
international players for Ukraine on par with the EU and the U.S. (Media1, 
Pol4, Pol5, Pol10), Russian presence is somewhat ‘regretful’ (Media8) due 
to its military engagement (Media9). Meanwhile, the EU, which is seen in 
positive light, is not ‘equal’ to such ‘super powers’ as the U.S. or Russia 
(Media1, Media9), and this theme of contrast — between Russia and Ukraine 
as well as Russia and the EU post Maidan — is the key theme in this group 
of interviews.  
The Maidan revolution as a turning point in the Ukraine-Russia relations 
Although Ukrainian elites do not share a unanimous view on the 
Maidan revolution, they believe that post-Maidan Ukraine has changed 
Ukrainian attitudes towards Russia. They clearly see this period as a turning 
point in Ukraine-Russia relations, or a critical juncture for Ukraine’s self-
identification as a European state. Some interviewees claim that the very 
‘theme of the revolution was to change the course to European integration’ 
(Pol7) and that Russia’s aggressive response was to ‘the prospect’ of 
Ukraine’s membership in the EU (Pol3). Others do not see the Maidan 
revolution as ‘a geopolitical event’, but claim it was Russia that ‘took it 
[Maidan] as opposition to itself’ (Pol8). Nevertheless, all stress that the 
period of ‘multiple vectors has ended’ (Media10), and Ukraine’s movement 
to the EU ‘has no alternative’ (Pol8). This idea implies the irreversibility of 
the ongoing change; yet it is explained differently by different interviewees 
and not all of these explanations point to the irreversibility of the change. 
While some respondents consider Ukraine’s definite break with Russia as a 
‘fortunate’ event (Media10), others treat it is a rational outcome: 
‘[…] there isn’t any alternative for Ukraine’ in terms of new alliances, 
as ‘the Russian vector is closed for a long time, the perspective with the 
European / Atlantic military constituent is extremely vague, and the EU 
remains the only possible way’ (Media2). 
Furthermore, when regarding the agency behind the change, it is Russia 
and its aggression (Pol5) rather than Ukraine that is seen as the cause behind 
it: 
Before the Euromaidan […] one third [of Ukrainians] saw their future 
together with Russia, another third of the respondents saw it together 
with the EU, and the rest couldn’t decide […] But nowadays, two thirds 
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of Ukrainians see their future only within the European model. And the 
theme of the Russian World, of the union with Russia, after the war has 
disappeared. […] The war has radically changed everything […] those 
Ukrainians who strive (to have their future together with Russia) […] 
are not well-informed […] and at present they are not thinking about 
joining anything connected with Russia or the Russian World. (Pol4) 
This observation refers to the public opinion polls that indicated 
regional distribution of attitudes towards Russian authorities (Figure 2) and 
is shared by a number of interviewees, who claim that the trend of pro-
European attitudes is ‘intensifying’ and ‘the expansion of Europeanness […] 
goes to Eastern Ukraine’, despite the latter is believed to ‘live under the 
pressure of Russian propaganda’ (Pol7). As a result, interviewees claim that 
‘the “Russian world” has practically vanished for Ukrainians’ (Pol4), 
Ukraine is ‘pushing away from Russia’ (Media4), and the EU is even 
perceived as ‘a true version of what the Soviet Union actually declared’ 
(Pol4).  
This narrative serves as a proper introduction into how Russia and the 
Soviet past are contrasted to the EU and European future in the minds of 
Ukrainian elites. Yet it is also unclear whether this radical change in attitudes 
came as a response to events and policies (as the interviews claim) or became 
a result of a thoughtful choice in favour of the EU as a new ideological vector 
to orient to. What remains present in these interviews is that Russia is 
perceived as the opposite of the EU in terms of identity and values, and 
whether this view refers specifically to Russia’s politics post Maidan or ‘the 
Russian world’ in general depends on the interviewees’ interpretation.  
Russia as the antipode of the EU 
According to the majority of Ukrainian respondents, the Russian image 
is ‘antagonistic’ to that of the EU (Pol6, Media4, Pol1, Pol2, Pol7, Pol8, 
Pol10) and ‘an absolute antipode’ of it (Pol4). The two actors ‘differ in 
values, politics, and freedom’ (Pol10) and are ‘like two poles in the minds of 
Ukrainians’ (Pol6). While Russia is ‘a… forced neighbourhood’, the EU is 
‘a desired neighbour’ (Media4). Considering these differences, European 
integration represents ‘a possibility […] to withdraw from Russia’s influence 
and to change the vector [of foreign policy] radically’ (Pol6).  
Such a positive image of the EU arises from the idea that the EU may 
support Ukraine’s institutional transformation (Pol4) with regard to both 
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‘economic standards and standards in rights and freedoms’ (Pol6). It is ‘the 
most attractive model for Ukrainians’ (Pol4), ‘the benchmark […] to follow’ 
(Pol6), and its image ‘is just improving’ with time (Pol2). By contrast, Russia 
is associated ‘with the former Soviet Union, with violation of human rights’ 
(Pol3) and ‘a [governance] model built on humiliation’ (Pol8). According to 
Ukrainian elites, ‘Russia […] tramples all European values’ (Media9), and 
despite the fact that Ukraine is also believed to share some ‘rudiments of the 
Soviet era’, such as ‘I am the State’ attitude (Media9) or the lack of equality 
(Pol5), it is the process of Europeanisation through which Ukrainian elites 
see Ukraine as different from Russia.  
According to the interviewees, Ukraine and Russia have become ‘two 
completely different societies’ (Pol3) not only in terms of ‘legislation’ but 
also mentally, as ‘a political Ukrainian is more freedom-loving’ (Pol3). 
Another interviewee states, ‘we have hostile, antagonistic, totally 
incompatible systems now in Ukraine and Russia’ (Pol4). 
Importantly, Ukrainian elites view Europeanisation and the EU’s public 
diplomacy as the source of the change in Ukraine’s political institutions and 
values (Pol3). In this regard, ‘the [generational] gap in the world outlook’ is 
something that Ukraine faces with regard to EU values (Pol9), because the 
older generation was ‘brought up in the totalitarian Soviet regime’ (Pol3). 
While this view describes Ukrainian youth as EU-oriented, it also points to 
how the anti-Russian mood may reinforce and sustain, similarly to the 
mechanism of self-reproduction in the path dependence approach. Thus, one 
interviewee points out that the ‘attractiveness’ of ‘the European Union 
vector’ is ‘determined […] by the unattractiveness of the Russian vector and 
the attractiveness of some other alternatives that are related’ (Media6). 
However, other participants signal that the reverse of this situation is 
possible as well, because ‘a dramatic reduction of pro-Russian moods […] 
did not give too many points to the EU’, just ‘took them from Russia’ (Pol5) 
and because the attractiveness of the EU or other international actors in 
Ukraine often depends on the political manoeuvring by Ukrainian elites. The 
examples of these were reflected in the consequences of the Kuchma’s 
Tapegate scandal and Yanukovych presidency (Media6). As such, not only 
some rudiments of the Soviet past may pose ‘negative feedback’ to the post-
Maidan change in Ukraine but also the choices of political elites in Ukraine 
and the EU’s weak presence in Ukraine’s societal institutions. Interpersonal 
relations also represent a sphere in which Russia stands out in a more positive 
way than elsewhere. 
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According to one respondent, millions of relatives in Russia and 
Ukraine cannot be the ‘enemies’, which creates some kind of confusion in 
the media portrayal of Russia, because, from the ‘state policy perspective’, 
it is an ‘enemy’ (Media3). However, Russia’s ‘simple play on’ the ‘general 
ignorance of the audience’ (Media3), as observed by the interviewees, is 
perceived by the elites very negatively. They believe that Russia’s ‘thesis of 
[…] sovereign democracy […] is actually reduced to ‘securing human rights 
‘by restricting civil liberties’ (Pol5), and if sovereignty prevails over human 
rights, ‘many people may be killed, just as in the Soviet Union.’ (Pol9). They 
also claim that the problem of ‘Russian-speaking citizens […] is in fact a 
misinterpretation of human rights’ by Russia with the aim to ‘transfer’ its 
‘propaganda messages’ (Pol5). Similarly, Ukrainian elites view the attempts 
of the ‘Russian propaganda’ to describe the EU as “collapsing” (Media7) or 
‘falling apart’ ‘completely wrong’ (Media10) and are concerned about the 
efficiency of this Russian propaganda even more when it comes to the image 
of Ukraine abroad.  
Therefore, while elites interviewees perceive the change of attitudes 
towards Russia as a turning point and an irreversible process, they still point 
to a number of issues that represent ‘negative feedbacks’ capable of changing 
the situation or at least making it more complicated.  
Russian diplomacy in the EU 
Ukrainian elites believe that Russia’s ‘financial and business influence 
on Europe’ (Media2) ‘hinders’ Ukraine’s relations with the EU (Pol1) and 
its members (Media2). Some suggest even that ‘most of the far-right 
movements and the Euro-skeptical attitudes in the EU are fuelled by Russian 
money’ (Pol7). The sense that Russia ‘uses a tremendous resource to 
influence politically within the EU’ and even to ‘affect the social awareness’ 
(Pol3) among EU residents through its ‘information war’ (Pol8) is a concern. 
Ukrainian interviewees believe that although European elites ‘understand 
Ukraine’, ‘ordinary Europeans who receive their information from the 
media’ are ‘subject to Russian propaganda’ (Pol6), and ‘Russia Today have 
already brainwashed millions of people […] using democratic mechanisms’ 
(Pol4). 
Consequently, the responsibility for the change of European attitudes 
towards Ukraine, as sensed by the Ukrainian elites, is placed on Russia as 
well, making it a source of agency not only in relations with Ukraine but also 
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in Ukraine’s relations with third parties. While ‘such events as the 
Euromaidan formed a very attractive and positive image of the country 
[Ukraine] further events related to the war’, including ‘active and effective 
Russian propaganda’ changed European attitudes towards ‘more pragmatic’, 
‘not as fascinated as’ in the aftermath of the Maidan revolution (Pol6). A 
similar idea is expressed in that Ukraine did not achieve visa liberalisation at 
the time, ‘Russia is mainly to blame for this. Ukraine is also to blame. But 
mainly Russia’ (Media8). 
Moreover, internal divisions in the EU are seen as a key problem by the 
Ukrainian interviewees (Pol6). The EU may be more ‘authoritative’ or 
affirmative when ‘there is no disunity between the major EU shareholders’ 
(Pol4). However, there is a certain ‘discord in positions of EU member-
countries, on different international issues’ (Media9). The most controversial 
opinion concerns France and Germany. On the one hand, these two states are 
viewed as the key mediators in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Yet, on the other 
hand, close economic and political ties between Russia and the EU and even 
more so between Russia and Germany (Media7, Media9) make them less 
interested in conflicting Russia (Media9, Pol6). Some respondents even 
‘suspect’ Germany and France ‘in some kind of playing along with Russia’ 
(Media4) because they suffer from anti-Russian sanctions (Media9, Pol6). 
Finally, ‘some countries have certain sentiments towards Russia’ and ‘a 
certain part of European elites focus on Russia’ (Pol6), which altogether 
causes a certain disbelief in the EU mediation abilities among Ukrainian 
elites (Pol8). 
Although Ukraine itself faces a number of ‘negative feedbacks’ that 
may reverse the change in attitudes to Russia, Ukrainian elites believe that 
the lack of the EU’s actorness or presence in Ukraine may become another 
such factor, and they are extremely concerned by this.   
Expectations vs. reality in conflict resolution 
While Russia has been perceived as a significant anti-Ukrainian factor 
in the EU’s domestic politics, its importance has grown even further with 
regard to the EU’s ability to negotiate peace in Ukraine, as perceived by the 
Ukrainian elites. Importantly, this area, along with the EU’s domestic policy-
making, represent those areas, where the image of the EU is the most 
controversial and least positive, despite the fact that Russia’s perceptions 
remain negative there.  
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On the one hand, the EU ‘took the responsibility to participate in a 
complex [Russian-Ukrainian] conflict’ (Pol1), and Ukrainian elites 
understand why the EU seeks a calibrated position, ‘dealing with Russia 
directly is futile’ (Pol9). However, they also find that the EU maintains the 
‘status quo’ with regard to the conflict (Pol5), does not seem to have ‘a 
strategy of dealing with Ukraine’ (Media6) and is more ‘concerned’ with its 
internal problems rather than Ukraine (Pol6).  
 
In addition, Europe remains a ‘soft power’ (Media7) and makes 
‘concessions’ to Russia in exchange for European ‘core’ value, ‘human life’ 
(Pol3). As a result, ‘the EU’s stance towards the war with Russia’ is 
somewhat ‘compromising’ (Media3) or even ‘apologetic’ (Pol3), despite 
‘[Europeans] believe that they have done even more than they could’ (Pol6).  
 
Such perception may be caused by the fact that Ukrainians ‘expected 
more decisive actions after the annexation of Crimea and the beginning of 
the war in Donbas’ (Media7, Pol9) than they received afterwards, and this 
gap between expectations and reality is expressed across a number of issues 
related to the conflict.  For example, the EU can still can act as a ‘judge’, ‘an 
intermediary’ between Russia and Ukraine’ (Pol2), but it better be a ‘referee 
who has a good whip to punish’ (Pol8). Another example concerns anti-
Russian sanctions. While the EU considers them effective, Ukrainians, find 
them ‘working’ (Pol5) but ‘insufficient’ (Pol6) and push for more sanctions 
(Pol5, Pol7) and ‘a tougher position towards Russia’ in general (Pol6). 
Ukrainian interviewees explain it by their concern that ‘the EU 
underestimates Russia’s margin of power’ (Pol8). 
 
Therefore, an overall perception of Russia in this aspect as of an 
aggressor is contrasted to the less decisive ‘soft power’ EU, causing a sense 
of helplessness among Ukrainian interviewees. This is partially caused by 
the fact that Russia appears to be neglecting ‘the multilateral approach’ 
favoured by the EU (Pol8), and that Ukraine’s ‘calls for a broader 
international participation’ (Pol5) do not work, as seen by the elites. Some 
interviewees even claim that ‘the influence of Russia on the OSCE is great, 
which is why Russia recognises the OSCE’, but the organisation itself is 
barely advancing to peace-keeping (Pol4 Pol9).  
 
In this respect, some of the interviewees pointed to the need for Ukraine 
to resolve the crisis on its own (Pol9) and propose two scenarios of doing so. 
According to the first scenario, ‘getting it [Donbas] back using military force 
[…] is impossible’ (Pol4), because ‘Ukraine’s forces, resources and 
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possibilities are absolutely incomparable’ to those of Russia (Pol6). 
Therefore, Ukraine needs ‘economic, political’ assistance but not ‘military’ 
(Pol9).  
In contrast, the second scenario involves much more radical measures: 
if we are unable to punch in the face via our own military forces, if we 
are unable to resist and cause very substantial losses to the aggressor 
then the external factor will not work in our country at all. The only 
threat is that Russia will suffer enormous casualties, because it is now 
suffering from casualties. (Pol4) 
Such a ‘hard power’ view offers a reflection of Russia’s own militarised 
approach, yet it remains in minority among Ukrainian interviewees, who 
profess largely diplomatic methods of conflict resolution.  
The Baltic states and the alternatives 
Since this paper concerns Ukraine’s views on the Baltic states as a 
potential example to follow, an interesting finding refers to the fact that these 
states appeared in the C3EU interviews when Russia was mentioned. First, 
Lithuania and Estonia are viewed as ‘former brothers and sisters from the 
Soviet bloc’ (Pol4) and have an ‘active’ position with regard to the Russian-
Ukrainian conflict]’ (Pol9, Pol3, Pol8, Media2). They are considered ‘the 
main lobbyists for the Ukrainians’ in the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe and the European Parliament, ‘because they have 
experienced occupation by the Russian Federation, or by the Soviet Union’ 
(Pol3). As such, the Russian factor here serves as a unifying force behind 
Ukraine’s relations with these countries. Their experience of 
Europeanisation reforms is also considered inspiring: ‘if I were the EU, I 
would have been smarter and would send the Balts here […] their ability to 
be persuasive is much greater, than that of the representatives of wise, 
experienced, and old Europe’ (Pol4). 
Yet on the other hand, neither the Baltic experience of European 
integration can be replicated by Ukraine in full (the EU ‘wouldn’t be able to 
accept’ bigger countries like Ukraine (Media6)), nor their power capacity is 
big enough to solve Ukraine’s problems (they ‘are trying to make some small 
things’ (Pol5)). As a result, the perception of them as of potential allies is 
rather vague, e.g. ‘neither GUAM, nor the Baltic / the Black Sea union’ can 
be compared to the EU in impact. These unions ‘exist on paper at best, at 
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worst – only in the imagination’ (Media2). A similar view is reflected in the 
following: ‘the Baltic countries can form their own alliance [as opposed to 
the membership in the EU]’, but it ‘will result in their weakening’ (Media8). 
Considering such diverse views about the role of the Baltic states in 
Ukraine’s Europeanisation and the Russia–Ukraine conflict, observing 
perceptions of these states in dynamic may be informative as well.  
Soviet past, Europeanisation and the Russian Aggression. The main 
Themes of Russia’s Images in the Context of Ukraine-Baltic 
Cooperation, 2019-2020. 
The topic of the shared past with the Baltic states as a unifying block 
for the Ukraine-Baltic relations remains a key theme of the second group of 
interviews. However, here, ‘Soviet’ and ‘Russia’ appear to be even more 
identical. Meanwhile, the theme of the Russia–Ukraine conflict slowly 
transforms into the theme of international cooperation and solidarity as a 
solution to it. 
Shared history 
Ukrainian elites stress that Ukraine shares a lot of historical and cultural 
ties with the Baltic states (Youth_cs4) but vary in the views on the impact 
that these ties may have on the modern state of affairs between the parties. 
Some go to deeper history and point to similarities of suffering from wars 
‘with Muscovy, Poland, Rzeczpospolita’ (Youth_p5). Some even claim that 
various periods of history have ‘influenced’ the minds of the people and ‘the 
vision of Ukrainians today’ (Youth_p2). In the context of the path 
dependence approach, it is an important finding, because new institutional 
choices usually work on the base of the old ones. Similarly, modern 
perceptions of international actors and partners may be to an extent shaped 
by various historical experiences. It is hard to measure, however, which part 
of history is defining in setting a new ideational path, particularly in 
Ukraine’s relations with other actors. 
For example, some interviewees assume that the Rzeczpospolita period 
became very visible (Youth_m10) in the history of Ukraine’s relations with 
the Baltic states. It also left a ‘good’ impression about some Baltic states 
among the people in Western Ukraine but not among those ‘in the East of 
Ukraine’ due to the ‘historical approach by the Russian Empire’. Similarly, 
it is believed that during the Soviet era there was ‘probably somewhat 
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negative… perception… of the Baltic states by Soviet people’ which may 
affect attitudes of Ukrainians nowadays (Youth_p2). 
 
Yet the majority of respondents view the Baltic states primarily as 
‘post-Soviet’ (Youth_p2), and the modern ‘period of post-Soviet 
Europeanisation’ as the most important in the course of Ukraine-Baltic 
relations (Youth_m7; Youth_cs9) ‘simply’ because these respondents are 
‘living’ in this period and may ‘feel’ and observe the change (Youth_m1), 
while ‘Rzeczpospolita […] was long time ago’ (Youth_m6).  
 
In this regard, the ‘post-Soviet tint’ (Youth_m7), ‘the history of all the 
atrocities that our countries [Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia] went 
through during the Soviet era’ (Youth_cs8) are considered ‘the unifying 
factors’ that help both parties to ‘understand each other’ (Youth_m6) and 
develop their ‘own strategy in the international arena’ (Youth_p2; also 
Youth_sc9). As such, ‘it is the independence after the Soviets’, that Ukraine 
and the Baltics ‘can finally make’ what they have ‘always fought for’ 
(Youth_p5), meaning that the Soviet past is not ‘defining’ (Youth_m6). 
 
This idea of achieving together translates into the idea of Europeanising 
together. In the context of the path dependence approach, this points to the 
importance of structure, or base, for building bilateral relations with other 
actors, yet also a possibility to change this structure in course of 
policymaking in real time.  
   
Transformation from Soviet to European 
 
One of the key themes, where Russia is extremely visible with regard 
to the Baltic states, is the prism of transformation from ‘Soviet’ to 
‘European’. A vivid example of this is provided below: 
   
‘Vilnius, I think, is the best… the best way to describe the 
transformations in Lithuania, because Vilnius used to be a very, let’s say, 
Soviet city. And now it’s a very European modern city, […] the epicentre of 
culture, epicentre of science and arts, and everything that makes a city 
developed and civilised and, maybe, European’ (Youth_cs4). 
 
Yet, the very process of this transformation in Ukraine’s context is 
viewed as much more complicated. On the one hand, Ukraine’s current 
course for Europeanisation is viewed as a result of ‘a good information 
policy’ and the change in ‘minds of Ukrainian people’ (Youth_p2), 
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supported by the understanding that Ukraine ‘should be ready to learn […] 
the Baltic know-how’ as well as ‘understand’ and ‘implement it’ 
(Youth_m6). Yet on the other hand, this has to be done ‘on the Ukrainian 
scale’, because these two kinds of partners are ‘completely different 
countries’ or even ‘parts of Europe’ in terms of ‘mentality, culture’ or 
‘civilisation’ (Youth_m6). Once again, civilizational factors viewed as 
‘negative feedbacks’ to the ongoing change in the minds of Ukrainians. Even 
with regard to the Soviet history, the Baltic states are perceived as ‘similar 
to Ukraine, but not so much [similar]’ (Youth_p2), with a ‘faster’ post-Soviet 
transformation and ‘bloody change of elites in the nineties’ (Youth_sc4) as 
opposed to the one in Ukraine. 
Among the three state, ‘Estonia and Lithuania’ are considered ‘very 
supportive of the reforms’ in Ukraine (Youth_sc4) and ‘the most vocal and 
strongest in combatting Russian aggression’ (Youth_cs9). As a result, 
Estonia is perceived not only in terms of its expertise on electronic elections, 
cybersecurity and Parliamentary ethics (Youth_sc4), or being ‘E-Stonia’ 
(Youth_cs8), but also as an example of a country that ‘managed to become 
a member of NATO while having a territorial dispute with Russia’ 
(Youth_cs8) — an issue of great concern in the context of Ukraine’s 
potential membership in the organisation. Estonia may thus serve an example 
of a ‘post-colonial country’ that ‘managed to break away from its […] Soviet 
occupation legacy’ (Youth_cs8). 
Meanwhile, Lithuania is perceived as ‘one of the countries that 
understand Ukraine the most’ and is ‘the most vocal in the international fora 
regarding Ukraine’s fight for independence’ (Youth_cs8). Lithuania ‘wants 
to play this mentorship role for Ukraine’ (Youth_m6) and is also viewed as 
an example of ‘how to get rid of the Soviet heritage and get into the European 
family’, or how to ‘become a post-Soviet member state in the EU’ 
(Youth_m6). By contrast, Latvia is considered less supportive in this sense 
due to a strong ‘Russian influence’ there (Youth_p3) or even as a perception 
of it as a sort of ‘pro-Russian country’ (Youth_m10).  
While this theme in the youth elite perceptions does not reveal a lot 
about the ideational change that has happened in Ukraine post Maidan, it 
points to post-Soviet Europeanisation as a way to eliminate Russia’s 
influence in the transforming countries. In parallel, Russia becomes a key 
element in building Ukraine’s relations with the Baltic states.  
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Combatting Russian aggression 
Russian aggression remains one of the most defining themes in the 
youth interviews. Here, some stories circulate around the narrative of ‘weak 
Ukraine’ fighting against Russia (Youth_p5) in a turbulent world 
(Youth_m1), but the majority of them focus on ‘partnership [with the Baltics 
allies] in […] combatting Russian aggression’ (Youth_p2). 
The notion of countering Russia is so strong because Ukrainian elites 
believe that the Baltic states have also experienced ‘this aggression’, 
(Youth_p3) and see it as the common ground to further strengthen their 
mutual ‘relationship’ (Youth_sc4) as of ‘allies’ (Youth_m10). The 
interviewees provide several examples of such a relationship, e.g. ‘Lithuania 
is working with Ukraine on […] combatting Russian propaganda in the EU’ 
(Youth_p3) and being ‘very supportive of Ukraine’ in the Russia-Ukraine 
conflict (Youth_sc4), or ‘Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania […] supporting 
Ukraine in its war against Russia’ by ‘taking care of soldiers, […] supplying 
important equipment, medical equipment or certain things that support our 
[Ukrainian] military’ (Youth_sc8). 
Moreover, the narrative of the Baltic states supporting Ukraine in its 
struggle against ‘Russian aggression’ also feeds into the Ukrainian media, 
according to the Ukrainian elites: ‘they [Baltic states] do a lot of statements 
regarding condemning the occupation of the Crimea and aggression in the 
East of Ukraine’ (Youth_p2), or ‘I read a lot about them, even in Ukrainian 
news’ (Youth_sc4). Still, it is believed that a better narrative for the Baltic 
states should be present in Ukraine’s media in order to ‘present’ them ‘better, 
as friends […], as countries that […] share a lot of common history with 
Ukraine […] that are very much interested in Ukraine’s success […]’ 
(Youth_cs8). 
While some interviewees consider ‘the relationship with the Baltic 
states’ as ‘strategically important’ but ‘not defining’ for the EU-Russia 
relations and the EU-Ukraine-Russia triangle (Youth_m6), the majority see 
the Baltic states as vitally important for Ukraine, e.g. ‘the Baltics understand 
how important it is to be clear with your international obligations, to be clear 
with whom you are speaking at the international fora when you are speaking 
with aggressor like Russia’ (Youth_p5). This is explicitly stated by another 
interviewee: 
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‘They [Baltic states] always clearly say about the conflict in the Eastern 
part of Ukraine and also annexation of Crimea by Russia exactly, without 
any negligence and saying that… even thinking that it could harm them, but 
they clearly support us in that. Also, they provide a lot of assistance for our 
military […] humanitarian support and medical support to our armed forces 
[…] a lot of support for central governmental institutions’ (Youth_p5). 
Once again and similarly to the idea expressed in the previous block of 
interviews, ‘the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbass’ are viewed 
as the ‘turning points’ for Ukraine’s closer cooperation with the Baltic 
countries because ‘in your bad times you really know who your friends are. 
And […] our Baltic neighbours […] really supported us’ (Youth_p3).  
In general, the aftermath of Maidan revolution and particularly Russia’s 
response to Ukraine’s European choice is perceived by Ukrainian elites as a 
turning point not only for Ukraine’s perceptions of Russia as ‘other’ in the 
context of Europeanisation but also for the perceptions of the Baltic states as 
‘allies’ in combatting Russia. While the irreversibility of this change in 
attitudes is questioned due to a number of structural differences between the 
parties, the more important question is the basis behind this change.  
It is hard to judge whether a newly achieved friendship between 
Ukraine and the Baltic states is guided by Ukraine’s desire to transform and 
adopt European norms following the examples of Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Estonia, as is claimed, or by the idea of the ‘common enemy’ Russia. As one 
interviewee states, the Baltic states are ‘friends’ of Ukraine because they 
‘share a lot in terms of history and challenges’ and ‘in particular those posed 
by Russia’ (Youth_cs8). Furthermore, as Kleinberga and Vizgunova (2020), 
demonstrate in this issue, Latvian media are similarly preoccupied with the 
‘Russian issue’ rather than with the Ukrainian issues even when portraying 
Ukraine or reporting on it. If this is true for both parties, the post-Maidan 
change in attitudes may not be deep enough to cause an ideational change in 
the country, because of the situationality of the character of the change. A 
situational alliance against a common enemy does not require a deep 
ideational change as opposed to a deep ideational change that leads to a new 
situational alliance.  
Geopolitics 
Despite Ukrainian interviewees believing that Ukraine receives visible 
support from the Baltic states with regard to combatting Russia, the majority 
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of respondents are rather pessimistic about Ukraine’s ability to achieve its 
aims in the conflict resolution. According to some, Ukraine needs ‘strong 
partners to protect’ it from the ‘Russian aggression’, to help Ukraine ‘be 
independent, and play a strong role in international arena’ (Youth_p2); and 
in this narrative, the EU performs as such a partner, offering ‘good 
cooperation’, sanctioning Russia and participating in the Minsk process. This 
scenario therefore may allow Ukraine ‘not to be […] an object in 
international relations, but to be a subject’ of them (Youth_p2). 
However, most of the interviewed elites describe partnership with the 
EU as rather ambiguous. This is due partially to the EU’s not being a 
unanimous ‘leader in international politics’ (Youth_p3), because as opposed 
to ‘more aggressive’ Russia and the U.S., the EU ‘is more like, “okay, we’re 
in the middle, we’re, like, good guys, trying to be good”’ (Youth_cs9). While 
while this is not seen necessarily as a negative development, ‘I don’t know 
whether it’s good or bad – not to be a leader’ (Youth_cs9), this issue overlaps 
with a number of other problems faced by the EU. 
For example, the Ukrainian youth elites believe the EU ‘could have 
done more’ for Ukraine (Youth_sc4) and, potentially, for other countries in 
Eastern Europe and the Caucasus with regard to the Russia aggression 
(Youth_sc8). Yet the reasons behind the EU’s inaction lie in the internal 
conflict between EU values and interests. While Ukrainian youth elites claim 
they realise that ‘national interests always prevail over the continent’s 
interest’, the youth are still concerned by the fact that the ‘agenda’ of some 
EU member states (Germany or France) is ‘most of the time […] in the way 
of Ukraine’s agenda when it comes to the war with Russia’ (Youth_sc4).  
While some interviewees state that the EU has ‘no united position on 
Russia’ (Youth_p3), others call the Nord Stream a ‘betrayal of Ukraine’ due 
to Germany’s ‘willing to do business as usual’ and call for the EU elites to 
finally decide, ‘whether they stand for European values or they stand for 
business as usual’ (Youth_cs8). As a result, this sense of neglect by the EU, 
as perceived among the Ukrainian youth, extrapolates from member states to 
the EU as a whole: ‘most of the time Ukraine is not treated fairly by the EU’ 
(Youth_cs4). 
According to the interviewees, this sense of unfair treatment explains 
why Ukraine starts seeking to achieve its own agenda, same as other 
international actors (Youth_sc4) and even in the course of ‘all these 
geopolitical games’ that the EU and Ukraine play in the EU-Russia-Ukraine 
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relationship (Youth_m6). Yet Ukraine is not perceived as being successful 
in these games by its own young elites due to geopolitical constraints and the 
lack of power, e.g. ‘how they [Germany, France] communicate with Russia, 
how they communicate with the U.S.’ (Youth_m6). Russia thus is perceived 
not only as a capable actor for Ukraine’s relations with third parties but also 
as an international player that discredits multilateral institutions (Council of 
Europe) and plays a key role in the ‘dissolution of the global liberal order’ 
(Youth_cs8). In general, youth find Ukraine locked between ‘different 
cultural and political projects’ of Russia, the EU and the U.S. (Youth_p2), 
which, together with the perceived power asymmetry, portrays Ukraine as 
being in a weak position: 
Ukraine cannot really compete in the international politics right now. 
Because as it is, as a state […] it is dysfunctional […] But still, it has a 
prominent role, as a territory. […] very important for relations between 
the EU, the US and Russia. But as a state at the table of negotiations’ 
Ukraine decides nothing. (Youth_m6) 
In this narrative, Ukraine is weak, and it needs the EU, but Russia will 
‘never’ let Ukraine ‘join the EU’ (Youth_cs4). Moreover, Ukraine’s 
domestic developments are seen as threatening to Ukraine’s future in the EU: 
Well, I became more negative in the last year because I see a lot of steps 
in the wrong direction […] We are getting closer to becoming an ally 
with Russia, and that worries me a lot. And I think that we are giving 
up a lot of our national interest in order to end this war, and I understand 
perfectly why it has to be done, but I just think that too many people 
have died in the aim for that. And this discourse, this cultural discourse 
that we share with Russia more and more is very worrisome because I 
think that in a few years we won’t even notice that we are part of the 
same cultural space, and it’s going to be like with the Black Sea fleet in 
Crimea back in 2010. When nobody even heard about the Kharkiv 
agreements, but they took place and nobody cared, and then it led to 
[…] to some very significant events. And I think the same is going 
happen now. We won’t notice it, but step by step we will become more 
and more integrated with Russia, and this scares me a lot. It scares me 
a lot because many people just don’t care. (Youth_cs4) 
This view refers to Ukraine’s potential rapprochement with Russia, because 
Ukraine needs to be ‘consistent with its European path’ as opposed to 
deviating towards Russia: ‘I would like to see our future, I don’t know, either 
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as a part of the EU, or closer at least to the European values. I don’t want to 
go back to this Russian world’ (Youth_cs9). 
Although such a view of a reversing change seems rather pessimistic, it 
slowly transforms into a theme of being recognised and respected among 
other interviewees. They, too, see Ukraine as a state ‘suffering from the 
aggression of another state in the world, which is already constructed in a 
peaceful way’; however, it is this area where they see Ukraine’s potential as 
of an international actor, at least for now (Youth_p5): 
[…] we are the voice of the international relations […] we have to show 
everyone that each country can be in such a situation. […] we have to 
connect the global community to say everything out loud, to be on the 
one side. And then, when we are united, we can tackle everything, like 
we are trying now to do with the Russian aggression. This, I think, is 
our role now, but I don’t want it to be a constant role for Ukraine. I 
think that in the future we have to overcome this problem and to become 
an example of the state, which transforms itself from post-Soviet period 
to the developed country. (Youth_p5) 
In this context, the Baltic states are seen as crucial partners for Ukraine, 
because they can prove Ukraine is not ‘alone’, and other actors also ‘stand 
firm by Ukraine’ (Youth_cs8). Moreover, this view even portrays Ukraine 
as a potentially influential actor in international relations. Ukraine’s 
‘historic’ mission could be to ‘facilitate the dissolution of one of the last 
empires, which is now the aggressive Russian Federation […], to make 
Russia free and democratic, to influence Russia in this way and […] to set 
all of Europe free of authoritarianism’ (Youth_cs8). In this context, the 
Baltic states and even Germany, France, or the United Kingdom are seen as 
partners who ‘are interested in the preservation of the European Union’ and 
European values (Youth_cs8). Therefore, there is ‘hope’ among some 
younger Ukrainian elites that Ukraine ‘will find general understanding with 
the European Union, with the United States, with the Russian Federation’ 
and will ‘overcome’ its current situation (Youth_m1). 
The theme of international relations thus represents the most 
controversial section of this analysis. Some interviewees share a more 
pessimistic view about the change from the anti-Russian stance towards less 
so certain one. However, others see a chance to maintain and entrench this 
choice through international cooperation. The prospects of using such 
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‘positive feedbacks’ however are questionable due to the perceived impact 
that Russia has on undermining Ukraine’s position. 
From the perspective of the path dependence approach, the youth 
interviewees support the idea that the Russian aggression has become a 
turning point for the bilateral relations between Ukraine and Russia, Ukraine 
and the EU and even Ukraine and the Baltic states, as well as for the 
respective perceptions about Russia in Ukraine. However, unlike those 
interviewed in 2017, youth interviewees in 2020 are less certain in the 
irreversibility of this change and are more concerned about the dynamics of 
political processes. 
Conclusions 
By comparing the two sets of interviews held at different times albeit 
with a similar focus on the EU-Ukraine cooperation, this paper reveals that 
certain trends in Ukrainians’ perceptions of Russia remain unchanged. First, 
both groups of interviewees see Russia’s response to the Maidan revolution 
and Ukraine’s choice of the European vector as a crucial juncture in Ukraine-
Russia relations. In this context, Russia is viewed as an aggressor, successor 
of the USSR and its illiberal policies, and the antipode of the EU. Meanwhile, 
Ukraine is seen as a country with European aspirations in need of assistance 
that looks up to the EU members (including post-Soviet Baltic states) as an 
example to follow.  
Interesting is the perceived lack of agency by Ukraine and the EU as 
opposed to that of Russia, because agency is crucial for a change in a path 
dependence process. In Ukraine’s case, local elites place the responsibility 
for the change in Ukrainian attitudes completely on Russia. From their 
viewpoint, Russia’s aggressive response towards Ukraine’s European choice 
provoked a negative shift in public attitudes. Not only interviewees call this 
change a ‘turning point’, but even they indicate a series of ‘negative 
feedbacks’ that may reverse the change. These vary from structural and 
cultural constraints (rudiments of the Soviet past, shared political culture 
with Russia, family ties) to such policy-related factors as choices of 
Ukrainian elites, interests of EU member states, and the situation in the 
international arena.  
Meanwhile, the perceptions of Russia differ even with regard to what 
constitutes Russia. For example, some interviewees differentiate between 
Russia as an enemy and Russia as a country where their relatives live, while 
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some associate Russian policies with the ‘Russian world’ — a much broader 
geopolitical and cultural concept that concerns the ‘Russian issue’ in the 
process of Ukraine’s self-identification. This means not only that Russia’s 
perceptions among Ukrainian elites vary, but also that the elites may concern 
Ukraine’s Europeanisation both as a political and/or a civilisational process. 
The decisive role of the elites in determining this process is also hard to 
evaluate. While the choices of political elites seem to be important for public 
attitudes, Ukrainian youth are more pessimistic about this, particularly when 
concerning Ukraine’s potential rapprochement with Russia. When 
contrasted to the results of the recent public opinion polls, this reveals a 
potential gap either between Ukrainian elites and Ukrainian public or even a 
generational gap among Ukrainian elites — an issue that may be considered 
in the future studies. 
In general, examining the change in public attitudes through the prism 
of path dependence requires knowledge of context and dynamics. This paper 
reveals that path-dependent choice should be evaluated against the 
counterplay between the positive and negative feedbacks it causes. As the 
above analysis demonstrates, the negative feedbacks in post-Maidan Ukraine 
have appeared and, with time, may change the dynamic of public attitudes 
towards Russia. Therefore, a seemingly definite change has largely 
concerned political processes rather than a deep ideational change. 
Meanwhile, the sources of the change remain another question for a research. 
While Ukrainian interviewees clearly see these sources as external (Russia), 
very few of them point to the EU’s public diplomacy and generational 
change as other factors that caused the change. Therefore, while this paper 
focused specifically on the dynamics of change post critical juncture, a 
longitude analysis of the context that produced the antecedent conditions 
may explain the causes behind the change better. 
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PORTRAYING RUSSIA IN LITHUANIAN INTERNET MEDIA: 
THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND SIDE 
Abstract 
Based on the representation of Russia in the leading Lithuanian online media outlet, the 
article attempts to examine the structure of news demand. The images and main narratives 
of Russia constructed by the media are relatively easy to identify and analyse through 
quantitative and qualitative content analysis. Nevertheless, an even more important part 
of the reception or the demand side of the news content is more difficult to assess. 
Audience interest can be measured by examining the attributes of articles of greatest 
interest and endorsement. Article share statistics is utilized as an indicator of the interest 
of active readers. Comparing the selected characteristics of the most shared articles with 
the control group of the mainstream articles, the article investigates the difference 
between the thematic frames, sentiment and length of the pieces. The results demonstrate 
that audience demand attributes differ from the general supply of media texts. Readers 
tend to endorse less intellectually demanding texts. Trivia and non-political texts are 
shared more often by the audience than deeper analytical texts. 
Keywords: Russia, communication, audience research, corpus analysis, framing. 
Introduction: Communicating Russia: Message Inception 
The average person is not directly familiar with world affairs and public 
policy but learns about them from the media. Media at the same time reflect 
the public reaction (reception) to the policies implemented. Therefore, the 
nature of public information in the media is important for both the opinion 
and for politics.1 
Historic memory studies demonstrate that the assessments of Russia 
and especially the period of the Soviet Union in Lithuania are salient and 
polarizing. Russia is traditionally perceived as a historical threat to the 
country’s independence, and its perceptions are predominantly negative.2 
1 Soroka, Stuart, and Christopher Wlezien. “Tracking the Coverage of Public Policy in Mass Media.” 
Policy Studies Journal 47, no. 2 (2019): 471-91. See also: Falck, Fabian, Julian Marstaller, Niklas Stoehr, 
Sören Maucher, Jeana Ren, Andreas Thalhammer, Achim Rettinger, and Rudi Studer. “Measuring 
Proximity between Newspapers and Political Parties: The Sentiment Political Compass [in Press].” Policy 
& internet  (2019): poi3.222 
2 Snyder, Timothy. “Memory of Sovereignty and Sovereignty over Memory: Poland, 
Lithuania and Ukraine, 1939–1999.” In Memory and Power in Post-War Europe: Studies 
in the Presence of the Past, edited by Jan-Werner Müller, 39-58. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002. See also: Lašas, Ainius, Irmina Matonytė, and Vaida 
Jankauskaitė. “Facing Past, Present, and Future: The Role of Historical Beliefs and 
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However, since 1990 after the restoration of independence, the perception of 
Russia's image in Lithuania has not been homogeneous. The first decade of 
independence 1990-2000 was a kind of honeymoon when under Boris 
Yeltsin Russian political regime was mostly treated neutrally and positively. 
After Putin came to power, Russia's ratings deteriorated. Russia’s aggression 
against Georgia in 2008 has affected the country's assessments negatively. 
Aggression against Ukraine in 2014 further aggravated negative assessments 
of Russia in Lithuania.  The level of hostility was topped by former 
Lithuanian former President Dalia Grybauskaitė who officially called Russia 
a terrorist state: “If a terrorist state that is engaged in open aggression against 
its neighbour is not stopped, then that aggression might spread further into 
Europe.”3 Attitudes and opinions have changed little since that period. Public 
opinion polls show that Russia is considered a threat to Lithuania. The role 
of the media in shaping perceptions goes along with politics. Major news 
channels largely reflect the political mainstream, with almost no variance 
among the lead outlets (including TV, papers, internet outlets).4 
Media tone in depiction of Russia in Lithuanian news sources 
corresponds with the securitization theory concept. Janušauskienė et al. 
(2017), in their analysis the portrayal of Russia in the Internet media, reveal 
the importance of threat and security topics, many with references to the 
situation in Ukraine, the attribution of the threat to the whole region, and the 
importance of international partners such as the EU and NATO allies.5 
Haas (2009) argues that media can be an intermediary for the speech 
act which helps to convince the audience about the necessity to take 
extraordinary measures to meet a threat. The success or failure of the speech 
act, therefore, depends on the way in which it is reported, that is, whether the 
media support the securitising move or not.6 Côté (2016) goes even further 
stressing out the importance of audience engagement arguing that the 
Experiences in the Lithuanian Public Perception of Military Threats.” Journal of Baltic 
Studies 51, no. 2 (2020/04/02 2020): 199-221. 
3 The Baltic Times, Lithuania President calls Russia ’terrorist state’, 2014-11-20, Rayyan Sabet-
Parry, https://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/35799/, access date: May 21th, 2020. 
4 Gintaras, Šumskas, and Matonytė Irmina. “Impact of the Mass Media on the Assessment of 
Military Threats”. Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 16, no. 1 (2018): 425-54. 
5 Janušauskienė, Diana, Eglė  Vileikienė, Laima  Nevinskaitė, and Ingrida  Gečienė-
Janulionė. Ar Lietuvos Gyventojai Jaučiasi Saugūs? Subjektyvus Saugumas Kintančiame 
Geopolitiniame Kontekste [in Lithuanian].  Vilnius: Lietuvos Socialinių Tyrimų Centras, 
2017. 
6 Hass, Rabea. “The Role of Media in Conflict and Their Influence on Securitisation.” 
The International Spectator 44, no. 4 (2009/12/01 2009): p.84. 
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audience reception and adoption are crucial for the completion of 
securitization act. 7  
Based on the Lithuanian internet media case study, the article examines 
the main narratives depicting Russia, its contents and audience reception 
mechanism. The volume of media narratives and frames (referred to as the 
supply side) is estimated against the audience attention and engagement 
measured by article shares statistic (the demand side). The analysis employs 
several analysis levels. The initial aggregated text corpus-based analysis 
helped to reveal the main narratives and trends within the information flow. 
Both the main text bodies and the headlines analysis produced a rather one-
sided negative picture of Russia. Russia is mostly associated with aggression, 
violations of the law and other negative information. Does this supply-side 
really meet the needs of the audience? Further content analysis of the most 
shared articles (which implies the most attention) revealed the 
incongruencies among the most mainstream media-driven topics are not 
necessarily the most readable and popular. 
Theoretical Framework: Reception Issues 
It is not the message transmission, but the issue of the message 
reception by the audience that raises the most concerns. The position of the 
political elite and the media is explicitly manifested and can be assessed 
relatively easy.  However, reception of media messages is more difficult to 
operationalize and measure. Simple criteria for selecting articles can be very 
arbitrary. The average reader would probably be reluctant to read attention- 
and time-demanding long research reports and journal articles.8 Perception 
problems also should not be ignored since the receivers of mediated and 
verbal and visual messages often get something completely different out of 
a message than that the sender intended to communicate.9 Miskimmon and 
O’Loughlin (2019) employ the term “stickiness” while developing the 
concept of strategic narratives and looking for answers to the question of 
why some elite and media narratives are better accepted by audiences, while 
others are ignored and rejected. Audience reception (or demand side) was 
measured with a q-methodology that combines both qualitative and 
7 Côté, Adam. “Agents without Agency Assessing the Role of the Audience in 
Securitization Theory.” Security Dialogue 47, no. 6 (2016): 541-58. 
8 Tang, Chris, and Gabriella Rundblad. “When Safe Means ‘Dangerous’: A Corpus Investigation 
of Risk Communication in the Media.” Applied Linguistics 38, no. 5 (2015): 671. 
9 Schroder, Kim Christian. “Media Discourse Analysis: Researching Cultural Meanings 
from Inception to Reception.” Textual Cultures 2, no. 2 (2007): 77-99. 
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quantitative attributes.10 The above-mentioned studies provided excellent 
insights on the justifications why some strategic narratives are better 
accepted than others. Those studies focused on narratives incepted by 
political elites while leaving behind the “mainstream” information flow and 
potential rationales why audience tend to choose particular media stories. 
Based on Schudson’s (1998) concept,11 Zaller (2003) introduces the notion 
of the “monitorial citizen” which is different from that of the informed 
citizen. The monitorial citizen is less interested in gathering and 
systematizing information, but more in the surveillance role. The audience 
should not necessary follow (and engage) in the leading media narratives in 
order to be aware of the situation. According to the author, most people do 
not need to proactively seek out information, but that does not mean they 
will be inactive all the time.12  
Is actual and active interest of the audience required at all? Soroka and 
Wlezien (2019) introduced the concept of thermostatic responsiveness which 
states that the audience basically does not need much information about 
politics and everything that is needed can already be found in the mass 
media. The public reacts to policy changes similarly to thermostatic process, 
adjusting their preferences for more policy downward (upward) when policy 
increases (decreases). The authors suggest that “broad shifts in policy may 
be captured in news content, that citizens may thus be able to learn relatively 
easily about the general direction (and magnitude) of policy change, and that 
this allows for effective thermostatic responsiveness.”13 Moreover, next to 
the questionable need to be (not) informed, the issue of information fatigue 
is addressed. According to Moeller (1999), due to the massive and almost 
repetitive coverage, many people may have experienced some sort of 
compassion fatigue.14 The authors argue that extensive coverage of the 
certain topics (information hypes) might have quite an opposite effect on 
10 Miskimmon, Alister, and Ben O’Loughlin. “Narratives of the Eu in Israel/Palestine: 
Narrative “Stickiness” and the Formation of Expectations.” European Security 28, no. 3 
(2019/07/03 2019): 268-83. and Roselle, Laura, Alister Miskimmon, and Ben 
O'Loughlin. “Strategic Narrative: A New Means to Understand Soft Power.” Media, War 
& Conflict 7, no. 1 (2014): 70-84. 
11 Schudson, Michael. The Good Citizen : A History of American Civic Life [in English].  
Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press, 1998. 
12 Zaller, John. “A New Standard of News Quality: Burglar Alarms for the Monitorial 
Citizen.” Political Communication 20, no. 2 (2003): 109-30. 
13 Soroka, Stuart, and Christopher Wlezien. “Tracking the Coverage of Public Policy in 
Mass Media.” Policy Studies Journal 47, no. 2 (2019): 471-472. 
14 Moeller, Susan D. Compassion Fatigue : How the Media Sell Disease, Famine, War, 
and Death.  New York; London: Routledge, 1999. 
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audience attention: “It was too intense; we lose interest and get bored of it 
all.”15 
The motives why the audience opts to read and endorse certain topics 
remain in the black box which needs further research. This paper attempts to 
assess the congruence between the media framed image and the perceived 
image of Russia. Through analysing the sample of the most shared 
(endorsed) news stories against the randomly selected control sample, 




Several methodological approaches are competing while processing 
and analysing big volumes of textual data. More technologically advanced 
and computer contingent linguistic corpus analysis relies on the semi-
automated or automated keyword processing.16 For large text collections, 
only the second approach is feasible. Some authors present the evidence that 
automatic keyword search and assignment based on naive Bayesian learning 
algorithm can be even more efficient and accurate than the manual keyword 
assignment method. In large text corpus, word frequency and proximity 
analysis are not inferior to traditional keyword analysis.17 Although this 
approach has obvious limitations in tackling subtle meanings and links in 
texts, experiments with checking its results against human coding show over 
90 percent accuracy under some conditions.18 Automated programme 
analysis of the corpus facilitates quantitative research, for example, to search 
15 Beyer, Audun, and Tine Ustad Figenschou. “Media Hypes and Public Opinion. Human 
Interest Frames and Hype Fatigue.” In From Media Hype to Twitter Storm, edited by 
Peter Vasterman, p. 260: Amsterdam University Press, 2018. 
16 Smith, Nicholas, Sebastian Hoffmann, and Paul Rayson. “Corpus Tools and Methods, 
Today and Tomorrow: Incorporating Linguists’ Manual Annotations.” Literary and 
Linguistic Computing 23, no. 2 (2008): 163-80. 
17 Conway, Mike. “Mining a Corpus of Biographical Texts Using Keywords.” Literary 
and Linguistic Computing 25, no. 1 (2009): 23-35. See also: Duguid, Alison. “Newspaper 
Discourse Informalisation: a Diachronic Comparison from Keywords.” In Modern 
Diachronic Corpus-Assisted Discourse Studies, edited by Alan Partington. Corpora 
Volume 5, Number 2, p.114.: Edinburgh University Press, 2010 
18 Koltsova, Olessia, and Sergei Koltcov. “Mapping the Public Agenda with Topic 
Modeling: The Case of the Russian Livejournal.” Policy & Internet 5, no. 2 (2013): 212-
13.
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for the most frequent words. However, in-depth analysis and interpretation 
require both quantitative and qualitative methods.19  
Modern corpus analysis tools offer a wide range of functions that 
greatly facilitate linguistic analysis of large volumes of authentic language 
data (frequency distribution, collocates, context analysis, etc.). However, 
these tools are usually not able to satisfy the fundamental need to add 
interpretive information to a wide variety of quantitative analysis toolbox. 
Adding contextual and discursive and other qualitative inputs next to the 
quantitative queries are necessary for a more thorough understanding of the 
phenomenon being studied.20 
This study combines both automated and manual ways to handle 
keywords. Whereas the analysis deals with the relatively big linguistic 
corpus (unique words volume N= 2,379,721), the primary aggregate 
explorative assessment is based on solely automated process such as text 
concordance and keyword collocation study. Therefore, quantitative 
parameters of articles related to Russia provides only one-sided (supply side) 
information about the dissemination of narratives. To investigate the 
information reception (demand side), one of the engagement criteria was 
used - the number of article shares. This criterion was chosen as one of the 
indicators of deeper involvement or interest. It means not only the number 
of passive reads but also the proactive dissemination of information in the 
person's social circle. The following analysis which includes audience 
involvement was based on smaller samples (N=139 most shared articles and 
N=300 for control group) which allows a closer look at the data and 
overcoming some obvious limitations of the big data approach. Manual 
keyword selection and topic coding still allows more nuanced context 
understanding and isolating irrelevant “noisy” data fragments.  
Sampling and text corpus processing 
Sample frame. Internet media outlet Delfi.lt is the leader of online media in 
Lithuania and all Baltic States. This news channel is appropriate for media 
19 O’Halloran, Kieran. “Investigating Argumentation in Reading Groups: Combining 
Manual Qualitative Coding and Automated Corpus Analysis Tools.” Applied Linguistics 
32, no. 2 (2010): 172-96. 
20 Conway, Mike. “Mining a Corpus of Biographical Texts Using Keywords.” Literary 
and Linguistic Computing 25, no. 1 (2009): 23-35. 
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analysis, as it not only creates its content, but also functions as a kind of 
media hub, publishing selected information from other media (local and 
central).21 
Sample size and selection criteria. The initial sample covered 2019 January 
- 2020 February period. The selection criteria were articles which contained
keywords: Russia, Russian. According to the selected criteria, the search
returned 4669 news texts matching the search parameters. To select the most
focused articles, the share (the number of shares) indicator was selected as it
well reflects person’s interest and engagement. The selected threshold for
including into the analysis was 300 shares. 139 articles met the selection
criteria and this sample was used for further analysis. A control (benchmark)
sample of 300 randomly selected articles also is included into analysis to
crosscheck whether these texts of greatest interest differed and in the overall
context.
Corpus file: Automated content analysis (computer-assisted content 
analysis) employed the aggregated text corpus with 2,379,721 words 
(additional articles heading corpus contained 59,274 words). Prior to the 
analysis, the text corpus was automatically translated into English. Then the 
text was pre-processed by removing the most common word forms (or stop-
words such as articles) and lemmatized to reduce the variation of word forms 
for the further analysis.22 
Variable selection. The quantitative content analysis includes a thematic 
framework, sentiment, and geographical and engagement indicators. 
21 According to Gemius Audience, in 2019 Delfi.lt attracted twice as many audience attentions 
as its nearest competitors. Comparing the time spent on Internet news outlets, Delfi.lt takes 
29.95%, 15min.lt - 14.95%, Lrytas.lt - 15.68%. https://rating.gemius.com/lt/tree/59, accessed on 
July 12th, 2020. 
22 Lucas, Christopher, Richard A. Nielsen, Margaret E. Roberts, Brandon M. Stewart, 
Alex Storer, and Dustin Tingley. “Computer-Assisted Text Analysis for Comparative 
Politics.” Political Analysis 23, no. 2 (2015): 254-77. 
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Findings: 
Depicting Russia. An Aggregate Text Corpus Analysis 
An initial look at the word frequencies in the corpus text (aggregate 
DELFI articles text body) of the prevalent keywords in the articles showed 
the importance of the political context in Russia-related online media texts. 
The frequency of keywords (USA, Russia, Trump, Putin, NATO) well 
reflects the geopolitical narrative being formed in Lithuania - the importance 
of the ally USA and Russia's threats (Figure 1). Interestingly, the frequency 
of mentioning Europe or the EU is relatively less frequent than that of 
Ukraine, which has become a very important part of Lithuania's geopolitics 
in the last six years. Ukraine in most cases stands as a proxy variable to 
demonstrate the Russian aggression narrative (the key ingredient in 
securitization process).  
Figure1. The most frequent keywords in the headlines (body corpus N= 2,379,721) 
* Font size represent the frequency of keyword occurrence. Delfi.lt, January
2019 – February 2020.
Source: Author’s Own
Explorative (based on word frequencies) keyword analysis showed 
quite unequivocally that the topic of Russia in Lithuanian online media is 
inseparable from the political and geopolitical context. The volume of 
keywords related to political institutions, the most dominant world’s states 
and politicians suggests that Russia is primarily seen as a political actor not 
as a cultural or ethnic entity. 
Simple keyword occurrences statistics give an oversimplified image of 
media discourse on Russia. It certainly provides an quick insight into the 
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overall picture of the thematic frames, but a deeper understanding of the 
problem requires additional study. In any language, words are not isolated 
entities. Collocation analysis allows evaluating how words occur in relation 
to each other (within close proximity).  
Corpus-based collocation (proximity) textual analysis helps to reveal 
the context of the narratives and main thematic frames. Collocation data 
provides greater insight into ways in which languages are being represented 
(or not) within sites identified through rate of recurrence and statistical 
significance.23 Targeted keywords Russia/Russian most frequently appear in 
close proximity with words which have negative connotations. Out of the top 
30 most associated keywords in the article corpus, two thirds (19) had а 
negative overtone. Most of them were attributed to various realms of hostile 
politics: information warfare (e.g. propagandists, trolls, interfering, agent), 
overt aggression24 (e.g. annexed, aggression, interfering, violating, 
mercenaries, tear, separatist) and espionage (e.g. agent, spies, covert) (Figure 
2).     
Figure 2. Most prominent collocates with the keywords Russia / Russian in article body 
and headline corpus (body corpus N= 2,379,721, heading corpus N=59,274) 
* Mutual information (MI) statistic. It is a measure of the strength of
association between words. This text corpus contains 2,379,721 total
23 Vessey, Rachelle. “Corpus Approaches to Language Ideology.” Applied Linguistics 38, 
no. 3 (2015): 277-96. 
24 Majority of these articles can be attributed to the aggression against Ukraine. Small proportion 
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words and 48,020 unique word forms. The article heading corpus has 
59,274 total words and 6,664 unique word forms. 
Analysing headlines proves to be a good down-sampling option to 
reduce large news corpora to a workable amount of data. However, the 
practical sampling frame consideration is not the only purpose to opt for the 
headline analysis. Headlines function to frame the event, summarize the 
story, and attract readers.25 Applying the same collocation strength 
assessment to the article headlines’ corpus returns quite similar results. The 
overall proportion of negative context words in the nearest proximity to 
target keywords (Russia / Russian) is smaller in comparison with article body 
corpus - 8 out of the top 30 collocates had a negative connotation. Given the 
specificity of the heading genre to include basic information about the 
storyline, main actors, geographical context and the outcome, this proportion 
is also significant. If we do not take into consideration geographic vectors 
and actor names (13 items in top 30 collocates), the part of negative context 
keywords becomes even more substantial.   
Sentiment analysis 
Subsequent sentiment analysis in the target group with the most 
readership endorsement and the control group also showed a predominant 
negative context. More than half of the most shared articles related to Russia 
are negative (55%), with positive texts accounting for only 5% of the texts. 
(Figure 3) In the control group, the average proportion of negative texts is 
even higher (62%). 
Figure 3: Articles by sentiment among the most shared articles group (N=139) 
25 Haider, Ahmad S, and Riyad F Hussein. “Analysing Headlines as a Way of Downsizing 
News Corpora: Evidence from an Arabic–English Comparable Corpus of Newspaper 
Articles.” Digital Scholarship in the Humanities (2019). 
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Thematic frames 
Politics is a lead topic within the most shared articles sample (77%). A very 
important part consists of articles analysing conflict situations (international 
or diplomatic conflicts and Russia's role in them - 38%). As many as 17% of 
the texts relate to topics that directly analyse military topics.  
Control group statistics show slightly different trends. In the general 
population of texts, politics occupies as much as 87%. Along with politics, 
articles related to law/justice stand out in the very general mass of texts - 
37% (among the most popular articles there are only 2% of them), military-
related texts - 25% (among the most popular there are 17%) (Figure 4). This 
again shows that easy reading content is more popular than specialized 
analytical texts. 
Figure 4. The most shared articles and control group articles by topic (Top shares N=139; 
control group N=300) 
Although most of the articles relate to political topics, the data from the 
shares shows that politics is not the most attractive and engaging topic for 
readers. Everyday tabloid-style texts receive twice as much attention as 
serious analytical texts. Scandalous information (both serious and trivia 
texts) is also shared much more frequently (Figure 5). 
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Figure 5 The most shared articles by topic and length (N=139) 


















































































characters) 8015 7979 6404 5862 5228 5084 4562 2971 
Average share 
count 434 685 559 664 1634 1117 624 1107 
The length of articles in the target group (the top shared) differs significantly 
from the general context. Compared to the control group, the volume of the 
most shared texts is larger for almost all topics. On political, military, legal 
and conflict-related topics, the average length of texts is almost twice as big. 
In only two areas (culture and scandalous topics) are the lengths of the texts 
of the most popular articles lower than those of the control group. An 
interesting trend is observed, which allows us to assume several significant 
segments of the media audience. The first type, conditionally called easy 
readers, are mostly interested in, and share everyday topics (lifestyle, 
culture/society, scandals) and, in a sense, avoid longer texts. The second type 
of sophisticated readers are engaged in longer, more detailed analytical 
texts. The intensity of text sharing in this group is on average lower than the 
involvement in information dissemination among easy readers. (Figure 6) 
Figure 6: Articles by topic and length. Most shared and control groups 
compared (Top shares N=139; control group N=300) 
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articles 8015 7979 6404 5862 5228 5084 4562 
29
71 
Control group 3475 3910 3574 2965 4939 6092 3665 
37
97 
Shares and sentiments 
The most frequent negative texts related to Russia also include China (a 
growing trend in recent years), Ukraine, and the US. Ukraine and the US are 
usually portrayed very positively in the Lithuanian media discourse, but in 
connection with Russian framework26  they find themselves in a negative 
context. Neutral texts related to Russia are usually limited to a single 
keyword: Russia. Interestingly, negative texts almost always include 
synonyms to the keywords “Russia/Russian”: Kremlin (most negative 
connotations), Moscow and/or Putin. This shows that when depicting Russia 
in a negative context, the media seek to define the image of the negative actor 
clearly—it  is the government and the centres of power, not the Russia the 
country or its citizens. Articles related to Europe, neighbouring Belarus, or 
Lithuania itself (the local hook will be described later) are relatively the more 
neutral. (Figure 7). 
26 Cumulative references to the following keywords: Russia, Russian, Putin, Kremlin, Moscow. 
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Figure 7: Countries by sentiment. Top shared articles (N=139) 
The overall proportion of negative-positive articles related to Russia in the 
control group does not differ from the sample of the most popular articles 
(the proportion of negative items in both samples is about 60%). The 
distribution of positive and negative items in the context of these countries 
is also very close in both cases. Putin, Moscow, Kremlin (political power 
centres) in the control group are also more often associated with negative 
text sentiment compared to the keyword “Russia” (Figure 8).  
Figure 8: Countries by sentiment. Articles in the control group (N=300) 
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Local context 
The analysis results suggest that ‘local hook’ is without a doubt one of 
the key factors in attracting readers’ interest and engagement. Two-thirds 
(63%) of the most shared articles in Lithuanian online media had a ‘local 
hook’ (Figure 9). In the control group, local context was present in only 37% 
of the texts. This suggests that Russia is n intrinsic part of Lithuania's foreign 
policy agenda, which is why it is receiving more attention and analysis in the 
context of local politics and current affairs.  
Figure 9: Local hook in proportions (%) in most shared and control samples (N=139) 
Media texts including related to the local context also bear more neutral 
sentiment. The proportion of negative and neutral sentiments among the 
articles with the ‘local hook’ is nearly equal, while articles without any 
relation to local contexts tend to be more negative (Figure 10).  
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Sources 
There is a clear trend that outlet–owned (DELFI) production is 
predominant (37%) among the most shared articles, while the lion's share of 
the general volume of articles is produced by the local news agency BNS 
(55%). Analytical texts especially stand out among the mostly shared 
segment, as they account for 35% (only 8% in the control group). 
There is a tendency for many Russia-related texts to be produced by an 
external news agency, however it does not guarantee the leadership in 
reader’s interest. In contrast to very “generic” (the agency focuses on the fact 
reporting only) news agency production, authored, more detailed and 
analytical articles receive more interest and engagement. (Figure 11).  
Figure 11: Articles by source (N=155, N=300) 
In the group of top shares, it is observed that the content of texts prepared by 
the outlet (with acknowledged authorship and unacknowledged) is evenly 
distributed between negative and neutral assessments. Negative sentiment is 
prevalent in the news stories sourced from news agencies, especially BNS. 
Yet, news agency reports lag behind Delfi’s texts in popularity (Figure 12). 
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In the control group, we observe very interesting trends. Here, Delfi.lt 
production, in contrast with the group of the most shared texts, is 
predominantly negative. The largest news provider BNS with approximate 
negative-neutral text proportions occupy more moderate positions here 
(Figure 13). It suggests that readers choose more neutral articles from the 
more “militant” authors of Delphi.  
Figure 13: Control sample article sources by sentiment (N=300) 
Key thematic frames in the top-shared group of articles do not differ from 
the total volume of articles. Political themes and the narrative of a conflict 
predominate in both groups are compared (Figures 14 and 15). However, in 
other thematic frames, it is observed that lifestyle/trivia texts are relatively 
popular among the top-shared articles (the demand side), although in the total 
volume of texts (supply side) they make up a relatively small proportion of 
all articles. 
Figure 14. Top shared articles by source and thematic frames (N=139) 
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The control group also shows a relative abundance of texts related to law and 
legal matters, although according to the popularity-sharing statistics they 
elicit the least interest. Supply in this area far exceeds demand (Figure 15). 
Figure 15: Control sample articles by source and thematic frames (N=300) 
Concluding Remarks: Is the Balance Between Information Supply and 
Demand Relevant? 
The study revealed a clear incongruence among the internet media 
content supply and actual reader demand. In depicting Russia, politics, 
military frames although sufficiently engaging the audience (shares), are far 
more frequent in the general sample. Texts with a legal topic are quite 
common in the general sample, but they are completely unpopular (shared 
very rarely). Easy reading content including articles on culture and tabloid-
style texts are more popular than specialized analytical texts. 
It is evident that easy topics attract more reader’s attention and 
engagement, consequently the strategic narratives “wrapped up” in the 
general and neutral context potentially would be better accepted by audience. 
Another factor attracting audience attention is local hook. Articles involving 
local context in the narrative get more readers’ attention and engagement.   
Is the media missing the target? Despite the incongruencies between the 
message supply and demand, the audience accepts the message, at least in 
the case of securitization. Russia is mostly represented as a negative actor. 
While analysing text sentiments, the results indicated that among the most 
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shared (demanded) articles as well as in the general volume of articles 
(supply side) the negative context is highly predominant. In most cases, 
Russia-related keywords appear in close proximity with the words which 
have negative connotations. This relation especially becomes evident in the 
articles mentioning Putin, the Kremlin and Moscow. This suggests that when 
depicting Russia in a negative context, the media seek to define the image of 
the negative actor clearly - it is the government and the centres of power, not 
the Russia itself or its citizens.  
The case study of the Lithuanian leading news provider demonstrated 
that the main messages disseminated by the media do not necessarily attract 
readers' attention and active involvement through message sharing. The 
evidence on audience (dis) interest fits the general idea of passive audience 
involvement (Zaler’s 2003 concept on “monitorial” citizen). The public does 
not necessarily need to be actively engaged in systematic news gathering and 
analysis in order to be informed.  Therefore, the question about how the 
actual government policies could be transferred and understood (necessary 
conditions of democratic participation) by the media-inattentive public 
remains unanswered and requires additional audience perception analysis. 
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VISUAL AND EMOTIVE: RUSSIAN E-NEWS COVERAGE  
OF EU-UKRAINE AGREEMENT ON UKRAINE’S VISA-FREE 
ENTRY INTO THE SCHENGEN ZONE 
Abstract 
This article contributes to the burgeoning field of the study of emotions in politics. 
Admitting the difficulty to assess emotions directly, we track emotions through verbal 
and visual representations available in political narratives, and media narratives in 
particular. In our focus are visual images (cartoons and photographs) contributing to the 
Russian media narratives on Ukraine. Our research case deals with the coverage of EU-
Ukraine agreement on Ukraine’s visa-free entry to the Schengen zone by the Russian 
popular e-news portals in 2017 (sample of 108 visual images). We question potential 
influence of emotive messaging on long-lasting perceptions of Ukraine in Russia in the 
context of the ongoing conflict and employ the image continuum of ‘difference’ – 
‘otherness’ – ‘enmity’ to understand the particular link between emotions and othering. 
We find visual imagery demarcates the boundaries between the Russian Self and 
Ukrainian Otherness, and risks long-lasting effects on perceptions and understandings, 
which will continue to feed into diagnosis of the ongoing conflict, and to influence the 
behaviour and relations around it.   
Keywords:  Ukraine, Russia, the European Union (EU), visa-free entry to the Schengen 
zone, visual images, emotions 
Introduction 
The last two decades have witnessed the ‘emotional turn’ in 
international relations (IR) scholarship (Crawford, 2000; Bleiker and 
Hutchison, 2008; Wolf, 2011; Brader and Marcus, 2013; Hutchison and 
Bleiker, 2014; Clement and Sangar, 2018 among others), where previously 
emotions were in the periphery of scholarly attention. In his comment on the 
lack of interest in emotions in IR, social psychologist Siamak Movahedi 
(1986, pp. 1-2) observed that the predominant reluctance to “acknowledge 
the significant role of social-psychological, cultural and ideological forces in 
the daily conduct of international affairs” was due to a particular pre-set 
vision of foreign policy – as a “rational-bureaucratic and strategic process.” 
The ‘emotional turn’ in IR resonates with the theory of political images and 
perceptions that traditionally stresses the central role played by the 
emotive/affective image element, on par with cognitive and 
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normative/evaluative elements (see the works by Boulding, 1969;  Hopmann 
1996), and specifically in political communication of such images. The study 
of emotions in politics, as an exponentially growing field, agrees that it is 
almost impossible to assess emotions directly. That is why in most instances 
researchers track emotions through verbal and visual representations 
available in political narratives, media narratives in particular. Exploration 
of their visual plane has become the latest addition to IR studies (Bleiker, 
2009; Hansen, 2015; de Buitrago, 2018; Pshenychnykh, 2019). In line with 
the most recent trends in IR research, we focus on politically relevant images 
tailored by media narratives, and explore emotions projected through 
photographs and political cartoons published by leading Russian e-news 
platforms when depicting Ukraine after the EU granted it visa-free entry to 
the Schengen area in 2017. We question potential influence of emotive 
messaging on long-lasting perceptions of Ukraine in Russia in the context of 
the ongoing conflict. 
The Russia-Ukraine conflict, as well as the rapprochement of Ukraine 
towards the West, especially the European Union (EU), challenges Russia’s 
regional leadership visions and respective foreign policies. The visa-free 
travel for Ukraine was yet another affront to Russia’s foreign policy within 
the Russian-Ukraine conflict since the Euro-Maidan movement in 2013. It 
demonstrated the next step in cementing personal encounters of Ukrainian 
citizens with Western socio-political norms, values and the way of life. It 
also indicated the priority the EU assigns to Ukraine (Russia attempted to 
negotiate no-visa entry to the Schengen area for its citizens, yet after the 
annexation of Crimea in 2014, these negotiations have been frozen 
indefinitely). Perhaps more importantly, Ukraine’s growing closeness with 
the EU/the West is sensitive for Russia’s psyche and national identity. For 
Russia, the ever-contesting West is a historical narrative. Western empires 
challenged the Russian Empire throughout centuries, and the West opposed 
the USSR in the Cold War era. After the collapse of the USSR, the EU’s 
Neighbourhood Policy (first outlined in 2003) and especially its Eastern 
Partnership framework (initiated in 2009) indicated to Russia Europe’s 
advance into geopolitical areas traditionally within Russia’s influence and 
control. In the eyes of official Russian narrators, by turning to the West, 
Ukraine – formerly a member of the Soviet ‘family’ – ultimately betrayed 
Russia and set a dangerous precedent for other post-Soviet states as well as 
many nations that build the Russian Federation.  
One of the factors that can endow emotions with political relevance is 
their projection vis-à-vis identity (Hutchison and Bleiker, 2014). For Janet 
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Holland (2014, p.203), national identity requires the production of 
difference, and this process may also include the “creation of otherness.” The 
nation state level could be used to amplify and intensify emotions towards 
other states (Wolf, 2011, p.11), including negative emotions that may lead to 
the extreme images of “otherness” – the enemy. Chaban, Zhabotynska and 
Knodt (2019a,b), who studied Russian e-news portals in their textual framing 
of Ukraine’s visa-free entry to the Schengen area, concluded that emotive 
messages conveyed through the narrator’s attitudes rendered the image of 
Ukraine at the end of the transition process from ‘difference’ to ‘otherness’. 
Yet, according to the findings, the intensity and range of emotions conveyed 
by the media texts did not move the image of Ukraine towards the image of 
the ultimate ‘enmity’ at the extreme end of the image continuum of 
otherness. In this article, we ask if and how visual images (cartoons and 
photographs) contribute to the Russian media narratives on Ukraine and 
position it within the image continuum of ‘difference’ – ‘otherness’ – 
‘enmity’. According to de Buitrego (2018, p.307), “there is little research on 
the particular link between emotions and othering,” and our study addresses 
this scholarly deficit.  
Attention to visual images allows for triangulation of the new findings 
against our previous research into textual emotive portrayals of Ukraine 
gaining visa-free access to the Schengen area (Chaban et al., 2019a,b). 
Relevant literature warns that research into emotions, and particularly into 
emotions in visual analysis, is challenged by researcher’s subjectivity. 
Triangulation is one powerful tool to counter this challenge, alongside a 
“systematic, theory-led method” (de Buitrago, 2018, p.305). In our research, 
such method is informed by the strategic narrative theory (Miskimmon et al., 
2013) which maintains that the narrative has a potential to be strategic if it is 
able “to construct a shared meaning of the past, present and future of 
international politics to shape the behaviour of domestic and international 
actors” (Miskimmon et al., 2013, p.2). To specify this definition, we 
previously argued that the distinctive properties of the strategic narrative 
include its firm grounding in historical and cultural contexts, its abundance 
in emotions-loaded narrative techniques, and its potential to entrench in the 
public consciousness due to multiple iterations of the intended ideas in verbal 
and visual representations (Chaban et al., 2019a,b). This article highlights 
the visual aspect as it integrates with the verbal aspect of the strategic 
narrative, so as to create emotive framing of the image. Therefore, this study 
offers one more conceptual innovation – visual elements in strategic 
narrative theorisation that remain an overlooked topic (for review see 
Pschenychnykh, 2019). 
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We start this article with a brief contextual section detailing the 2017 
event of the EU granting Ukrainian citizens visa-free access to the Schengen 
area. We proceed with the presentation of our theoretical and methodological 
frameworks and then present the results of the empirical analysis of our 
sample of 108 visual images. We conclude with a discussion of the 
importance of visual means in political media discourse. We outline special 
role of emotions rendered by visual means in the formulation and projection 
of strategic narratives of ‘otherness’ and argue our contribution to the 
‘emotional turn’ in IR which is intrinsically linked to tailoring strategic 
narratives indispensable for foreign policy making. Emotionalisation of 
visual imagery, working in consonance with the textual emotive means, 
contributes to the process of Ukraine’s ‘othering’ in the Russian political 
discourses. We conclude that visual imagery further demarcates the 
boundaries between the Russian Self and Ukrainian Otherness, and risks 
long-lasting effects on perceptions and understandings, which will continue 
to feed into diagnosis of the ongoing conflict, and to influence the behaviour 
and relations around it. 
Historical contexts 
According to the European Commission (2019), “visa liberalisation is 
one of the EU’s most powerful tools in facilitating people-to-people contacts 
and strengthening ties between the citizens of third countries and the EU.” 
The EU and Ukraine negotiated visa-free travel for Ukrainian citizens into 
the Schengen area for almost a decade – between 2008 and 2017. According 
to Ukrinform (2018), the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian Parliament) signed 
and ratified the agreement on the facilitation of visa issuance between 
Ukraine and the EU on January 15, 2008. A visa dialogue between Kyiv and 
Brussels started at the EU-Ukraine Summit in Paris on September 9, 2008. 
In 2010, the European Parliament adopted a resolution recognizing 
Ukraine’s right to join the EU and granted the European Commission a 
mandate to elaborate a “road map” on visa-free travel between Ukraine and 
the EU member countries. In April 2011, the President of Ukraine approved 
of the National Plan for the Implementation of Visa Liberalization. On April 
6, 2017, the European Parliament confirmed the right of Ukrainian citizens 
to enter the EU without visas. Approved by the European Council on May 
17, 2017, (the text of the decision was published on May 22, 2017), visa-free 
travel came into effect on June 11, 2017. According to the EU Delegation to 
Ukraine (cited by Ukrinform, 2018), “5,799,360 Ukrainians took advantage 
of visa-free travel to the EU in the first three months, namely from July 11 
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to September 11, 2017. Sixty-one people were denied entry.”  Between June 
2017 and January 2019, 2,000,000 Ukrainians used their right to enter the 
Schengen area without a visa (Unian, 2019).  
Theoretical framework 
Strategic narrative theory – a critical reinterpretation of the ‘soft’ power 
concept (Nye, 2007) in the age of globalization, global governance and new 
media – aims to explain how communication flow may serve an instrument 
in producing influence. Strategic narratives, intended to shape the behaviour 
of domestic and international actors (Miskimmon et al., 2013, p.2), have a 
life-cycle that includes phases of formulation, projection and reception. The 
theory also differentiates between three intertwined yet distinct levels of the 
system, identity and issue narratives. According to Chaban et al. (2019), the 
construct of the three levels helps to “addresses the intersecting visions of 
the Self and the Others critical in the study of images and perceptions in 
external relations.” Specifically, narratives about the international system 
outline how actors view the international order and the Self in relation to 
other powerful global players. Identity narratives focus on those norms and 
values (often linked to and interpreted in historical and cultural terms) that 
make the Self distinctly different (if not unique) from other actors. Narratives 
deployed by political actors with the intent to influence specific issues often 
highlight the theme of a range of capabilities and benefits the Self has vis-à-
vis others in particular issue domains.   
While research informed by the strategic narrative theory often purports 
to explain influence projected towards international actors, in this study we 
are interested in strategic narratives projected towards domestic audiences 
yet with a focus on external actors.  In our case, these are narratives projected 
by the Russian popular e-news media towards their domestic audiences who 
are informed about the EU-Ukraine relations (i.e. visa-free access to the 
Schengen area granted to Ukrainian citizens by the EU). On a systemic level, 
this event triggers the necessity to produce narratives that have to rebuff the 
EU’s successful contestation of Russia in its geopolitical ‘neighborhood’ (or 
‘near abroad’ in the Russian political parlance). These are also narratives that 
have to convince domestic audiences that Russia is not losing in the 
geopolitical competition to the West, and it makes sense for multiple nations 
that form the Russian Federation to stay within it. On the identity level, the 
considered narratives have to portray Russian values and norms as unique 
and superior to those of the EU and Ukraine that strives to Europeanize its 
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normative outlook and practices (for more discussion on the normative 
dialogue between Russia and the EU see (Headley, 2015a,b; 2018)). On the 
issue-specific level, the considered narratives have to convince that the 
Others – the EU and Ukraine in our case – perform with flaws on operation 
level, which questions rationality of Ukraine’s ‘European choice’. Arguably, 
narratives existing on the three intertwined levels provide means to structure 
the “possible interpretation of the world” (Movahedi, 1986,) among its target 
audiences. For Siamak Movahedi (1986), “the interpreted world involves 
elements of an action situation, including national interests and security as 
well as the intention, capability, and national characteristics of the other 
party, such as reliability, aggressiveness, and trustworthiness.”  
We follow the social identity theory that argues that the construction of 
the Self-Other nexus is never emotion-free. Self-visions tend to be heavier 
on the positive side, while images of the Other are prone to acquire negative 
characteristics. This inherent bias stemming from the human’s strife for self-
preservation is exploited for ideological purposes, with an ideological system 
– defined as a “system of basic beliefs” (Movahedi, 1986) – providing
“grounds and rationale for certain foreign policy decisions” (ibid.). Relevant
literature points to three positions in identity-emotion intersection
instrumental for the existence of ideological systems (on the level of nation
states): ‘difference’, ‘otherness’ and ‘enmity’. Anthony Smith (1991, p.9ff)
proposed that national identity is about “describing political community with
institutions, rights and duties in a historic and defined territory, with shared
myths and memories, and a given way to comprehend and define the self.”
Sybille de Boitrago (2018, p.304) follows this thought by stating that “a
national identity is differentiated from something other in order to exist” and
thus emphasising the role of difference. However, according to Janet Holland
(2014, p.203), the production of difference may also include the creation of
“otherness.” The process of othering, where a state frames another state as
the key or radical Other, leads to Self-Other relations conceived from a
negative point of view (Neumann, 1999). Ultimately, provided the process
of othering is loaded with ample and intensive negative emotions, the Other
may end with the image of an enemy (Wolff, 2011) – an antagonistic, hostile,
harmful and potentially deadly opponent.
Here we stress that the analysed media are not the “oppositional voices” 
(the latter are not many in Russia), and the content of media narratives is 
similar to that of official (power) narratives. The difference is in their 
“language” (verbal and pictorial) which is less expressive (more diplomatic) 
in official narratives and more expressive in the media. Our previous inquiry 
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into the Russian mainstream media framing Ukraine’s visa-free access to the 
Schengen area (Chaban et al. 2019a,b) demonstrated the weighting in 
evaluations and the share volume and frequency of negativity in verbal texts. 
The inquiry exposed solidifying the image of Ukraine as the Other, and 
moving Ukraine to the extreme in imagining the Other vs. the Self. We also 
concluded that the texts profiled only minimally positive images of Ukraine 
and its actors when “historical links in the past and shared culture between 
Russia and Ukraine were cited as common grounds” (Ibid.). In this study, we 
want to explore the contribution of visual imagery to the emotive load behind 
the process of Ukraine’s othering in Russian opinion-making discourses. We 
predict that the emotionalisation of visual images will serve yet another 
powerful input into the shift of meanings assigned to Ukraine in the Russian 
media framing – from ‘difference’ to ‘otherness’– echoing, amplifying and 
strengthening the textual framing. Our special attention will be on political 
cartoons and photographs. We ask how visual imagery complements the 
textual imagery we observed previously and adds to/intensifies the existing 
emotive framings to move the meanings assigned to Ukraine from distinct 
‘otherness’ to ‘enmity’ exposed in a conflict. According to de Buitrago 
(2018, p.306), conflicts “allow for emotionalisation, in that they provide 
fertile ground and give room for emotionalising the contested issue(s) as well 
as self and other.” Importantly, “emotionalising the situation and the 
involved issues and actors adds weight to the claims made” (de Buitrago 
2018, p.306). 
We conceptualise the resulting emotive framing of the Other as a key 
part of a complex architecture of factors that can make a narrative ‘strategic’, 
or aimed to influence the public outlook and behaviour (Miskimmon et al. 
2013). These factors – the narrative’s contextualization within a cultural and 
historical continuum shared by the communicants, the narrative’s 
emotionalization through particular verbal descriptions, and the narrative’s 
accentuation achieved through iteration of the key ideas that are to be 
entrenched in the public mentality (Chaban et al. 2019a,b) – are presumed to 
be relevant not only for verbal, but also for visual semiotic means. Although 
the strategic narrative theory has been tested in a great number of textual 
productions, the role of visuals remains under-researched.  Visual element in 
the strategic narrative theorisation and testing has been increasingly argued 
as important and requiring an in-depth analysis (see Pschenychnykh, 2019 
for its motivation). Our paper responds to this query with examination of 
cartoons and photographs integrated into media texts.   
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Method 
 
 In current IR scholarship, the so-called ‘visual turn’ is becoming a 
prominent trend that reflects on growing realisation that “visualisations in 
various forms [are] an integrated part of contemporary culture and everyday 
life” (Knoblauch et al., 2008, para 1). As Bocken (2005, p.24) aptly noted: 
“Pictures rule out our world. … Anything that doesn’t appear as image has 
hardly any clout in culture and society.” A dramatic increase in “society’s 
use, production and transmission of visual forms of communication” 
(Knoblauch et al., 2008, para 2) has been echoed by increasingly widespread 




 One of the most challenging research issues is the question of how to 
approach visual data analysis. We are positioning our protocol within the 
interpretive social science tradition, using a qualitative approach within 
which methodologies “address the cultural meaning of visual data and relate 
to the ways in which actors themselves interpret visual data” (Knoblauch et 
al., 2008, para 3). Abundant relevant literature invites to consider a number 
of categories in the analysis of visual images. We prioritize literature that 
treats visual means as a tool to explicate the construction of the Self and 
Other in the observed discourses and convey emotively-loaded messages 
aimed to elicit emotive and affective responses. For example, Hughes (2007) 
attracted attention to how visual means are used for expression about the Self 
and Other and advocated to study how they render emotional amplification 
as well as intentions and motivations for actions. Andersen et al. (2015) 
invited to take note of the discourse regarding the behaviour of the other; 
assumed/interpreted motivations for specific behaviour; and character 
ascription made to the other.  
 
 Multimodal approaches – when the visual and verbal interact – remain 
under-researched in studies of visual imagery (Fahmy and Kim, 2008, as 
cited in Chaban et al., 2014). Our research contributes to the study of 
multimodality innovatively – via considering visual images within the entire 
narrative space instantiated verbally and visually. This narrative space 
features information understood as the narrative-based political concept 
(NBPC) (Zhabotynska, 2017a, p.32; Zhabotynska and Velivchenko, 2019, 
p.366). We maintain that within an NBPC, the information rendered verbally 
and visually displays thematic, emotive, and emphatic interaction. 
Importantly, there is a link between an NBPC and strategic narrative theory: 
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any narrative has content (it renders some homogeneous information) which 
is represented by an NBPC.  
Thematically, a verbally rendered NBPC is hierarchically structured 
into domains divided into parcels that include thematic quanta generalising 
information which is provided by particular textual descriptions. This 
structure represents the NBPC’s conceptual ontology (Zhabotynska, 2017a). 
We further argue that the information featured by the visual images 
integrated with the verbal texts has its own conceptual ontology mapped onto 
the ontology of verbal information in a specific way: it highlights the issues 
(actors and the constituent events) related either to a particular focus of the 
verbal ontology or to its several foci that have the same actors. Therefore, 
our analysis of the visual means representing the NBPC “Visa-free travel for 
Ukraine” includes exposure of their content and building its conceptual 
ontology mapped upon the respective ontology of the verbally rendered 
information (see Chaban et al., 2019a,b). 
Emotive interaction of the verbally and visually rendered information 
has two interrelated aspects. First, it is the interplay of the verbal and visual 
information within an entire textual message. Second, it is the impact of the 
verbal information upon the visual one, due to which the latter acquires an 
implicit assessment. The interplay between verbal and visual homogeneous 
emotive connotations (neutral, positive or negative) has a number of 
potential options:  
(a) TEXT: neutral + PICTURE: neutral
(b) TEXT: neutral + PICTURE: explicitly connoted
(c) TEXT: explicitly connoted + PICTURE: neutral
(d) TEXT: explicitly connoted + PICTURE: explicitly connoted
Option (a) suggests a neutral row of compatible visual and textual 
images, which is declared to be optimal for an objective reporting style. 
Meanwhile, emotion-free media messages are seldom. Our previous study of 
the verbal devices that instantiate the NBPC “Visa-free travel for Ukraine” 
in the Russian news media (Chaban et al., 2019a,b) demonstrated evident 
negative connotations in evaluations of Ukraine moving closer to the EU: 
out of 555 verbal descriptions of the NBPC, 241 were negative.  According 
to the above interaction options, the visual accompaniment of these verbal 
narratives contributes to their content in two ways: explicitly negative visuals 
may amplify explicit negativity of the verbal text, as in (d), or explicitly 
negative visuals may attach negativity to a verbally neutral text, as in (b).  In 
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the last case, the placement of the visual image adds a nuance to 
understanding of the intertextuality. A negatively connoted picture placed at 
the beginning of an emotionally neutral text may programme its further 
negative interpretation; and when placed in the middle or at the end of a 
neutral text, a negatively connoted picture may partially or entirely change 
its initial neutral perception. 
Option (c), when a negatively connoted text includes a neutral picture, 
may have two outcomes of the text’s interaction with this picture: depending 
on the visual content, the picture may either remain neutral (thus serving as 
a mere illustration of some verbally rendered issue) or it may obtain implicit 
negativity (that supports a similar assessment which is explicit in the verbal 
manifestations of the NBPC). Thus, the total body of visuals representing the 
NBPC “Visa-free travel for Ukraine” may be stratified within a tripartite 
evaluative continuum related to negativity: neutral pictures – implicitly 
negative pictures – explicitly negative pictures (Figure 1).   
Figure 1: Evaluative continuum of the visual means in connoting negativity 
We presume that the full length of the evaluative continuum (the 
presence of its three parts) exposed in thematically homogeneous pictures 
relates to the emphatic type of interaction between the verbal and visual 
representations of an NBPC. With regard to the NBPC “Visa-free travel for 
Ukraine,” it means that the longer evaluative continuums shaped by the 
visual information correspond to the prominent thematic issues – the facts 
emphasized by numerous textual descriptions.   
The thematic, emotive and emphatic interactions of information 
featured in an NBPC verbally and visually defines the resulting research 
procedure for the analysis of visuals portraying the NBPC “Visa-free travel 
for Ukraine.” This procedure includes such steps: (1) thematic grouping of 
the visual means according to a conceptual ontology, which is matched with 
the respective conceptual ontology arranging information rendered verbally; 
(2) analysing the thematic chunks of the visuals’ conceptual ontology with
regard to the evaluative continuum of negative connotations; (3) defining the
most prominent topics represented with a complete, tripartite, evaluative
Neutral 
pictures 
(retain neutrality in 
any verbal context) 
Implicitly negative 
pictures 
(acquire negativity in a 
particular verbal context) 
Explicitly negative 
pictures 
(retain negativity in any 
verbal context)  
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continuum of visuals, and describing the semiotic techniques that assign 
negative connotations to the visual means.  
 
Visual means in the focus of analysis 
 
Our empirical focus is on two types of visual images that accompanied 
the articles on Ukraine’s no-visa access to the EU in the selected Russian e-
news platforms – political cartoons and photographs. Both types add to the 
process of creating the resultant emotion-loaded frames. 
 
 Keeping the conceptual focus on Self-Other perceptions, we choose 
cartoons as they “can express critical views of self and other, and of their 
relations” (de Boitrago, 2018, 308). Relevant literature considers political 
cartoons to be an important part of political opinion discourse (Wiid et al., 
2011, p.138). Bain et al. (2012) stress that cartoons are “sources of 
significant discursive and interpretive power” (consider, for example the 
scandal surrounding the so-called ‘Mohammed cartoons’ in Denmark or 
tragedy of Charlie Hebdo in France). IR scholarship is increasingly 
interested in political cartoons (Dodds, 2010; Manzo, 2012, de Bouitrego 
2018). Here, Gombrich (cited in Bigi et al., 2011, p.153) argues that the 
power of cartoons comes from their ability to capture both context and 
relationships into a single visual ‘snapshot’, which can “re‐contextualize 
events and evoke reference points in ways that a photograph or even a film 
cannot.” Thus, cartoons can offer condensed and simplified portrayals of 
complex situations in order to aid audience cognition. We extend this 
argument and offer that cartoons are often more than a “single visual 
snapshot” but in many instance a multi-modal visual means. They combine 
a picture and a text and as such the visual in cartoon establishes relationship 
to its own verbal text as well as the text of the article it is situated in. The 
text in the cartoon might do quite a lot of explicit explaining.   
 
 Irrespective of the presence of the text in cartoons, “cartoons seize upon 
and reinforce common sense and thus enable the public to actively classify, 
organize and interpret in meaningful ways what they see or experience about 
the world at a given moment” (Greenberg (2002, p.181). By capturing a 
moment in this way, cartoons are often argued to have a “universal’ 
readability and appeal” (Conners, 1998, cited in El Refaie, 2009b, p.182) – 
yet in a particular culture.  Being culture-specific, they may invite different 
interpretations (Dodds, 2010; Hughes, 2007). Importantly, cartoons – 
through provocation – are effective in triggering certain emotions. As Bigi 
et al. have noted, a cartoon can “[expose] viewers to a point of view for or 
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against its subject, either by presenting it as a figure worthy of sympathy or 
by distorting it into a figure of ridicule” (2011, p.153). Political cartoons are 
an “effective way for artists to express their thoughts about the events in a 
certain period in a comical manner” (Becker, 1959). And while irony or 
mockery are the most typical emotive strategies employed by cartoons, 
Dodds (2010) observed cartoons rendering danger and threat. By their 
nature, cartoons cannot be “neutral.” Political cartoon are not humorous, they 
are sarcastic. Multiple iteration and involvement of the historical and cultural 
memory of the audience central for the cartoon production resonates with 
characteristics of strategic narratives rendered verbally. 
Photographic visual means is a popular subject in political 
communication literature. Its detailed overview remains beyond the limits of 
this article. Here, we cite works that invite to consider photographs in a two-
pronged approach – as images that “…are produced to serve as records of 
reality, as documentary evidence of the people, places, things, actions and 
events they depict” (Van Leeuwen and Jewitt, 2002, p.4) as well as images 
where their maker or makers “have (re-)constructed reality, as evidence of 
bias, ideologically coloured interpretation” (Van Leeuwen and Jewitt, 2002, 
5, as cited in Chaban et al., 2014). We share the argument that 
photojournalists’ outputs may be not random but “manufactured and framed 
for consumption…” (Perlmutter and Wagner, 2004, p.95). We also share an 
argument that image selection by the editors may be based on aesthetics or 
political motivation (Perlmutter and Wagner, 2004, p.94). By undertaking a 
visual images analysis of photographs, our study aims to explore “the hidden 
or implicit text that lurks behind any given icon and photography” (Sekula, 
1982, p.85, as cited in Chaban et al., 2014). We presume that in portraying a 
particular image rendered by media narratives, photographic images that 
record reality as well as frame it in a particular, ideologically coloured way 
interact with the verbal text as well as with each other.  
Aware of the challenge of subjectivity in the analysis of emotive 
connotations, we conducted data analysis independently from each other and 
compared results. The research team had only minor instances of 
disagreement in the coding of the visual images, and differences were 
discussed and resolved. Analysis of two types of visual images allowed to 
increase validity of the analysis, while a bigger sample strengthened its 
reliability. 
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Sample 
Our focus is on Russian e-news portals as a part of mainstream media 
camp. Despite the rising influence of new social media, mainstream media 
(which have acquired a digital format) remain a “vital actor in the system 
creating and reinforcing misperceptions” (Duffy, 2018, p.15). This is 
especially true in non-democratic societies where elites and governments 
monitor and censor media, while media is subordinate to the elites.  
The case selected for observation is granting Ukrainian citizens visa-
free travel to the Schengen area. The periods of observation are 11-18 June 
and 12-16 July, 2017, representing two timeframes – one week after the visa-
free travel started and one month after it came into effect. The data was 
collected in real time, as the news items were appearing. The key search 
terms included: Ukraine, the European Union/EU, Europe, European 
Commission/EC, European Parliament/EP, European Court of Justice/EJC, 
and case-specific visa-free travel. The key search words included full names, 
abbreviations and composites typical of the Russian language (e.g. 
Evrokomissiia). The media were processed by a native speaker of Russian. 
Overall, six mainstream e-news portals were observed, with the final sample 
of 52 articles: Aif.ru (8 articles); Life.ru (14), Mk.ru (5), Novayagazeta.ru 
(1), Republica.ru (1), Ria.ru (23). The analyzed Internet e-news portals are 
recognised as popular and influential media sources, with wide reach inside 
Russia and outside its borders (Malashenko, 2015). Out of the 52 articles, 
seven were reprints, while the rest were original articles. Our sample is 108 
visual images, among which two are multiply iterated cartoons. One more 
cartoon considered in this study came from a later article published by 
Luga1news.ru a year after the visa-free agreement’s enactment and focused 
on the evaluation of its consequences.  
Findings 
Analysis of information rendered by 108 pictures that accompany 53 
(52+1) media narratives on granting the visa-free travel for Ukraine allows 
for building the visuals’ conceptual ontology that includes three thematic 
domains: (1) UKRAINE – THE EU RELATIONS, (2) UKRAINIANS 
TRAVELLING TO THE EU, and (3) RUSSIA ABOUT VISA-FREE TRAVEL FOR 
UKRAINE. Each domain has several parcels, the negative evaluation of which 
fits into the tripartite continuum which is either incomplete or complete 
(Table 1).  
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Table 1: VISA-FREE TRAVEL FOR UKRAINE: Conceptual ontology of visual images 
with a matrix of the evaluative continuum (six mainstream e-news portals) 










1. UKRAINE – THE EU RELATIONS 50 37 10 3 
1.1. Ukraine 1 1 - 
1.2. President Poroshenko 11 3 7 1 
1.3. Ukrainian officials 5 5 - - 
1.4. The EU officials 5 5 - - 
1.5. Visa-free travel enactment: 
celebrations in Ukraine  
9 9 - - 
1.6. Visa-free travel enactment: 
celebrations on the Ukraine-
Slovakia border 
8 6 1 1x2 
1.7. Ukraine's getting closer to the EU 10 8 2 - 
2. UKRAINIANS TRAVELLING TO
THE EU
46  24  9 13 
2.2. Getting biometric    passports 1 - 1 - 
2.2. Transportation 10 9 1 - 
2.3. Crossing the border. 
 Passport control 
26 15 7 3+1x10 
3. RUSSIA ABOUT VISA-FREE
TRAVEL FOR UKRAINE
12 11 1 - 
3.1. Russia 1 1 - - 
3.2. President Putin 4 4 - - 
3.3. Russia's officials and Russia's 
Ukrainian allies 
2 2 - - 
3.4. Russia-Ukraine relations 2 1 1 - 
3.5. Lermontov's poem "Farewell, 
unwashed Russia" 
3 3 - - 
TOTAL 108 72 20 16 
Among the three thematic domains in table 1, the most salient visually are 
the first and second themes, UKRAINE – THE EU RELATIONS, and 
UKRAINIANS TRAVELLING TO THE EU, which agrees with the thematic 
salience of the respective verbal texts (Chaban et al., 2019a,b). Thematically 
and emotively, the parcels of the visual ontology agree with representation 
of actors throughout the domains of the verbal ontology (Table 2). 
Table 2. VISA-FREE TRAVEL FOR UKRAINE: Assessments of the actors in the 
conceptual ontology of verbal descriptions (Chaban et al. 2019a, b). 
Actors Negative descriptions Positive descriptions 
Visa-free travel for Ukraine 30 - 
Ukraine 93 5 
Ukrainian people 50 - 
Ukrainian authorities 11 - 
Ukrainian president Poroshenko 35 3 
The EU (all actors together) 22 - 
Russia - 12 
Russian President Putin - 7 
Total 241 27 
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Comparison of the negative evaluation realised verbally and pictorially 
reveals a larger portion of negativity depicted verbally: out 555 verbal 
descriptions instantiating the NBPC “Visa-free travel for Ukraine,” almost a 
half of the sample (241) are negative, while out of 108 attendant visual 
images, one third (36) are negative. Among the emotively connoted visual 
images, 20 have implicit negativity, and 16 have explicit negativity that 
makes the evaluative continuum complete. A complete evaluative continuum 
has been found in three parcels of the visuals’ conceptual ontology: 
1.2. “President Poroshenko,” 1.6. “Visa-free travel enactment: celebrations 
on the Ukraine-Slovakia border, and 2.3. “Crossing the border. Passport 
control.” These three parcels, prominent in the visual ontology, are also 
prominent in the verbal ontology (see Chaban et al., 2019a,b). The remainder 
of the section considers the ways in which the pictures feature the above 
three topics.  
Parcel 1.2. “President Poroshenko.” The Ukrainian president, as a key 
person in the development of Ukraine – the EU relations and an actor of a 
number of events constitutive for the NBPC “Visa-free travel for Ukraine,” 
is portrayed in 11 pictures, three of which are neutral, seven have implicit 
negativity, and one has explicit negativity. Some visual images are photos 
taken at the festivities celebrating the enactment of Ukraine’s visa-free 
travel. At those events, the Ukrainian president said farewell to Russia and 
emphasised Ukraine’s progress in cooperation with the EU.  
The three photos classified as neutral are official, contextually free 
portraits of the president. The seven photographs, classified as implicitly 
negative, portray Poroshenko participating in different events. In these 
photographs, he is not maintaining a direct eye contact with the reader, which 
may imply that his addressee is not the Russian audience.  Besides, avoiding 
a direct eye contact with the interlocutor may point to insincerity of the 
speaker. The photos also depict Poroshenko with a clenched fist, arguably a 
symbol of threat. In most photos, Poroshenko is speaking in front of a 
microphone, which may indirectly reference his love of public appearances, 
PR and publicity.  
One visual image, classified as explicitly negative, is the cartoon 
portraying Poroshenko as a saint in a conventional Orthodox icon. The hallo 
around his head has the stars symbolising the EU, and near the hallo are the 
words “Sacred Visa-Free Travel.” Similar to a tsar, Petro Poroshenko holds 
the ‘sceptre’ and ‘power’ – a toilet brush and night pot respectively. The pot 
also associates with the Saint Grail (de-sacralisation of “Sacred visa-free 
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travel”), while reference to plumbing and toilet hints at the ‘careers’ awaiting 
Ukrainians in the EU. Referencing his position in power, Poroshenko is clad 
in an official suit, yet he also wears a shabby casual scarf the match to which 
is a crumpled euro banknote in his lapel pocket. The cartoon has obvious 
historical and cultural resonances for the Russian-speaking audiences. 
Historically, it alludes to Peter the Great, the most famous Russian tsar 
whose first and patronymic names (Pyotr Aleksyeevich) coincide with those 
of Poroshenko, and whom the Ukrainian president allegedly wants to 
resemble. Culturally, the reference to an Orthodox icon is accompanied by 
Porochenko’s parallel with Ostap Bender, a character from the satirical novel 
“12 chairs” by Ilf and Petrov popular in the former USSR. Ostap Bender, a 
notorious swindler, is prompted by a banknote in Poroshenko’s pocket and a 
scarf around his neck (Bender’s distinctive feature). Also, potentially, the 
scarf alludes to scarves worn by gay men – reference to “Gayropa” (gay 
[Eu]rope) to where Ukraine is seen to be heading, with its commitment to 
European liberal values different from the Russian conservative values. The 
narrative strategy – destruction of the image – is realised through the 
narrative tactic of mockery that is also most used in verbal descriptions (see 
Chaban et al., 2019a,b referring to the narrative strategies of suppression, 
destruction and direction described in Wagnsson and Barnzje, 2019). This 
cartoon was encountered once, in the article published a year after enactment 
of Ukraine’s visa-free travel and concerned with its value for the country. 
The cartoon precedes the verbal text thus prescribing the further emotive 
perception of Ukraine and its European choice.  
Parcel 1.6 “Visa-free travel enactment: celebrations on the Ukraine-
Slovakia border.” This theme is represented by nine visual images, six of 
which are neutral photos, one is a photo with implicit negativity, and one is 
a cartoon with explicit negativity.  
Six photos classified as neutral depict the Ukrainian and Slovakian 
presidents at the festivities dedicated to the enactment of the visa-free travel 
agreement. One photo with implicit negativity features the Ukrainian and 
Slovakian presidents walking towards each other with open arms. And while 
neutral, or even positive image at the first site, in combination with the verbal 
representations, the image hints at Ukraine’s “European embrace” (and 
Ukraine’s subsequent betrayal of Russia).  
In one of the neutral photos, the Slovakian president meets his Ukrainian 
colleague in a symbolic ‘door’. The door theme gets continuation in the 
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explicitly negative cartoon featuring Poroshenko as a tiny person who tries 
to reach a red button (named “Visa Regime”) that opens a metal garage 
door/window blind (arguably, with the potential allusion to an iron curtain). 
The opening is half-closed, we can see only a partial perspective on a zig-
sag road leading to the horizon. The road is paved in a familiar blue colour 
of the EU flag. The cartoon is entitled “To reach the stars” – reminiscence of 
the Latin saying Per aspera ad astra (lit. Through thorns to stars), with the 
stars understood also as a symbol of the EU. The clues – a half-closed 
opening, the tiny height of the Ukrainian leader that does not allow him to 
reach the button, the zig-zag road behind the curtain – frame Ukraine’s 
cooperation with the EU as hardly attainable, challenging in progress and out 
of scale for Ukraine. Arguably, an opening, no matter how small, another 
lifting of the “iron” curtain, and a road ahead may hint some positivity, yet 
it is negated by a minute figure of the Ukrainian leader, who is suggested to 
be out of proportion for the grand task. As such Ukraine’s break-through to 
Europe is metaphorically diminished.  Historically, the cartoon also cross-
references Peter the Great, who “cut out a window to Europe” (A. Pushkin) 
by conquering the Baltic coast. The figure in the picture, though, is very 
small to be compared to Peter the Great. Another historical allusion is the 
rising curtain that looks like an iron one, and thus refers to the “Iron Curtain” 
– the ideology that separated the USSR from the West. Similar to the cartoon
discussed above, this cartoon also employs the narrative tactic of mocking.
Arguably, it instantiates the narrative strategy of destruction that may be
coupled here with the subsidiary strategy of direction: Ukraine should not try
to attain unattainable and be more sensible and realistic in its aspirations and
directions. The cartoon’s title – “To reach the stars” (alluding to the EU stars
but also to celestial unreachable objects) – reinforces this message. The
cartoon was used twice, in both cases after neutrally-connoted texts.  The
cartoon offers a means to re-interpret the neutral emotivity rendered by the
text.
Parcel 2.3 “Crossing the border. Passport control.” This theme is most 
prominent, being represented in 26 visuals – 15 neutral photos, seven 
implicitly negative photos, and four explicitly negative images, three of 
which are photos and one is a cartoon.  
The neutral photos show a Ukrainian passport, the Ukrainian border, 
Ukrainian border guards and Ukrainian passport control officers at work. 
The photos classified as implicitly negative depict long lines of vehicles at 
the Ukrainian border waiting to cross (5 photos). Other photographs 
supporting this message are photos of a border officer with a sizeable pile of 
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Ukrainian passports implying big numbers of Ukrainians ready to leave 
Ukraine for Europe.  Finally, in one picture a female is holding two 
Ukrainian passports in a way that resembles a card game (potentially, 
invoking idea of a gamble). 
One of the photos with explicit negativity features a Ukrainian passport 
with a 100-euro banknote inside – an allusion to corruption of the border 
officers. Two photos depict a huge crowd of Ukrainians (headed by aged 
women with worn-out frowning faces) who try to cross the Ukrainian-Polish 
border. The narrative tactic employed in such images – the fact’s pejoration – 
instantiates the narrative strategy of destruction. In the same category is the 
cartoon that represents crossing the country’s border as a symbolic event in 
the life of a Ukrainian. Here, a dishevelled person with a missing tooth who 
is dressed in the Ukrainian national costume and who has a sack stuffed with 
what not (including a bottle of vodka, sausage and a toilet plunger) and 
decorated with a ribbon in the colours of the Ukrainian flag is standing in 
front of the EU starred flag. He recites a verse in ‘surzhik’ (a vernacular 
blend of Ukrainian and Russian, characteristic of lower education groups), 
with the Ukrainian words being intentionally distorted, or “errativised”:  
Я достаю из широких штанин гордость украинську, паспорт 
помятый та еду в Европу зранку! Дывитесь, завидуйте, я 
еврогражданин… или еврогражданка! 
[I pull it from the wide pants, my Ukrainian pride – the crumpled 
passport, and go to Europe in the morning! See and envy, I am a male 
citizen of Europe… or a female one!’]  
The above verse has a vivid cultural resonance. It is a parody of the verse 
“My Soviet Passport” by the renowned Soviet poet Vladimir Mayakovsky 
(1893-1930). The verse, which was compulsory for learning in the Russian 
literature course at Soviet schools, reads:   
Я волком бы / выгрыз / бюрократизм. / К мандатам / почтения нету. 
/ К любым /чертям с матерями / катись / любая бумажка. / Но эту... 
/ Я / достаю / из широких штанин / дубликатом / бесценного груза. 
/ Читайте, / завидуйте, / я — / гражданин / Советского Союза. 
(1929) 
No reverence for mandates — / good riddance! / Pack off to very hell / 
for good / any old paper, / but this one... / As / the most valuable / of 
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certificates / I pull it / from the [wide] pants / where my documents are: 
/ read it / envy me — / I’m a citizen / of the USSR! (translated by Dorian 
Rottenberg).  
The cartoon utilises the narrative tactics of mocking and pejoration of the 
fact (pointing to ‘Gayropa’, with its system of moral values very different 
from those in Russia) that instantiate the narrative strategy of destruction. 
The cartoon has a high degree of frequency. It accompanied 10 articles 
published on the Ria.ru news platform. In all articles, the cartoon was placed 
after the verbal text. In half of the instances, the text was emotionally neutral, 
and the cartoon placed at the end re-directed neutrality to negativity. 
Concluding discussion 
Scholars (Hayakawa and Hayakawa, 1990) describe the war on 
consciousness as a universal phenomenon, and protest against its use by 
governments against their own people. In this paper, we have considered an 
example of such a ‘war on consciousness’ waged for the minds of the 
Russian-speaking audience. We explored visual images employed by the 
leading Russian e-news platforms in their framing of Ukraine. Our study 
focused on one of the milestones in Ukraine’s move towards Europe and a 
major event in the framework of Ukraine’s strategic narrative of ‘European 
Choice’ – Ukraine obtaining its visa-free entry to the Schengen area. Our 
attention to visual images is intentional. The strength of visual imagery lies 
in its ability to dramatize issues, generate emotional responses, and “create 
cognitive shortcuts that compress complex arguments” (Hannigan, 2006, 
p.77-78).
Our analysis of the visual means – following an earlier analysis of the 
verbal representations of the same event (Chaban et al., 2019a,b)  – provides 
an empirical insight into the solidification of Russia’s strategic narrative on 
Ukraine as Russia’s ideological “Other.” Visual images allow it to happen 
on two levels – othering of the Ukrainian state/government/president, but 
also of Ukraine as a country and its people. Here, our message is that it is 
important to consider the multimodal impact: most of negativity in the verbal 
descriptions was assigned to Ukraine and its people (Chaban et al., 2019; as 
well as Table 2 above) and the visuals have supported and magnified this 
verbal message. It is the combination of the textual and visual means that 
adds to the resulting message of Ukraine as increasingly an ultimate “Other” 
to Russia and its people (see the Introduction to this Special Issue quoting 
the most recent statement by the Russia President Putin on Ukraine 
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becoming “anti-Russia”, “requiring our special attention from a security 
point of view” (Osborne and Marrow, 2021)). 
We add to the strategic narrative theorisation. Visual means, as well as 
verbal texts into which they immerse, expose the distinctions typical of 
strategic narratives – multiple iterations, pronounced historical and cultural 
resonances and emotive load.  At the start of this article, we asked if visual 
images framed Ukraine for Russian readers on the continuum of 
‘difference’– ‘otherness’ – ‘enmity’. Here, we conclude that Ukraine’s 
‘difference’ was prominent in the visuals. Multiple visualisations stressed 
Ukraine is ‘different to Russia’ – it has a different passport, different state 
emblem, and different flag. Ukrainian folk costumes and embroidered shirts 
worn by Ukrainians at celebrations intensify this frame. Yet, visual images 
insist on framing Ukraine as moving from ‘difference’ to ‘otherness’. As 
such, they amplify the dynamics of a similar image that we found in our 
earlier analysis of the verbal news texts. Visual means depict Ukraine 
embraced/embracing with Europe, its young people being enthusiastic and 
positive about this change and huge crowds celebrating – all this while 
Ukraine is adopting European values (e.g. ‘Gayropa’). At the same time, the 
reproachment with Europe is shown to be more about Ukrainians’ feverish 
desire to leave Ukraine (e.g. long lines at the borders or piles of passports) 
and even crimes they commit to get out of the country by any means (e.g. 
images hinting at smuggling children out of Ukraine). Visuals also convey 
that Ukraine is not really Europe (e.g. images of Ukrainians looking poor 
and haggard trying to get passports or cross the border, or a cartoon with a 
dishevelled toothless Ukrainian migrant with a toilet plunger). Ukraine’s 
European aspirations are rendered to be out of Ukraine’s reach. However, 
there are only occasional pictures than may indicate a further move to the 
image of ‘enmity’ (e.g. Poroshenko’s clenched fist). The detected shift from 
‘difference’ to ‘otherness’ rendered by the visual images arguably feeds into 
the key characteristics of the strategic narrative – it may mobilise and justify 
certain actions. It is easier to justify conflict, annexation and enact support 
for military aggression if the opponent is seen as not ‘just different’ from the 
Self, but as distinctly the Other – with different values, outlooks and 
orientations. 
Directed at the domestic audience, visual images contribute to the 
strategic narrative on the three levels. On a systemic level, depictions render 
an image of the EU as a contester who is associating with a weak, 
underperforming Ukraine. As such, Russia is not losing in the geopolitical 
competition to the West, but rather becoming stronger by disassociating from 
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poor Ukraine whose citizens are swarming to the borders to leave the 
country.  On the identity level, images portray Russian values and norms as 
superior to those of the EU and Ukraine (references to ‘Gayropa’, to 
smuggled children, to corruption, or to former partner Ukraine who is 
embracing/embraced by the West). On the issue-specific level, visuals 
deliver narratives that convince domestic audiences that the Others, the EU 
and Ukraine, perform with flaws on the operational level (huge lines at the 
borders or at offices to get biometric passports) – the portrayal that 
downgrades the EU as compared with Russia to where Ukrainians may come 
without problems.   
We conclude that any insight into emotively coloured images (visual 
and textual) must be necessarily nuanced. In our article, we propose a 
particular protocol of human-led analysis of emotivity delivered by visual 
means – an evaluative continuum of negative intensity evolving from 
neutrality to implicit and, finally, explicit negativity.  Moreover, we map this 
continuum against the thematic references within a cognitive construct of the 
narrative-based political concept developing an analytical matrix. We argue 
this protocol is applicable for other studies concerned with the intersection 
of cognitive and emotive aspects of IR. Finally, we advocate multimodal 
consideration of connotations assigned to both visual and textual means in 
their interactions. Thematic and emotive resonance between visual and 
verbal modes in framing the Other will amplify the political message and 
serve a solid ground for strategic narratives to take off.  
Our analysis demonstrated that out of two the types of visual images, 
cartoons were the most effective at realising narrative strategies and tactics 
(namely, the strategies of destruction and re-direction) similar to those 
employed for framing by the verbal means discovered in our earlier study. 
Cartoons specifically are an example of simplifications accompanied by 
emotionalisation of conflictual relations: political actors may also have 
stakes in such simplifications and apply these to benefit their political 
agendas” (de Buitrago, 2018, 306) (not lastly due to their multimodality). 
We invite to interpret cartoons as ‘catchy’ memes disseminated by mass 
media through the Internet. Similar to genes that replicate information in the 
physical world, memes, like viruses, replicate ideas and influence human 
thought and behaviour (Dawkins, 1989). The unusual “protein shell” of 
political cartoons is their expressive external form that “hooks attention and 
injects negative assessment which causes mind-numbing. Being 
“immobilized” by a deep negative emotion, one accepts an accompanying 
virtual fact without any critical thinking” (Zhabotynska, 2017b, 240). 
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In our follow up analysis, we examine cognitive, normative and emotive 
reactions by the readers of the news to the reports on Ukraine’s visa-free 
arrangements. In it, we ask if textual and visual images projected by popular 
e-news portals have triggered resonant emotive images among their readers
in terms of valence and intensity, elicited similar strategies and tactics in the
narratives of reception, and mapped a similar positioning of Ukraine on the
continuum of ‘difference’ – ‘otherness’ – ‘enmity’. Future research may also
assess visual images accompanying news texts of other major events in
Ukraine – in the context of its relations with the EU as well as Russia.  Future
studies may also try to gauge the impact of visual images on readers directly
– e.g. through social psychology experiments. Comparative analysis – across
time and space – may provide additional insights into the dynamics of Self-
Other representations in Russian political and media discourses and question
evolution of Russia’s strategic narratives on Ukraine.
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Abstract 
This article is produced in the framework of the policy analysis project: “Challenges to 
the European Security Architecture: Narratives of Control and Influence” by Vilnius 
Institute for Policy Analysis to examine how the European security architecture and 
international law are challenged by strategic narratives promoted by Russian foreign 
policy elites who seek “great power” status for their country, pursue exclusive influence 
in Russia’s European neighborhood, and are increasingly active in efforts to destabilize 
Western democracies. The article will answer the questions if these Grey Zones might be 
dangerous to the European political order. Who are the actors proliferating them and what 
are their intentions? What kind of narratives and media manipulations are these 
proliferators using?  The authors argue that Grey Zones flourish on some of the 
differences in perception of the international order. The West largely understands 
international law and democracy as universally normative and technical. On the other 
hand, the Russian model of plural civilizations, promoted by the government undermines 
the possibility of a shared normative basis for institutions. The Russian effort is received 
as universalist while being local and Russian and thus have consequences in difference 
of perception for both sides. Consistency of the Russian narrative indicates that in spite 
of the current fixation with disinformation and Russian-led information warfare, Russia 
has been coherent in drawing on an imaginary “security”, establishing how much 
adaptation of Russia to international order is “possible” by building the image of the 
neighboring countries as the grey zones and connecting activities and effects of its 
activities with the narrative. 
Keywords: Russia, security, hybrid threat, grey zone narratives, 
Introduction 
Following the Crimean occupation and annexation of 2014 by the 
Russian Federation there has been a steady rise in pro-Kremlin rhetoric by 
the policy think tanks in the West. Russian think tanks and non-governmental 
organizations are among the most important tools at the disposal of Moscow 
and are widely used to exercise soft power in the international sphere. These 
think tanks seek to influence policy discourse, not unlike other means of 
disinformation or propaganda, but their activity is much more targeted, 
directed and precise. The Russian think tanks seek to imitate a model of 
alleged free speech and open discussion while only presenting and promoting 
conceptions of European security that would be the most favourable to the 
Russian state interests.  The Russian strategic establishment attempts to 
apply the system/identity/issue framework in a systematic manner. While 
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there is a wealth of literature analyzing these features of Russia’s worldview 
we attempt to what do think tanks distinctively bring to Russian narratives, 
often without  consistency  across  the think tanks, and  illustrate the idea of 
‘grey zones’ in Russian narratives of contested regions. 
Before being presented in the West, these narratives were actively 
tested internally by the Russian policy analysis community immediately 
following the 2008-2009 Russian-Georgian war and the 2014 occupation of 
Crimea.  These narratives of Grey Zones are not just simplistic 
interpretations of EU and NATO policies on the western frontier of Russia. 
These strategic narratives are utilized in order to weaken western political 
alliances, diminish their prestige and decrease their support of the Baltic 
states, Finland, Poland, Ukraine and all of Eastern Europe.  
What are the Grey Zones? 
There is a temptation to frame Grey Zones in terms of a conflict phase 
or operational environment. There are attempts to operationalize the Grey 
Zones as type of hybrid influence, which is used to destabilize rival states. 
The term or concept of Grey Zone is neither new nor unique to the relations 
of Russia to the Baltic states, Poland, Finland or Ukraine. For example, 
Turkey for several decades (intensively since the 1996 Imia crisis) in 
territorial disputes with Greece over the Aegean Islands, claims that 132 of 
the small islands belong to a Grey Zone. The Grey zone in the Greek-Turkish 
dispute came forward when historical, ideological and linguistic arguments 
began to be used to justify territorial claims on the Mediterranean islands as 
of undefined sovereignty (Heraclides 2010). The terminology of Grey Zones 
was applied to the Baltic states after the 1997 NATO summit in Madrid, 
when Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic were invited to join NATO. 
Eastern and Central European states, which were not invited, in the eyes of 
foreign political analysts and in the view of the political elites of those 
countries were seen as being in a position of uncertainty and insecurity, a 
kind of Grey Zone, over their uncertain future membership in NATO. For 
the Baltic states being in the Grey Zone translated to a cultural and political 
insecurity and an alarming prospect of becoming forever separated from the 
West and turning into a zone of instability.  
Political instability becomes one of the key characteristics of countries 
that find themselves in the Grey Zone. In such countries, politicians battle 
each other by providing increasingly radical choices. Pro-Western political 
and cultural elites can easily lose their ground because the overall insecurity 
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in these countries can manifest itself in questions of cultural and 
civilizational identity. The Grey Zone as a rule is characterized not only by 
insecurity but also by uncertainty. All this takes place in the framework of 
the Russian policies negating international law as an instrument of power. In 
the Russian view, existing rules reduce room for manoeuvre. In its modus 
operandi, Russia has violated these rules in the past and presented this as an 
opportunity to redefine international law. Contrary to the Russian strategic 
narrative, Russia resorted to violence not in reaction to what the West has 
been doing in Europe but due to its own limited capabilities to match the 
goals of great power domination and a lack of resources to achieve these 
goals. This discrepancy led to Russia’s overuse of coercion and kinetic 
power resulting in the further fostering of Grey Zones across Europe in 
Donetsk, Luhansk, Crimea, and Transnistria. (Pugsley et al., 2015) 
The complexity and unpredictability of the security situation directly 
correlates to how difficult it is to answer the question whether there is a 
strong guarantee of NATO countries being able collectively to respond to 
Russian aggression. The western neighbors of the Russian Federation in the 
face of international cataclysm may not have a clear position on the European 
security architecture or the capability to ensure NATO guarantees or self-
reliance in a specific situation. Division and disunity, “patronage” or lack of 
from the larger countries in the medium or long-term perspective and a state 
of uncertainty and insecurity may cause the countries to fall into an economic 
“grey zone”, which would quickly spell economic weakness and exclusion 
from the safety networks of the international system.  
In the conditions of a shifting security architecture, divisions between 
the EU and NATO always become apparent. However, this disconnect 
becomes apparent not because of indigenous cultural-historic development 
but mainly because of cultural-historic projections narrated by Moscow. 
Russia consistently tries to entrench into political rhetoric its portrayal of all 
of Eastern-Central Europe, but especially of the Baltic States, Poland and 
Finland as dependent on Russia economically, culturally and in a wider 
civilizational sense. Russia expects that countries, which its propaganda 
considers and maintains as “theirs” and “being bound by close ties” with 
Russia, in the end can be easily pushed toward “neutrality” or even allied 
relations with Russia. Metaphors take on an important role in justifying and 
constructing their version of reality, instead of consistent, adequate, and 
clearly formulated reasoning. Various biases and stereotypes are presented 
as facts on the ground. 
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With the developments of international security environment, it is very 
important that states bordering Russia do not become targets of Russia‘s 
Grey Zone policy processes. Is it possible to stay to the wayside of these 
processes? Clearly not. However, it is also impossible to clearly answer all 
questions that may arise. There is no distinct boundary between certainty, 
strong belief and doubt that NATO and EU allies will defend the Baltic States 
or the rest of the East Central European countries in the face of a Russian 
threat. The current debates probably will not increase the certainty of 
whether the alliance security apparatus will come in to play as intended in 
the case of crisis. Uncertainty is always part of the perceptions in bilateral or 
multilateral relations in the past and future.  
The ideological context of Grey Zones 
According to the conventional thinking of the Kremlin, recent NATO 
expansion, conflict and disagreements between Russia and European 
countries are impeding and destroying the capability of international 
organizations such as the OSCE or the Council of Europe to resolve such 
tensions. Neither side has cancelled the Paris charter or the founding NATO-
Russian Act, however their contents regarding unilateral United States 
actions have begun to be disputed. They allege that the weakening 
international arms control regime is contributing to this turn of events. 
(Marten 2018) 
Recently, Russian analysts in the international sphere have begun 
ramping up the dialectic of the undefendability of the Baltic states and all of 
Eastern-Central Europe and of its belonging to the Russian sphere of 
influence. As a reaction to the supposed weakening of the arms control 
regime, they suggest disarmament of the Eastern part of Germany and the 
Baltic states and the disarmament of the corresponding parts of Belarus and 
Russia. Russia meanwhile is stoking distrust between the Baltic states and 
their  Western partners, while simultaneously questioning the sustainability 
of this partnership in the West while aiming at retaining Russia's historical 
status as a great power and hegemon in the former Soviet Union and in 
engaging  in competition with the United States (Clunan 2014). 
On the level of discourse, for many years in Lithuania, other Baltic 
States and Poland, we commonly encounter a conservative narrative of anti-
communism and an eventual turn toward Europe. In Lithuania, as in Poland, 
there is a certain longing for the East, directed toward Belarus, Ukraine and 
Russia, i.e. a certain “orientalism” (Zarycki 2010). Without a doubt, this 
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orientalism is associated with a superiority complex and internalized 
Western civilizational mission. On the other hand, there is no doubt that it is 
important to support the real and perceived benefits of human rights, 
democracy and free market. These contradictions are easily exploited by the 
adversaries in Russia. They easily manipulate the conservative perspective.  
The proponents of the mono-perspective view often misunderstand that 
narratives are used to inculcate life scenarios that portray overcoming 
obstacles and victory over difficulties. All scenarios have their cultural and 
sociodemographic filters. Very often narratives are used to demolish a 
particular view held by outsiders and to reinvent the self according to a plan. 
On the other hand, narratives operate within diverse past-present and future 
perspectives. There are attempts to classify narratives in terms of ideological 
narrative wars. On the other hand, it is apparent that in the wars of narratives 
nobody has the clear upper hand. Some narratives weaken and lose 
importance, but they are never truly “defeated.” Their followers may dwindle 
and lose interest due to a changing political, economic or socioeconomic 
context, as well as people’s deaths. All states that harbour a single 
perspective, such as conservative or authoritarian, are very vulnerable to 
narrative invasion and the destabilizing effects thereof, both within the 
country and internationally. Maintaining multiple viable perspectives will be 
effective in countering a systematically propagated authoritarianism or an 
imperial view of the world.  
Strategic narratives 
Strategic narratives enable us to explain causality in the political 
process and to connect seemingly different political events in the past, 
present and future into a logical chain and worldview. If necessary, these 
narratives help mobilize audiences in support of required political decisions. 
Strategic narratives enable the integration of different political challenges 
and solutions into a discrete and believable story. Strategic narratives help 
observers to interpret the past, the present and the future. They can help 
muster political support for certain decisions not just within the country, but 
also internationally (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin & Roselle 2013, Miskimmon, 
O’Loughlin & Roselle 2017). 
Strategic narratives are immensely useful to politicians and state 
administrations in attaining long-term strategic goals. With their aid, 
members of international organizations, politicians operating in the 
international sphere, transnational elites, decision makers, institutional 
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actors and others can rationalise their course of action. Usually strategic 
narratives are directed toward audiences acting internationally and 
strategically, classified into identity, systemic and problem narratives or 
narratives of political goals (Miskimmon & O’Loughlin 2019, Miskimmon 
& O’Loughlin 2017). Sometimes they may be directed also at societies at 
large and include storytelling about (a) what the country is like, (b) in what 
international space it operates, but also (c) problem narratives, that are 
utilized to achieve certain political decisions (Miskimmon & O’Loughlin 
2019, Miskimmon & O’Loughlin 2017). 
Strategic narratives are directed at transnational and foreign policy 
actors, while states use these narratives to strategically solidify their status 
in the world and to justify their goals in international politics. Strategic 
narratives are tools used by political subjects to create shared meaning in the 
past, present and future. Strategic narratives are understood as a cyclical 
progression in the formation of narratives, the projection of narratives and 
their perception. Analysis of narratives allows us to understand how the 
identities of are created, shaped and how they are opposed by others.  
Strategic narratives have a powerful regulatory potential and act as 
certain “instructions” directing how one should act now as well as in 
situations that may arise in the future (Brockmeier & Harre 1984). Strategic 
narratives are not prototypical, they do not follow the blueprints typical of 
the novel or of autobiography. Typically, they refer to one or two 
components that characterise the view the storytellers hold of themselves. 
Narrative research turns storytelling away from narratives as structures and 
looks at narratives as context, within which there is the storyteller and the 
listener. Narratives also influence why certain events instead of others are 
viewed as meaningful or meaningless. The internalised narratives of social 
groups characterise their expectations, historical goals, past sacrifices, allies 
and enemies (Chaban, Miskimmon & O’Loughlin 2019). 
Russia employs strategic narratives to shape perceptions and ensure the 
development of Russian political, economic and military interests 
(Miskimmon & O’Loughlin 2017). In its strategic narrative, Russia projects 
the international system as being populated by “great powers working in 
concert, an elite group of states reinforcing a hierarchy to which Russia 
claims membership” (Miskimmon & O’Loughlin 2017). Russia occupies a 
central place in its foreign policy narrative and narrative of the global order. 
The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation 2000 and Foreign 
Policy Concept of 2000 both reinforce ideas of Russia’s greatness, by 
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claiming that it is a centuries-old country among the largest of the Eurasian 
powers (Miskimmon & O’Loughlin 2017, Russian National Security 
Concept and Nuclear Policy 2021, The Foreign Policy Concept of the 
Russian Federation 2000). 
While feuding with the EU and USA, Russia feels increasingly 
pressured by China. Despite the possible Sino-Russian disagreements and 
conflicts in the future, Russia still defends its interests through foreign policy 
imagery stemming from the Eurasian narrative where Russia is seen as a core 
of the Eurasia and still tries to maintain and control its zone of influence 
along the borders of the former USSR. There is a huge rift between the EU 
and Russian perspectives. For example, Moscow portrays Ukraine, Georgia 
and Moldova as lacking attributes of sovereignty, while Brussels considers 
these states as having the right to self-determination.  
The guilt symmetry approach is one of the essential blocks of the 
Russian narration of the international system. Russia claims that a lack of 
recognition of legitimate Russian interests led to annexation of Crimea, and 
thus the West also bears responsibility for the strained security situation in 
Europe (Interview given by the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov 
2014, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Interview 2015, Washington Post 
Staff 2020). Using this strategy, Russia tries to “balance out” its own 
digressions, building them on the idea that big players use international law 
to secure their own interests all the time, and that international law is an 
instrument of great power competition. Subscribing to guilt symmetry means 
normalizing infringements of rule-based order and simultaneously 
subscribing to the ideas of great power competition. If international fora were 
to accept the ideas that Russia annexed Crimea defending its own interests 
and reacting to Western foreign policy, it would effectively eliminate the 
primacy of sovereignty of states in rules based international order (“Rossiia 
ne tol’ko narushaet mezhdunarodnoe pravo” 2018). 
Russia actively uses strategic narratives to justify the international 
policy decisions it undertakes to further its foreign policy agenda. The 
Russian strategic narratives operate as a system of smaller narratives 
dispersed around different countries and regions which support and justify 
one another. Some larger narratives are engrained in Russian history and 
political culture. Among those historical narratives are those on Russia 
saving “the bourgeois West from its iniquities” and “bringing order” while 
other nations are sinking into anarchy (Wesson 1974). The narrative of 
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defending rights of compatriots is at least few hundred years old – Catherine 
II justified the invasion in Poland and Lithuania on behalf of the Orthodox 
peasantry that needs protection from the predominantly Catholic nobility 
(Wesson 1974). The narration of Russia as a peaceful actor acting in self-
defence and on behalf its own security while expanding into lands of weaker 
states is also not new (Wesson 1974). These older narratives are reused today 
for political ends. Some new strategic narratives that are in use today were 
developed and detailed in Russian think tanks to be later better adapted in 
the policy world; these include ideas on multipolar world order, 
defendability of the Baltic States, and NATO expansions. The objective of 
these narratives today is to project Russia‘s great power status and to 
minimize the effect of possible repercussions for disregard of international 
law, and utilize all tools to curb NATO accession process and prevent post-
Soviet countries from, and punish them for, selecting a pro-Western path.  
Think tanks as tools to promote Russian strategic narratives in the West 
For economic reasons the Kremlin is much less able to spread its 
narratives via creative industries, lifestyle offers or technological innovation, 
than, for example, the United States. However, this fact alone does not mean 
that Russian efforts are less effective. Moscow’s toolbox for strategic 
narration include political statements and initiatives, favourable media 
outlets, GONGO’s, think tanks and expert networks; when all of this fail, 
Russia is known to engage in war and land grabs, as in case of reacting to 
Georgia and Ukraine.  Think tanks are one of the most convenient tools to 
distribute strategic narratives.  
In Russia, the majority of think tanks working on foreign policy and 
security are either directly financed by the state or through businesses 
associated with the Kremlin. Such think tanks have the task of reinforcing 
the Russian strategic narrative. The Global Go To Think Tank Index Report 
identified a total of 143 think tanks in Russia in 2020 (McGann 2021). 
However, the number of think tanks that are producing actual policy-oriented 
work in foreign affairs and security is much lower. Among think tanks used 
to project Russian soft power, Pallin and Oxenstierna, in a report published 
by Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI), identify the following: RIAC, 
Valdai club, Council for Foreign and Defense Policy CFDP, the Gorchakov 
fund, The Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISS), Rethinking Russia, 
Jakunin initiative for the dialogue of civilizations, Information Security 
Institute (ISI) (Vendil Pallin & Oxenstierna, 2017). 
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Barbashin and Greaf, in their analysis for the Atlantic Council focused 
on Russian think tanks and grand narratives, name RIAC, Valdai club, SVOP 
(Sovet po Vneshnei i Oboronnoi Politike), PIR Center, CAST, CENESS, 
INSOR, CSR among those think tanks that instead of academic or contract 
model function according to the advocacy model. Unlike the academic 
model which focuses on academic research, and contract one which focuses 
on contracted research, advocacy think tanks recruit people with different 
background and seeks to “influence policy making and public debate” 
(Barbashin & Greaf 2019). 
In our analysis, we focus on advocacy think tanks that publish in the 
English language, thus seeking to internationalise their model. These are 
Rethinking Russia, RIAC, Valdai, PIR Centre, CAST, CENES, Gorchakov 
Fund and IDC Paris; we also included the academic institution IMEMO 
which despite focusing more on the academic model is very active in 
English.  
Figure 1. Russian think tank publications throughout 1998-2019 
As is evident from Figure 1 which details the number of analytical 
publications in the English language throughout time, the number of 
analytical production grew significantly after 2008 and after 2014 and 
continues to be relatively high. The first spike in 2009 speaks of the need for 
Russia to explain its position and change foreign outlook after the Russo-
Georgian war. The 2015 and 2016 spike is most likely in reaction to the 
declaration of sanctions and other deterrent measures that the collective West 
applied to Russia after the 2014 annexation of Crimea. Behind this growth 
of numbers is the need for Russia to formulate narratives that would support 
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West and Russia and simultaneously prevent countries from joining NATO 
and muddle Russian infringements of international law.  
Figure 2. English language publications according to the institution 
The primary institutions that are spreading Russian strategic narratives in 
English language are the Valdai Club and the Russian International Affairs 
Council (RIAC) (Figure 2). Posing as independent establishments, Valdai 
and Russian Council as well as other think tanks analysed are either directly 
founded and supported by the state, or supported by the businesses close to 
the Kremlin. Interest in the topic of sanctions might directly stem from the 
boards and funders of some of these institutions whose members and 
representatives are individually sanctioned. The best example of this is 
Valdai Club, an influential discussion platform on foreign policy and 
security. The Valdai yearly conferences from the very beginning have been 
attended by Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev. The Valdai Club is 
currently managed by RIAC, MGIMO and National Research University. 
The sources of funding of Valdai are not clear. But among their partners they 
name banks and large industrial corporations. Among these is Alfa Bank, 
headed by Mikhail Fridman and Petr Aven, who were in danger of being 
sanctioned by the US, also VTB bank, which has been sanctioned by the US, 
EU, Canada and Ukraine, and its president Andey Kostin is also the subject 
of sanctions, BF Renova fund, which is headed by Victor Vekselberg, who 
is on the sanctions list of the United States. Another supporter is the steel 
company Severstal whose main shareholder is Alexei Mordashov. Alexei 
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Mordashov is the fourth richest person in Russia and the fifth largest 
shareholder (OCCRP 2016) of Rosiya Bank, under US sanctions.  
Academic and social capital (Bourdieu 1984) of the Russian research 
institutions and think tanks allows the distribution of strategic narratives 
beyond the network available in Russia. This is enabled by associating 
specific narratives with already familiar personalities, recognized situations, 
familiar truths and a recognizable analytical centre. To legitimize their 
narratives Russian think tanks employ: 
• Network authorship. Co-authors, editors and other ‘helpers’ from
Western Institutions are engaged in the authored documents. These
can be representatives of well-known think tanks, foundations or 
diplomats. The social capital of the persons and organizations can help 
legitimise the controversial content through co-authorship.  
• Internationally recognized patrons. Having the patronage of well-
known funders helps legitimise content.
• Repetition of the same message increases persuasive effect (Schulz-
Hardt, S., Giersiepen, A., & Mojzisch, A. 2016) while the repetition
from the multiple sources creates the so called “truth effect”, or in 
other words the perception that the message resonates with a 
significant number of people and thus is correct (Koch, T., & Zerback, 
T. 2013). If the message arrives from several recognised sources, this
both increases its availability to audiences and its believability.
In recent years, not only the number of Russian think tank publications grew, 
but also that of Russian expert engagements with their Western counterparts 
through workshops and seminars, and common publications. 
Rearangement and peripherisation: Narratives of the Grey Zone 
Russian foreign policy towards the collective West functions to the 
backdrop of the following three narratives: 
• European security architecture is in crisis,
• US/NATO is destabilising the region,
• Russia has its sphere of influence.
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The goal of the narratives is to shape perceptions of the Western policy elites, 
including the advisors and analysts, on the Russian understanding of the 
international system. We argue, that these are three main narratives that are 
used to back up Russia’s aggressive military stance on the NATO’s Eastern 
Flank and in the Mediterranean.  
Though identified separately, these narratives act as an argumentative 
whole. They rely on similar discursive premises of great power competition 
and draw support from one another. For example, in public statements and 
analyses it is argued, that European security is in crisis, because US and 
NATO are destabilising the region and the collective West does not 
recognise the legitimacy of the Russian sphere of influence (Putin 2021).  
Below we provide analysis of three narratives focused on rearrangement of 
international system and peripherisation of states that Russia calls its sphere 
of influence. 
We analyse these narratives based on the analytical framework 
proposed by O‘Loughlin, Miskimmon and Roselle (Miskimmon, 
O’Loughlin & Roselle 2013, Miskimmon, O’Loughlin & Roselle 2017) and 
expounded on in earlier sections of this article. All of these narratives are 
geared towards specific policy changes that would allow Russia to contain 
NATO enlargement and impose its authority on neighboring countries, thus 
effectively peripherising them. To achieve this it seeks to shape Western 
policy elites perception on functioning of internatioanal political and security 
systems.   
Narrative 1. Crisis of the European Security Architecture 
Quick rundown: 
Gist. The European security architecture is disintegrating. Former arms 
control regimes are disintegrating, militarization is rapid, tensions are 
growing. This might lead to ‘inadversible collision’ between NATO and 
Russia.   
Activity. Political and diplomatic activity of Russia pushing European 
Security Treaty, adapted version of the CFE treaty, failing to update its 
Vienna document, etc. 
Intended effects. Cancel infringements of international law by adopting new 
provisions, restrict sovereign decisions of independent states to choose 
political alliances, diminish trust in NATO and EU.  
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The foundation of this narrative is a centuries-old sentiment of Russia 
“bringing order” to the “decadent” Europe (Wesson 1974). The narrative of 
European security crisis states that Europe is militarising steadily and this 
threatens European security. According to this narrative, arms control 
regimes such as the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and political declarations 
such as the 1997 Russia-NATO Founding Act and other were instrumental 
in keeping the security sphere of Europe transparent and predictable (Ellehus 
& Zagorski 2019). According to this narrative, Russia is concerned with the 
security of Europe and thus proposes new treaties and amended versions of 
the existing treaties.  
Among early proposals is Dmitri Medvedev’s European Security 
Treaty of 2009 (Zagorski 2010) - a document aimed at legally impeding new 
NATO accessions and deployments. (Weitz 2012) Later policy proposals 
stem from the same institutional network at the centre of which is the Russian 
International Affairs Council and IMEMO (Primakov Institute). These 
proposals come in the form of expert policy recommendations signed by a 
number of authors associated both with the above-mentioned institutions in 
Russia and with analytical and academic institutions in Europe and the US.  
One might ask why Russia, which violated these treaties and documents 
or withdrew from them, is now complaining about the lack of predictability 
safeguarded by these documents? The US have claimed since 2013 that 
Russia possesses weaponry banned by Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
Treaty (INF) until in 2019 US pulled out from the treaty (U.S. Withdraws 
From Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty 2019). Russia withdrew 
from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in 2015. Back in 
2007, it announced it would no longer keep up with the stipulated provisions. 
The Russian Foreign Ministry formally announced that Russia withdrew 
from the treaty and will no longer inform about, or accept inspections of 
tanks, armed vehicles, heavy artillery, helicopters or military aircraft. It also 
announced that Russia is no longer bound by the “ceiling” of armaments. 
Russia has violated principles of the Russia-NATO Founding Act repeatedly, 
most recently by the annexation of Crimea, supporting military formations 
in Donbass, fostering break-away regions across Europe and by many other 
illegal activities. Although the NATO-Russia Founding Act is only a good- 
will, non-binding document, its repeated violations are reflective of the 
overall tense and distrustful situation between Russia and the collective 
West.  Complaining about the dissolution of these documents helps Russia 
present itself as a constructive force in the context of rapid militarisation.  
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The narrative about European security crisis aims to show Russia as 
seeking order, justice and dialogue, while the international arena is immersed 
in anarchy and chaos in which countries are frantically arming themselves. 
The collective West is presented as driven by irrational fears and 
Russophobia (DFRLab 2018, Belikova 2019). It portrays the international 
system as being crisis, which could subside if new agreements proposed by 
Russia were be in place (Ellehus & Zagorski 2019). A narrative that calls to 
return to the violated principles international law distracts attention from the 
illegal activities of Russia, instead pointing at flaws of international order, 
that allegedly are the reason why Russia violated them in the first place. This 
narrative portrays the international system and its pillars in a crisis that could 
subside once the new agreements proposed by Russia are in place. This 
would effectively cancel possible effects of the Russian violation since 
documents would be adapted to these violations.   
The issue or problem narrative here revolves around arms control 
mechanisms in Europe. These mechanisms ensure the transparency of 
deployments, they allow planning the resources and could foresee upcoming 
acts of aggression. They also allow to predict what kind of resources other 
countries can mobilize in case of a potential crisis.  
In conclusion, the narrative of the crisis in European security 
architecture aims to portray Russia as a constructive actor and to enable 
Russian access to arms control regimes, while still maintaining benefits of 
annexations and military deployments abroad, as well as malign influence in 
other countries.   
Narrative 2: The US/the West are Destabilizing the Region 
Quick rundown: 
Gist. Transferring the blame to the US and/or NATO by claiming that the 
US/NATO are destabilizing the international system by withdrawing from 
arms control treaties, supporting sanctions for Russia, new NATO 
accessions, etc. 
Activity. Expulsions of Western diplomats from Russia, support for anti-
European parties with the EU, meddling in the US elections, internal 
propaganda, disinformation efforts in the West.  
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Intended effects. To diminish trust in the US and NATO, increase doubt in 
sanctions mechanism. To cause doubts about US motives in Europe. Project 
great power status for Russia. Support the Russian mantra: “The West and 
Russia need dialogue.” 
It is a multifaceted practical policy-oriented narrative, which claims that 
the United States and NATO are destabilizing European security situation. 
Some iterations of this narrative are focused on shaping perceptions on arms 
deployment, others are focused on sanctions. For example, withdrawal of the 
US from nuclear non-proliferation treaty within Russia’s expert narratives is 
considered a world order destabilizing action that is “leading the world 
towards a new arms race” (Batiuk 2017). US military deployments in the 
Baltic States are presented as illegal, despite the fact that Baltic States fully 
approve and welcome these deployments (Astakhova 2015). Belarus is 
presented as worried about US-led militarisation in Poland and the Baltic 
States (V. Sutyrin 2019). US is presented as the main architect of the Three 
Seas Initiative that allegedly is simply an anti-Russian coalition (“Troemor’e 
– amerokansko-pol’skaia zapadnia dlia postsovetskikh respublik” 2018).
Narratives focused on sanctions claim that by using sanctions the US is
splitting the world into their own camp and outsiders and that Russian
sanctions are hurting the West (Zagorskii 2017). According to this narrative,
the main tool of the US in Europe is NATO (Zagorskii 2017) and NATO
activities in the Baltic States and Poland are leading to a new arms race.
All these examples speak about Russia’s deliberate alienation by the 
collective West. Similarly, to the narrative of the Crisis of the European 
Security Architecture, Russia is presented in this narrative as a peace- and 
dialogue- seeking actor, which only aims to defend its own security, while 
the West continues the unjust victimisation of Russia. Within this narrative, 
references to the Russia-NATO Founding Act are frequent. In this act, signed 
in 1997, goodwill intentions between Russia and NATO were expressed in 
order to create more security and stability in Europe. After the 2008 Russo-
Georgian war and after the 2014 Crimean annexation and Russia’s support 
for armed formations in Donbass, it became obvious that Russia is not 
interested in security and stability of Europe. Even though this document was 
never legally binding, but merely envisaged political intentions (Deni 2017), 
after the events in Georgia and Ukraine, it is clear that the Russia-NATO 
Founding Act is void also in practical sense.  
This narrative presents the international system as a platform for great 
power competition (Miskimmon & O’Loughlin 2017), where great powers 
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either work “in concert” or compete, while smaller countries follow their 
lead. Such thinking today includes Cold-War-like territorial divisions, 
ignoring the right of states to choose alliances and independent political 
paths. In this narrative, the European Union and NATO are presented as 
aggressors and revisionists who are coveting countries that historically and 
culturally lie in the Russian sphere of influence. This narrative seeks to 
present the international system governed by great powers, instead of relying 
on international law. By replacing a law-based approach with great power 
competition ideas, Russia aims to show that the West breached the unwritten 
rules of the former by inviting countries to join NATO or Eastern Partnership 
format, or in general to choose a pro-Western path, because those countries 
were already in the Russian sphere of influence. To further this view, Russia 
employs the idea of guilt symmetry, a claim that the West is also to blame 
for Russian digressions from the international law. According to this 
narrative, the EU and the US through the Eastern Partnership format are 
practicing historical revisionism: “With the launch of the EU’s EaP in 2009, 
which offered the countries “in between” (Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, 
Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) political association and economic 
integration with the EU, though not full membership, the EU became a major 
revisionist actor alongside the United States in Moscow’s eyes” (Charap et. 
al. 2018). 
In its policy goals, this narrative is practical and geared towards greater 
political influence by containing the collective West or individual countries 
using new arms control regimes and security building measures, as well as 
weakening the effect of the sanctions that were imposed on Russia. In 
addition, the idea of great power competition is detrimental for the US and 
transatlantic alliance, as it diminishes trust in these players by casting doubt 
on their motives and support for the law-based international order. This 
narrative also promotes the idea that the West needs dialogue with Russia 
(Batyuk 2016). Russia has violated the principles of international law by 
annexing Crimea and further acting to destabilizing the region of Donbass, 
Russian security services are murdering political opponents in the West, their 
agents are interfering in elections, while attacks on critical infrastructure in 
Ukraine are financially damaging both Europe and the US. Sanctions can be 
regarded as a form of dialogue appropriate for the current political situation. 
To conclude, the narrative about the US and NATO destabilising the 
region relies on ideas of a world order based on great power competition and 
guilt symmetry between the collective West and Russia. This narrative is 
geared towards actual international policy changes and sets basis for a 
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narrative on Russia’s sphere of influence which will be analysed in the 
following section.  
Narrative 3. Russia‘s Sphere of Influence 
Gist. Historically, some countries are Russia’s sphere of influence. 
Activity. The Belarus-Russia Union State, the annexation of Crimea, the 
militarisation of Kaliningrad, defending compatriots, handing out Russian 
passports in the Donbass region, refusing to withdraw from Georgia and 
Transnistrian Moldova, modernisation of military forces in Abkhazia, etc.  
Intended effects. To decrease the trust in NATO and the European Union, 
projecting great power status for Russia.  
Russia’s narrative of the sphere of influence claims that post-Soviet 
Europe is historically part of Russia’s sphere of interest and influence 
(Trenin 2009) or “privileged interest” (Kramer 2008).  Along with other 
above-mentioned narratives, it aims to push countries Russia considers its 
sphere of influence into the Grey Zone, where provisions of international law 
do not apply. The narrative about Russia’s sphere of influence is of a varying 
cultural and historical depth and strength depending on the country. For 
example, applying it to Ukraine and Belarus it is based on the idea of an All-
Russian Nation, which purports that the three countries (Russia, Ukraine and 
Belarus) have origin in the same unified “Russian substrate” (Smith et. al 
1998). For the Baltic states, the narrative is historically legitimated by 
claiming that these are territories that were part of the Russian Empire and 
later the Soviet Union and thus are naturally part of the Russian sphere of 
influence (Vorotnikov & Ivanova 2019). This narrative claims that the Baltic 
States joined NATO due to the grace of Russia (Charap et. al. 2018), that 
Russia had hopes of countries bordering on it to become a “buffer zone” from 
NATO (Trenin 2009), that countries bordering Russia would form “a belt of 
friendly, loyal neighbors” (Trenin 2009). More policy-oriented iterations 
suggest that independent states should consult Russia before joining 
alliances (Ellehus & Zagorski 2019), or that the West and Moscow should 
supply independent states with proposals on their aligned or non-aligned 
statuses (Charap et al 2019). Most of these narratives sometimes casually or 
unintentionally are overtaken and supported by branches of foreign thinks 
tanks or other policy organizations in Russia in order to please local policy 
environment. The internalisation of these stories happens when attitudes 
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towards the issues by the strategic communities are not well expressed in the 
targeted countries  
In terms of identity, this narrative seeks to portray Russia as a great 
power, the sovereign that transcends the sovereignty of smaller states. This 
narrative can be considered inheritance of imperial Russia which expanded 
at the expense of its neighbouring states, unlike European imperialism which 
was much more oriented towards overseas territories (Wesson 1974). After 
the end of the Cold War and the beginning of greater fluidity, with the rapid 
increase of Chinese international influence, the projection of this narrative 
helps maintain the idea that Russia ranks among great powers. However, this 
narrative is unstable due to the size of the Russian economy and continues to 
be challenged by other players. Thus the notion of Russia as a great power is 
supported and furthered by the Russian ideas of multipolar (Timofeev 2019) 
or polycentric world order. In contrast to China or the US which utilise their 
economic influence, Russia, because of its limited economic power, much 
more often resorts to methods such as diversion, coercion, persuasion and 
blackmail. One of the ways to maintain the narrative of Russia having 
privileged zones of influence is purporting military threats and consistent 
disregard for the sovereignty of smaller countries.  
The narrative on the Russian sphere of influence is only possible in the 
context of international system narrative based on ideas of great power 
competition. It would not be possible, from the perspective of international 
law as a primary organising principle of international system, because 
spheres of influence would simply be illegal. Guilt symmetry plays 
important role in this narrative: the West is portrayed  as seeking to “softly 
oust it [Russia] from European politics” and engaging in hybrid warfare 
through organising colour revolutions in the post-Soviet space (Timofeev 
2016). 
In the practical sense, the spheres of influence narrative aims to restrict 
sovereign states’ seeking and joining alliances and to empower Russia to 
have more influence in these matters. Numerous policy proposals have been 
put forward on how to achieve them. Among them is a proposal for countries 
to seek consultations with Russia before joining alliances: “Without 
questioning the right to freely choose alliances, Moscow insists that it should 
not be exercised at the expense of the security of other states (including 
Russia), and that the indivisibility of security should be taken into 
consideration—another promise of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. In 
particular, the 1994 OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of 
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Security explicitly commits the participating states to “bearing in mind the 
legitimate security concerns of other states” while exercising the freedom of 
alliances (Ellehus & Zagorski 2019). Another proposal of this kind is focused 
on a “third way” or neutral status. In contrast to the currently accepted notion 
of neutrality, such as the neutrality declared by Switzerland, this “third way” 
neutrality would be offered by great countries to smaller ones, a stipulation 
that they ought not to join alliances (Charap et al 2019). 
Conclusions 
Russia uses Grey Zone policy processes and the supporting narratives 
in order to establish itself as superior to NATO in the region along Russian 
borders. Russian thinks tanks, as distinct from academic institutions focusing 
exclusively on academic forms of debate, participate actively in public 
policy debates which aim to change perceptions of the international 
environment in the targeted countries.  
Government-backed think tanks’ and their public personas’ 
collaboration with think tank networks in the West, their publications and 
presentations in English, their organised international forums and 
discussions are among main tools that help to promote Russian strategic 
narratives in the West. These should be recognised as part of the Russian 
hybrid toolbox.  
Think tank narration of the international system, its structure, and main 
problems, as well as Russia itself often reflects narratives promoted by policy 
elites. Therefore, we conclude, that it is very likely that this narration is 
intentionally designed to reflect Russia’s interests in the European region.   
In its strategic narration, think tanks and policy elites present a fabricated 
dilemma of strategic stability in Europe to be solved in one way only – by 
recognising Russian sphere of influence and restricting NATO and the US.  
On the one hand, in strategic narratives, national governments on the Russian 
western frontier are portrayed as incapable of offering a viable defence. On 
the other hand, within Russian strategic narration on its spheres of influence, 
these states to a different extent are stripped of agency of governance and 
ability to make their own policy decisions and are rather presented as 
territories, zones, and spheres governed by their more powerful Eastern or 
Western neighbours  
The political goal of such narratives is to the diminish trust in 
international formats such as NATO on one hand, and, on the other hand, 
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persuade individual states within NATO, that NATO Eastern Flank efforts 
are pointless. It is detrimental for the law-based international order and 
alliances built on these principles to juggle with the ideas of Russia along 
with other great powers deciding the foreign policy and security issues of 
other states. It would violate core principles of European international 
relations – democracy, sovereignty of states and the right to make 
independent foreign policy decisions. As a second order effect, such 
narration might cast doubt on various behind-the-curtain deals of trusted 
partnerships. This strategic narrative promoted by the Russian think tanks 
and their analysts is also detrimental for EU’s Eastern Partnership format, as 
its portrayed international system and political motives leave little choice for 
countries to actually follow a pro-European path. The Russian objection to 
legal and moral obligations (international law and international decency) as 
leverage and, along with political correctness, might undermine stability and 
endanger peace. The Russian foreign policy community needs strategic 
narratives that would help to shape the perception of Russia’s breaches of 
international law in the eyes of policy players in Europe and the US as 
necessary and justifiable. The situations of the targeted countries are 
deteriorating as Russia’s perception starts to be taken for granted as an 
objectively existing state. The solution is however not a change in policy 
with mind-projection fallacy to satisfy the opponent’s phobia-based 
expectations, but rather to assist in combating the phobia itself.  
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Abstract 
The article examines narratives of Russia’s geopolitical future that originate in Neo-
Eurasianist ideology. These narratives, rooted in the pre-war Russian émigré school of 
historiography, identify Russia’s special civilisational destiny as a land-based power that 
makes it distinct from Western sea powers. These narratives have circulated among 
Russia’s right-wing intelligentsia since the late 1980s and have recently become 
mainstream. Their partial adoption by the Kremlin ideologists demonstrates their 
exceptional staying power and also raises questions about how the Russian ruling elite 
sees the future. The case studies selected here include the writings of the veteran author 
Aleksandr Prokhanov, influential theorist Aleksandr Dugin, and the Kremlin 
advisor Vladislav Surkov. We argue that while Prokhanov’s and Dugin’s visions are 
based on eschatological notions rooted in the Russia’s pre-Petrine past and in folklore. 
Surkov’s programmatic article that takes some of the same notions as its point of 
departure is nonetheless a poor attempt at imagining a future as an indefinitely 
suspended present of the Putin regime. 
Keywords: Prokhanov, Aleksandr; Dugin, Aleksandr; Surkov, Vladislav; Neo-
Eurasianism; newspaper editorials; time in political narratives.  
Мы рождены, чтоб сказку сделать былью 
[We are born to make fairy tales come true] 
The Song of Soviet Aviators, 1923. 
Ever since the start of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, Putin’s 
ideologists and propagandists have been busy devising narratives of the 
“Russian world” “getting up from its knees” and correcting an “outrageous 
historical injustice” imposed upon Russians outside the Russian Federation 
by the Western powers intent on weakening their defeated Cold War foe. 
Thus, given Russia’s resolute choice not to abandon its people outside its 
borders, residents of Crimea “were able to peacefully express their free will 
regarding their own future” (Putin 2014), while the residents of Donetsk and 
Luhansk regions had to resort to armed insurrection and war in order to 
defend the future of their language and culture on their own land. These 
narratives are all too familiar to the viewers of Russia’s state-controlled TV 
channels and other media outlets that have been exploiting them for the last 
seven years. More recently, following Putin’s increasingly draconian 
political measures, including the decision to change the Constitution and 
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have the two-term limit on power it stipulates “zero out” for himself, one 
wonders what sort of future he envisions for his country and, no less 
importantly, how this future is legitimised. Already in his speech on the 
annexation of Crimea, he resorted to various historical narratives and myths 
through which the future of the peninsula was framed and, in a sense 
prefigured: the original unity of the three East Slavonic nations, the baptism 
of Prince Vladimir in Chersonesos, the glorious imperial and Soviet military 
history in which Crimea played an important part as a stronghold common 
to a whole number of nations united under Russia’s fold. In thinking about 
the future, Putin’s speech writers and advisors draw their inspiration from a 
range of sources in all of which the vision of the present and the future is 
prefigured and predetermined. This vision is always ultra-conservative, most 
often religious, ultra-nationalist, utopian, at times racist, and on occasion 
downright bizarre. In what follows we would like to examine a particular 
futuristic narrative line that is firmly rooted in Neo-Eurasianist fantasies and, 
in part, in Russian fairy tales. We find traces of the same type of thinking in 
the rambling, baroque editorials regularly penned by the veteran author 
Aleksandr Prokhanov, militant scholarly and journalistic texts of the ultra-
right philosopher Aleksandr Dugin, and a recent programmatic article of the 
Kremlin’s long-term ideologist Vladislav Surkov. We argue that although 
the three approaches to futurity share some of the same ideological basis, 
they demonstrate a clear difference when it comes to the future. Where 
Prokhanov envisions the past as prefiguring the future in dreams and fairy 
tales, Dugin sees the future as a deliberate return to a certain kind of past 
which to him is an expression of eternity, and Surkov expects the future to 
be nothing but an extension of the present.  
Prokhanov and his editorials: the evolution of the Soviet genre 
Among the Russian online newspapers, the weekly Zavtra.ru occupies 
a special position because, as its title [Tomorrow.ru] suggests, the 
newspaper’s identity is constructed around the notion of the future. The 
concept of futurity, which the newspaper develops and promotes, is a 
symbiosis of science and eschatology, technology and religious beliefs, all 
of which are given political dimensions. This combination makes the idea of 
achieving the ultimate futuristic dream of humanity - that of immortality - 
possible, providing there is state leadership which directs the nation along 
the right path. Historically, from the year of its conception in 1993, this 
newspaper has been a platform for strong nationalistic and patriotic views.1  
1 The newspaper is available online and in hard copies, its declared circulation is 
100.000 copies.   
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It promotes the geopolitical views of popular Neo-Eurasianist ideology 
which groups or juxtaposes civilisations in terms of their alleged 
in/compatible worldviews based on historically divergent or similar pasts. 
As a platform concerned with futurity, the newspaper often generates visions 
and scenarios for the future which are linked with utopian narratives and, in 
some cases, fairy tale motifs. In the case of the specific futurity of Zavtra.ru 
the development of this vision is steered mainly through the editorials of by 
its editor-in-chief, Aleksandr Prokhanov (b. 1938), a veteran journalist and 
essayist with the career spanning from the late Soviet era to the present. An 
important public personality, Prokhanov’s political vision is based on 
drawing a line of continuity between pre-modern Russia, the Russian 
Empire, the Soviet Union and contemporary Russia. He terms this alleged 
overarching line of permanence “the Empire” and dubs the current juncture 
in time/space as the stage before the final “Fifth Empire”, and presents his 
vision of Russian religious-technocratic messianism. Focusing on the 
culture-specific genre of editorials, we demonstrate that the editorials in 
Zavtra.ru are the laboratory of creation of a specific brand of futurity, which 
is proleptic in its incorporation of the past into a vision of the desired future. 
We argue that this futurity is simultaneously forward looking and 
conservative because it glorifies the events of the past on the basis of their 
futuristic potential which could not be fully realised earlier. The ability to 
dream as well as the subject matter of dreams become a category for 
evaluation of the past, present and future of the national states and their 
people. Moreover, the will and ability to turn dreams into reality are 
presented as unique characteristics of the Russian people and their leaders.  
The style and rhetoric of Prokhanov’s editorials are strongly grounded 
in the form of this genre as it was defined and practised in the Soviet Union. 
Peredovitsa or peredovaia stat’ia is a front-page newspaper article which 
was one of the important means of propaganda in the USSR. In the 1970s, 
peredovitsa was charged with “informing and influencing the wider 
readership.” According to the definition of the style of peredovitsa in the 
1973 textbook The Language and Style of the Editorial Article (“Язык и 
стиль передовой статьи”), editorials are texts which are used for 
expressions of subjective and emotive views with the aim of influencing 
political opinions of a wide collective of readers: 
In the editorial articles the factors of subjective evaluation have the 
decisive influence in the usage of language resources which solve 
communicative tasks of persuasion, giving directives and aiding the 
critical evaluation of unfolding events. The language of the editorial 
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expresses the subjective aspirations of the authors to influence the 
political and ideological views of the wider readership. Language 
forms here acquire deeply expressive character […].  (Solgalnik 1973 
58) 
Moreover, according to the tenets of the newspaper style and structure, there 
should be a sharp distinction between a dry and informative style of the rest 
of the newspaper and the emotive style of the editorial:  
Study of newspaper narratives shows that there is a clear difference 
between informative articles and editorials. The first kind use 
documentary style conveying information. The second kind have an 
overtly evaluative polemical character and have the effect of agitation, 
in many parameters coming close to the language of fiction.  (ibid.) 
Starting from the Perestroika period of the late 1980s, the Russian 
language of mass media has developed significantly and became enriched 
with religious vocabulary and homiletic rhetoric, identified by scholars as 
“religiozno-propovednicheskii stil’” – “religious homiletic style” 
(Gosteeva).  This style, in turn, borrows its vocabulary and rhetoric from 
literary and ceremonial genres, intersecting them with long-form journalist 
writing (publitsistika).  The new style partially overlaps with the style of 
Soviet editorials which synthesised various genres and allowed an 
expression of authorial subjectivity. What was a set of characteristic features 
of Soviet editorials becomes a feature of contemporary publitsistika with its 
emphasis on emotive expressivity which has to have an appeal to the large 
collective of the speakers of the Russian language (Solgalnik 2006). Of 
special relevance to Aleksandr Prokhanov’s editorials in Zavtra.ru is the 
notion of the symbiotic style of the narrative, which brings together elements 
of essayistic writing, reportage and fiction. Moreover, Prokhanov also 
incorporates and even develops a religious-homiletic style by introducing not 
only religious themes but also by using the rhetoric of religious sermons. 
Notably, Prokhanov is not only an essayist but also an author of award-
winning novels with phantasmagorical conspiracist plots, most of which 
promote Neo-Eurasianist ideology (Livers 2010, 2020).2 His experience in a 
wide range of writing makes him a competent author of the culture-specific 
genre of newspaper editorials.     
2 His 2002 novel Mr. Hexogen (Gospodin Geksogen) won that year’s National Best 
Seller competition. He also won the prestigious literary Bunin Prize in 2009, the aim of 
which is “to revive the best traditions of Russian national literature”. In “Obladatelem 
Buninskoi premii stal Aleksandr Prokhanov”. Kommersant. 23. 10. 2009. 12. 
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Narratives of eternity and continuity in history 
  
In his editorial “The Fifth Stalin” (“Piatyi Stalin”) (19. 12. 2018) 
Prokhanov formulates the idea of a homogenous cultural continuity in Russia 
(Prokhanov 2018).  He explains this continuity by the idea of common 
aspirations for the implementation of dreams into reality. To develop the 
concept of such unifying continuity he creates the notion “Stil’ Stalin”, 
“Stalin Style” which he uses proleptically and transhistorically, but, 
importantly, not transnationally. According to him, this Style already existed 
in Kievan Rus which united disparate peoples into a cohesive nationality and 
made way for the building of an empire. The Stalin Style, Prokhanov 
maintains, achieved its high point during the time of real Stalin whose 
leadership helped Russia to realize its industrial, technological and military 
might. Of relevance is the fact that between 1930 and 1953 (the year of 
Stalin’s death) there indeed emerged style known as stalinskii ampir, 
Stalinist Empire style, which found its representation in architecture, 
sculpture and interior décor. Characterised by grandeur and pomposity, the 
style incorporated elements of Deco, Baroque and Napoleonic Empire but, 
notably, after Stalin’s death, this Stalinist Empire style was criticised for its 
excesses and extravagant spending.3  And while today the most iconic 
architectural monuments of this style adorn the cityscape of Moscow as well 
as its underground metro stations, they are artefacts of a particular epoch and 
particular ideology. Scholars of the semiotics of grand buildings and 
sculptures of the Stalin period note that these structures were erected as 
“intentional” monuments. They were meant to represent “ahistoricity”, and 
function “as some sort of utopian preserve of the future where time would 
not flow” (Yampolsky 98).  At the same time, as monuments, they also 
bridged the past with the future thus creating and reinforcing an idea of 
homogenous continuity in a given culture.   
 
Fittingly, in Prokhanov’s definition, the Stalin Style is transhistorical, 
encompassing past, present and future, and, for this reason, it is presented as 
a cultural phenomenon which emerged long before the historical Stalin. 
Prokhanov conceptualises this style as a specifically national phenomenon, 
which unifies national character with the uniquely specific style of 
leadership. This essentialised uniqueness, in turn, has strong messianic 
connotations. Notably, the alleged continuity in culture is interrupted only 
by the outside enemy. Historical Stalin, whom Prokhanov calls the fourth 
 
3 See a discussion on this in Day.  
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Stalin, is presented as the apogee of the so called “Russian time”: “Stalin is 
a splash of the Russian time from the peak of which eternity opens up” – 
“Сталин — это всплеск русского времени, с вершины которого видна 
бесконечность”.  
  
This chronotopic image creates an intersection between time and space, 
where the space is geopolitically bound to the Russian Empire’s territories 
while both time and space converge in eternity. The implication is that 
territorially the Russian Empire will not diminish and that those who live 
within its borders are guaranteed the kind of future which goes beyond the 
limits of earthly existence. This eternity is achieved by technological 
advances and hard work, which will make the return of Stalin himself – the 
Fifth Stalin - possible. The rhetoric and the imagery have distinct religious-
propagandistic overtones in line with the tenets of the Soviet editorials 
combined with the developments of the last decade of the Soviet Union.     
 
Addressing the issue of real physical immortality, Prokhanov 
characteristically enmeshes science, art and dreams in his formulation of 
Russian futurity, in which the resurrection of Stalin becomes a reality:   
 
Скульпторы и художники, стремящиеся поставить монумент 
Сталину, не спешите и дождитесь его нового появления. Пятый 
Сталин не будет отлит из бронзы, не будет высечен из гранита 
или мрамора. Пятый Сталин — это скорость света, это скорость 
русской истории, это русская мечта. Художник, ты можешь 
изобразить скорость света? Можешь изобразить русскую мечту? 
 
Sculptors and artists, who aim to put a monument to Stalin, do not rush 
but wait for his new appearance. The Fifth Stalin will not be cast in 
bronze, nor will he be cut out of granite or marble. The Fifth Stalin – 
is the speed of light, the speed of Russia’s history, it is Russian dream. 
Artist, can you represent the speed of light? Can you represent the 
Russian dream? 
 
Prokhanov’s vision of the future has broad appeal because it converges 
elements of religious and scientific utopianism. Notably, Prokhanov is a 
Fedorovian, and on many occasions he refers to Nikolai Fedorov’s The 
History of the Common Task (1903) as the source of his beliefs in the 
possibility to achieve the corporeal resurrection of generations of dead 
ancestors. Fedorov’s scientific utopian thinking had an unparalleled impact 
on both religious and atheistic futurity in Russia and the Soviet Union. It also 
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influenced the development of Soviet cosmism which was driven by 
Fedorov’s idea that new planetary spaces will be needed to accommodate the 
resurrected humans and a growing population of now immortal people 
(Young).  However, unlike Fedorov’s quest for a global and transnational 
collaboration in achieving this task of resurrecting the dead, Prokhanov’s 
cosmism is centred around the nation state and even alludes to the current 
race towards the colonisation of planetary spaces. It is, perhaps, for this latter 
reason that he equates Stalin and new Russian Empire of the future with the 
speed of light. 
 
In Prokhanov’s editorials the narrative of historical continuity in 
Russian missionary dreaming and the strength of the state inevitably has to 
include the country’s current leader, Vladimir Putin. In an article with an 
explicitly futuristic title, “Putin, a Russian Dreamer” (30.01.2019) “Путин - 
русский мечтатель”, Prokhanov further develops the topic of the Russian 
dream. In this article, his Fedorovian utopianism and cosmism become overt 
and enmeshed with folk dreams about a better future. Opening with the 
question “I would like to understand, what is our state-power, our multi-
ethnic Russian Dream?” Prokhanov proceeds by formulating the dream:   
 
Эту Мечту не угадаешь сразу. […] Её можно понять, если 
кропотливо исследовать весь путь нашей истории от древних 
времён до нынешних дней, если услышать, как высказывают эту 
Мечту самые прозорливые, самые просвещённые люди разных 
русских времён: её пророки, её ясновидцы, её великие, 
прозревающие будущее, политики и поэты.   
 
This Dream cannot be guessed quickly. […] It can be understood by 
scrupulously examining the whole path of our history from ancient 
times till recent days; it can be understood by hearing how this Dream 
is expressed by the most foreseeing and enlightened people of various 
times in Russian history: its prophets, its seers, its great future-seeing 
politicians and poets.  
 
Of note is Prokanov’s use of the words such as “prozrevat’” which he 
borrows from the religious vocabulary and uses in a new meaning. 
Prozrevat’ means to start seeing after being blind, which is an allusion to 
Christian Scriptures (John 9:25), while figuratively the verb means to foresee 
and predict. This lexical choice results in the image of Russian leaders as 
anointed by Providence in their historical mission, which includes the current 
activities of the president of Russia.     
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National dreams and fairy tale narratives  
 
In this editorial Prokhanov turns to dreams in their relation to various 
nationalities. He also uses fairy tale motifs as the foundation for what he 
conceptualizes as specific national dreams. His strategy is to show that 
dreams need to be turned into reality. Today, the dreams of the Russian 
nation as expressed in Russian fairy tales are realised by people toiling in 
science, industry and agriculture: “Русские сказки своим неповторимым 
языком поведали нам о нашей Мечте, которую сегодня мы продолжаем 
воплощать в наших лабораториях, на наших нивах, на наших хлебных 
полях”. (“Russian fairy tales revealed to us our Dream in their unique 
language, and today we continue to realise it in our laboratories, in our 
cornfields and farmlands.”) 
 
Turning to Russian fairy tales allows Prokhanov to create a narrative of 
Dreams which synthesises pre-Christian folk motifs with religious 
eschatology and scientific futurity. Importantly, Prokhanov uses fairy tales 
as an expression of a nation’s specificity. Dreams in his rendition become 
reflections of a nation’s mentality determined by its historical past. 
Importantly, he mentions dreams of other peoples of Russia and strategically 
confines his examples to the territorial borders of the Russian state. 
Describing his conversations with people of various ethnic groups during his 
travels through Russia, he focuses on the themes in the dreams of 
immortality and the good life on this earth. He then turns to defining various 
national dreams of the main powerful states globally, and his choice of the 
nations allows him to show contrasting dreams as well as different ways in 
which these dreams are implemented in reality. He first identifies and 
glorifies the Russian dream as well as the dreams of some ethnic groups of 
the Russian state, and then formulates his understanding of American and 
Chinese dreams. The choice of the United States and China is grounded in 
the geopolitical doctrines of Neo-Eurasianism. According to Neo-
Eurasianist views, the United States represents an Atlanticist civilisation, 
driven by mercantilism and expansionism. Countries of the Atlanticist 
groups represent civilization which is incompatible with the Eurasian 
mentality of continental peoples presented as deeply rooted in native soil. 
China also stands outside of the notion of “complimentary” nations of 
Eurasia.4  This is in line with the original Eurasian thinking of the 1920s 
 
4 The tenets of Neo-Eurasianism are essentialist and were developed by Lev Gumilev 
whose work came to prominence with the fall of the Soviet Union. Gumilev coined 
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defined by Nikolai Trubetskoi, who excluded “old Asiatic kingdoms” such 
as China from the Eurasian world. The reason for this exclusion was 
explained by the fact that China as an ancient civilisation was formed before 
Genghis Khan’s unification of the peoples of Eurasia under the “Pan-Asiatic 
imperialism” (Trubetzkoy 195). According to Trubetskoi, in its 
subordination to the Muscovite State, the Eurasian world “achieved for the 
first time a cultural self-sufficiency” (Trubetzkoy 197).  Contemporary Neo-
Eurasianist thinking valorises this idea of the homologous development and 
unity of the peoples of Eurasia.  
 
According to Prokhanov, dreams about futurity develop differently 
among different nations. In Russia, such dreams materialise in achievements 
in science which, importantly, in his rendition are presented as being in 
harmony with both the Russian Orthodox faith and pantheistic beliefs. 
Fittingly, Prokhanov’s choice of nationalities within Russia itself is selective 
and in line with the categories of Neo-Eurasianism. His description of 
conversations held with wisemen and sages during his travels mentions a 
carefully selected group of the peoples of Eurasia. The absence of some 
nationalities is particularly evident in his descriptions of travels in the 
Caucasus when he writes about the dreams of the Ossetians but excludes 
dreams of the Muslim minorities. Another illustration of strategic choice of 
ethnic groups is Prokhanov’s mention of the Mari people of the Volga region 
who traditionally practice animism. The choice of Mari fits current trends in 
the neo-pagan revival in Russia which accommodates ancestral cults of 
rodnoverie and serves the nationalist agenda (Laruelle).  Having paid tribute 
to the role of dreams expressed in fairy tales—such as the desire for 
abundance and eternal life—Prokhanov prepares the ground for the 
culmination of these dreams in the scientific futurity of the Fedorovian 
brand, which is materialised in the victories of space exploration:   
   
Русская Мечта — мечта космическая. Она несётся в мире с 
первой и второй космической скоростью, она несётся в мире со 
скоростью света. (Prokhanov 2019) 
 
The Russian dream is cosmic. It moves with the first and second 
cosmic velocity, it moves with the speed of light.  
 
His summary of the Russian Dream celebrates the role of the state and its 
leaders: 
 
concepts such as komplimentarnost’ and “ethogenesis” to argue that some ethnic groups 
(including Jews) are not compatible with the others. (Gumilev) 
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Так в чём же она, Русская Мечта? Это мечта о могучем и 
праведном Царстве, которое окружает и охраняет общество 
великой справедливости, любви и благодати, где в гармонию 
приведены силы природы и силы техники, силы отдельного 
человека и всемогущего государства. Где жизнь лесного цветка и 
жизнь мерцающей звезды небесной соединены общим 
ощущением мировой симфонии. Эта благодать добывается 
великими трудами, великими усилиями всего нашего 
российского общества, каждой российской земли, каждого 
проживающего на этих землях народа. (Ibid.) 
 
So what is the essence of the Russian Dream? It is a dream about a 
mighty and saintly Kingdom which defends the society of great 
justice, love and grace, where the forces of nature and powers of 
technologies harmoniously unite with the forces of the individual and 
the almighty state. It is the place where the life of a forest flower and 
a shining star in the sky are united by the collective sense of world 
harmony. This grace is achieved by great labour, great efforts of the 
whole of our Russian society, of every bit of the Russian soil and of 
every nationality that lives on this soil.  
 
While Prokhanov pays tribute to the nationalities of the Russian state, he 
nevertheless maintains that all dreams and hopes of these nationalities 
converge into a homogenous Russian dream.    
 
Having identified the Russian dream, Prokhanov defines “the American 
Dream”. While he pays tribute to the US’s achievements in science and 
technology, he denies the eschatological dimensions of the dream of the 
American people:  
 
Американская мечта — это “град на холме”, это крепость, 
построенная на горе, с которой видны все другие, лежащие в 
долинах, города и селения. И если в каком-то из этих селений 
возникает непорядок, американцы из своих бойниц посыпают 
долинные города и селения своими крылатыми ракетами. (Ibid.) 
 
The American dream is a city on a hill, it is a fortress from which all 
other cities and villages are observable. And if there is trouble in one 
of these places Americans start firing rockets from their arrowslits at 
these cities and villages. 
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Prokhanov not only promulgates the Soviet image of the United States as a 
country of aggressors, he specifically limits the so-called American dream to 
the defence of the existing order without wanting to change the present for a 
better future.   
 
His definition of “the Chinese Dream” similarly diminishes the role of 
futuristic visions and presents China as a civilisation of secular orientation:  
 
Китайская мечта, которая сопрягается с Великим Шёлковым 
путём, — это мечта о восстановлении китайского достоинства, 
того достоинства, которое на протяжении долгих лет попиралось 
то англичанами, то японцами, достоинства, которое было 
растоптано. И сегодня Китай, достигая великого возрождения, 
стремится утвердить своё существование в гармоничном и 
цветущем мире. (Ibid.) 
 
The Chinese dream is connected with the Silk Route. It is a dream of 
re-establishing Chinese dignity, the kind of dignity which for many 
years was insulted at times by the English, or by the Japanese, a kind 
of dignity which was trampled upon. Today China, reaching its great 
rebirth, aims to assert its existence in a harmonious and flowering 
world. 
 
What explicitly characterises and distinguishes these two national 
dreams from the Russian dream is their lack of daring eschatological 
aspirations. Both of these dreams, in Prokhanov’s construal, are concerned 
with this worldly life but lack the vision of immortality. Having described 
these alternative national dreams, Prokhanov’s editorial makes a rhetorical 
conclusion about the distinctive character of the Russian dream:   
 
Русская мечта — это храм на холме. Мы построили холм из 
наших верований, страданий, поражений, из великих побед и 
откровений. На вершине этого холма мы построили храм, 
который своими крестами касается небесной лазури, касается 
света Фаворского. И этот свет проливается к нам, на землю, в 
наши семьи, на наши космодромы, в наши гарнизоны, на наши 
заводы. (Ibid.) 
 
The Russian dream is a temple on a hill. We have built the hill from 
our beliefs, suffering, defeats, from great victories and revelations. On 
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the top of this hill, we have built a temple whose crosses touch heaven 
and the Tabor light. And this light shines on the earth, on our families, 
on our cosmodromes, on our garrisons, on our factories.     
 
Russia is presented as a country of dreamers who are united by 
transgenerational ties: 
 
Мы — мечтатели. Ты, я, родившийся вчера младенец и старик, 
доживающий свою долгую жизнь. Россия — это страна 
мечтателей и героев. 
 
We are the dreamers. You and me, the baby who was born yesterday 
and the old man, who is at the end of his long life. Russia is the country 
of dreamers and heroes.  
 
In this editorial Prokhanov suggests that only those who have a common 
dream can have a future. Russia comes out as a leader because of its alleged 
ability to implement the boldest futuristic dream of its peoples, namely, to 
achieve immortality. Of note is the fact that Prokhanov is prepared to grant 
people of nations such as the USA and China the ability to dream, albeit in 
an inferior way. This can be explained by the fact that his notions of future 
are proleptic and take into account a common historical past. This model of 
assigning significance to the shared past and an affinity of goals is in line 
with the main principles of Neo-Eurasianism. 
 
In this context, Prokhanov’s selection of nations and their dreams has a 
telling void – it excludes European states, nations and their dreams. The 
absence of Europe in this scheme of civilizations is quite conspicuous and as 
such it is a void which must serve a purpose. In terms of the Neo-Eurasianist 
geopolitical doctrine, Western Europe is an Atlanticist civilisation due to its 
colonial expansionism and the de-territorialisation of continental borders. 
The editorial article is a mix of subjective imagination, fiction and political 
discourse, and as such it is a form of literature which relies on deconstruction 
by its readers. It is expected that the reader will fill the void based on his or 
her general knowledge. Readers of the newspaper cannot fail to notice this 
void as Europe/EU today is an important political entity. The void thus 
becomes a device that signifies a hidden meaning. The question which 
Prokhanov invites his readers to ponder on is this: Why is Europe not part of 
his thematization of national dreams? The answer, we propose, lies in a 
carefully chosen strategy: If the narratives of the unifying dream are a 
foundation of a given nation, then the European Union does not fall into this 
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category because it is a young and inorganic entity. Eurasian Russia is 
presented as a homogenous civilization which is founded on identical drives 
and hopes in spite of its multi-ethnic composition.5  (Hence the purpose of 
mentioning diverse nationalities such as formerly animistic, but today mainly 
Orthodox Mari people of the Volga region and Orthodox Ossetians.) The 
United States and China also are the entities which have, according to 
Prokhanov, a common task. They have been integrated historically into 
nations with people who share the same dreams because they were moulded 
by common mythologies. Europe and the EU are fragmented entities when 
it comes to the “dream” reflected in fairy tale motifs and narratives. From 
this follows that the EU/Europe does not have a common dream and 
therefore cannot have a future. Historically the systematic collection of fairy 
tales by folklorists occurred at the time of the rise of the nation state at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century. Romantic philologists such as the 
Brothers Grimm collected fairy tales in the Germanic lands, and not in 
“Europe’. Viewed in this context, the EU might be a political entity, but, by 
implication of the Prokhanovian notion of dreaming together, it has no future 
because its people were not brought up on the same dreams. The logic of 
Prokhanov’s reasoning is circular: in order to have a dream one has to be 
brought up on the same dreams. If people do not share the dreams through 
generations, they cannot succeed in the way they think about the future 
because they do not dream together. The implication is that the EU is not 
going to be a major player in the domain of futurity because its mission is 
not based on the firm foundation of the narratives which have homogenous 
beginnings and happy endings.   
 
Mixing Fairy Tales with Geopolitical Doctrines 
 
While Prokhanov’s editorials perform the same function as they did in 
the Soviet press, his style has characteristic features which correspond to new 
developments in the essayistic writing that emerged since the 1980s. 
Prokhanov’s editorials both reflect this development of religious-homiletic 
style and imagery and employ a number of features of the Soviet newspaper 
editorials, one of them being an expectation to refer to a wider political 
context. In this case, the context relates to the geopolitical situation of Russia 
via-à-vis the European Union in all its complexity. Moreover, his implicit 
categorization of fairy tales as underpinned by the unifying role of the 
national state is a manifestation of his authorial subjectivity. Such 
subjectivity was a prescriptive feature of the Soviet editorials which has 
received further developments in current Russian media.  
 
5 On Neo-Eurasianism and futurity in Prokhanov’s fiction see Mondry. 
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By choosing to treat dreams and fairy tales within the notion of the 
nation state Prokhanov adheres to a view of fairy tale motifs which has its 
beginnings in the era of Romanticism with its emphasis on national heritage. 
Importantly, according to this folkloristic paradigm, the phenomenon of 
similar plots in fairy tales and myths among peoples is explained by 
similarities among rodstvennye narody (kinship peoples), stressing their 
common genealogical origins. A later concept of brodiachie siuzhety 
(migratory plots), articulated by Aleksandr Veselovsky (1838-1906), puts an 
emphasis on cross-cultural influences and the mobility of plots. Fittingly, in 
the Stalin era in the post-WW2 period, followers of the Veselovsky school 
of folkloristic thought were criticized for the notion of migratory and 
transnational plots.6  Such theoretical views were regarded as unpatriotic as 
they diminished the notion of exclusivity and specificity of national myths 
(Veselovsky). 
 
Prokhanov’s concept of the specifically national dreams and fairy tale 
motifs conforms to the nationalistically-tinted understanding of fairy tales. 
More importantly, his adherence to the notion of the common plot motifs 
among the rodstvennye narody intersects with the Neo-Eurasianist 
geopolitical ideology. Yet he adjusts the notion of rodstvennye narody by 
excluding other Slavic peoples such as Ukrainians making his void 
politically motivated and recognisable by readers. With Ukraine’s leanings 
towards Euro-Atlantic structures, the current rift between Russia and 
Ukraine clearly has an impact on Prokhanov’s elaborations on the dreams 
about the future.7  It is for this reason that he selectively concentrates on 
ethnic groups situated geographically to the east of Moscow to both reiterate 
and politically modify the foundations of the original Eurasianism. (In 
Trubetskoi’s writing, Ukraine, in spite of the period of colonisation by 
Poland, was viewed as a Eurasian civilisation.) Additionally, Prokhanov’s 
inclusion of dreams of shamans and wisemen intertwines animistic beliefs 
with the Orthodox faith to reflect the fashionable syncretistic religious and 
cultural trends, such as rodnoverie and quasi-New Age movements in vogue 
in Russia today. This syncretistic collage, in turn, echoes the 
phantasmagorical plots of his novels as well as the plots of other fantasy 
 
6 On the history of trends in Russian and Soviet folkloristics see Meletinskii. The 
publication of Meletinsky’s book became possible during the brief period of Thaw in 
the Soviet Union. The second edition came out after the fall of the Soviet Union. 
7 On Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic orientation see Vineta Kleinberga and Elizabete 
Vizgunova in this issue. 
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literature which deal with the resurrection of famous historical personalities, 
including Stalin and even Nikolai Fedorov himself.8   
 
It is important to reiterate that dreaming together is not the only factor 
which guarantees a radiant future for Russia. In line with his notion that the 
Russian people turn Russian fairy tales into reality, Prokhanov maintains that 
political leaders have to be able to implement common dreams into reality. 
In his editorial “Lenin, a Мan of the Sky” (“Lenin – chelovek neba”) ( 22.04. 
2020), dedicated to Lenin’s birthday, Prokhanov calls Lenin a great 
“futurologist” who could not only predict future but also “realise it.”9 
Notably, in fictional genres, such as Soviet science fiction, dreams and the 
future have to turn to reality while realisation and actualisation of dreams 
have to complement the ability to dream collectively (Gomel).  At this 
juncture Prokhanov’s narratives link the pathos of the newspaper editorials 
with the plots of Soviet futurity fiction and current fantasy literature in line 
with the canonical principles of Soviet newspaper writing. In terms of the 
tenets of the genre of the editorials, Prokhanov incorporates all its major 
characteristics. On the one hand, his editorials have a degree of subjectivity 
which renders critical questioning of his revelations superfluous. On the 
other hand, his views about futurity and the achievement of immortality are 
not entirely fictional. To be effective they are grounded in the futuristic 
trends and activities of contemporary Russian society which, according to a 
recent anthropological study, has strong movements and communities who 
work on the achievement of immortality and the extension of life beyond the 
confines of the earth by techno-biological means.10  In this way the emotive-
subjective writing of Prokhanov’s editorials responds to the wider context of 
trends and aspirations of contemporary readers. Notably, his propagandistic 
editorials promote political agendas by advocating the cohesiveness of the 
multi-ethnic empire – “the Fifth Empire”– whose future is construed as 
invincible and eternal because its past and present are fortified by 
homogenous dreams. The political leaders of this Empire are presented as 
great visionary dreamers and futurologists who have the ability to mobilise 
people “to make fairy tales come true”.  
 
8 Viktor Sharov’s novels fall into this category. See an interview with him on “Shkola 
zlosloviia”. On these plots see Mondry 2017.  
 
9 “Ленин был экономист, политик, футуролог, он остро ощущал будущее, он его 
предрекал и потом реализовывал” (Prokhanov 2020). 
 
10 See Bernstein, a recent anthropological study of contemporary futurity groups, 
including followers of Nikolai Fedorov and Cosmists. The study is based on interviews 
and placed in the context of Russian thinking about scientific and religious immortality. 
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These last words – “we were born to make fairy tales come true” which 
come from the song of the Soviet aviators written in the 1920s encapsulate 
the overarching expression of Soviet and post-Soviet national futurity 
advanced by Prokhanov. Read against the backdrop of the newspaper 
editorials, the line from the song embodies both continuity and change 
between the Soviet and post-Soviet propagandistic futurity. The wording of 
the song of the early aviators has a remarkable flexibility which captures 
both the overt and the hidden dimensions of collective dreams’ propaganda 
powers. In the 1920s, this line served as an incarnation of the atheistic 
technocratic dream to fly and to conquer the sky. Notably, the line-slogan 
strongly alluded to the motifs of Russian and Slav fairy tales about the flying 
carpet, “kover-samolet” which, as a form of folk creativity, were interpreted 
as devoid of religious mysticism. Overtly, the conquest of the sky by Soviet 
aviators was positioned to negate religious beliefs in the sky as heaven. Yet, 
paradoxically, the dream of reaching the sky could not be separated from 
religious eschatology, and the atheistic state’s propaganda learned to make 
veiled use of people’s quest for the afterlife. In Prokhanov’s editorials the 
three components – the scientific-technological, national fairy tales and 
trendy post-Soviet syncretistic beliefs - are amalgamated in line with, and by 
means of, this genre as defined by Soviet textbooks and practiced in Soviet 
newspapers. The continuous effective power of these editorials lies in their 
emotively expressed use of the proleptic futurity grounded in the power of 
historical narratives to incite patriotism and nationalism.      
 
Dugin on being, time and eternity 
 
Prokhanov’s figure is now mainstream; the resonance and influence of 
his writings is significant: he is invited to TV talk shows and gets interviewed 
in major media outlets on a regular basis. This is not only due to his 
indisputable literary talent and long-standing reputation as a radical 
journalist. The Neo-Eurasianist ideas that drive his prolific visions are also 
influential and inform the writing of political theorists and even key 
politicians whom they advise. It is hardly surprising, considering that in 
search of a new master ideology that would make sense of Putin-age Russian 
and Soviet history as a continuous line, the latter have been increasingly 
tempted to adopt the Neo-Eurasianist model that largely ignores the political 
nature of successive regimes but instead employs the geopolitical logic of 
particularism. Aleksandr Dugin, the supreme guru of this movement, 
throughout his illustrious career, has been consultant to a wide array of 
politicians, from former Russian State Duma Speakers Gennady Seleznev 
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and Sergey Naryshkin (the latter currently head of SVR, Russia’s Foreign 
Intelligence Service) to LDPR leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky. His geopolitical 
theories to this day inform some of the ideological tenets of the regime even 
though the man himself is no longer welcome in mainstream media and 
government offices due to the extremist nature of his ultra-right views. Long-
time friends and associates, Prokhanov and Dugin share roughly the same 
platform, but where Prokhanov works mainly by creative association and 
flights of literary fancy, Dugin, former Chair of Sociology of International 
Relations at Moscow University from which he was banished in 2014 for his 
public call, at the peak of the Donbass war, to “kill, kill, and kill Ukrainians” 
(Dugin 2014) relies on scholarly methods. Dugin’s evolution as a thinker led 
him from membership in the late Soviet chauvinist and anti-Semitic Pamiat’ 
movement to the creation, together with the writer Eduard Limonov and rock 
musician Yegor Letov, of the Nationalist Bolshevik Party, and finally to the 
International Eurasianist Movement.11 His ideas owe as much to Eurasianism 
as they do to the German Conservative Revolution (esp. Karl Haushofer), 
pioneers of geopolitical discourse (esp. Halford Mackinder), European 
National-Bolshevism, the French Nouvelle Droite, as well as to Martin 
Heidegger whom he quotes in just about every treatise. As Andreas Umland 
points out, the term Neo-Eurasianism, in his case, is not entirely accurate 
(Umland 466f). More recently, Dugin rebranded his political philosophy and 
now calls it “the Fourth Political Theory”: it serves as an alternative and a 
counterweight to those three that dominated the 20th century and beyond: 
communism, fascism, and liberalism. In Dugin’s “fourth theory,” the 
original Eurasianist premise discussed above in reference to Prokhanov, 
morphs into the notion that collectivistic and traditionalist land powers, or 
tellurocracies, are poised to fight against individualistic, liberal sea powers, 
or thalassocracies. These two poles are still centred around Eurasia on the 
one hand and the Atlantic on the other, but the geographic principle does not 
necessarily always apply as countries in outlying regions could be co-opted 
by the Eurasianist cause as long as the strict criteria of nationalism and 
traditionalism are adhered to. But what is behind these criteria? 
 
Like Prokhanov, Dugin too often contributes to Zavtra. His style is 
quite different from his older colleague’s, but his contributions also seek to 
furnish the readers with edifying political narratives that, like Prokhanov’s, 
focus on the future, albeit as one would expect, Dugin’s are formulated with 
more scholarly precision. In 2017, Zavtra featured a very revealing 
conversation between Prokhanov and Dugin. In it, Dugin goes to the heart 
 
11 For a comprehensive assessment of Dugin’s evolution as a thinker see Shlapentokh 
2017. 
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of what his “fourth political theory” is all about:  a future defined by a 
specific, axiological understanding of time as infused with eternity. This 
eternity is easily accessed if one follows Dugin’s lead: 
 
Современный либерализм тоталитарен, глобален. И чтобы 
противостоять ему, ни в коем случае нельзя возвращаться ни к 
коммунизму, ни к фашизму, ни даже к их национал-
большевистской помеси, потому что это тот же самый Модерн. 
Четвёртая политическая теория предлагает выйти за пределы 
политического Модерна, за пределы и либерализма, и 
коммунизма, и фашизма, и соединить будущее — 
постсовременность, постмодерн — с традицией, с возвратом к 
традиции, интерпретированной как вечное, а не как прошлое. В 
духе Нового времени мы обычно считаем, что настоящее 
отменяет прошлое. […] То, с чем мы имеем дело, — это время, 
отпавшее от своей оси. Возвращение к оси, по образу и подобию 
которой время и создано, есть задача Четвёртой политической 
теории. На этом основании строится проект будущего, который 
воплощается в теорию многополярного мира, поскольку каждый 
народ в ней являет главную ценность. Народ становится 
носителем той вечности, о которой идёт речь, поэтому пробиться 
к ней, минуя народ, невозможно. Универсализм здесь очень 
тонкий. Соединение всего происходит через углубление каждого 
народа в своё частное. 
 
Contemporary liberalism is totalitarian and global. And in order to 
resist it, one should by no means go back either to communism, 
fascism, or even their national-Bolshevik cross because it is still 
modernity. The fourth political theory offers us the opportunity to step 
beyond political modernity, beyond liberalism, communism, and 
fascism and to connect the future—postmodernity, the postmodern—
with tradition, a return to tradition interpreted as eternity, not as the 
past. In the spirit of Modernity, we generally hold that the present 
cancels out the past […] What we are dealing with here is time that 
has fallen off its axis. To return to this axis in whose image time has 
been created is the task of the Fourth political theory. The project of 
the future is built upon this foundation—it is embodied in the theory 
of a multipolar world because in it, every nation manifests its own 
supreme value. The nation becomes а carrier of the eternity we are 
talking about here; therefore, it is impossible to get through to it 
bypassing the nation. The universalism here is very subtle. Everything 
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is bound together through an immersion of every nation into its own 
particularity. (Prokhanov, Dugin 2017) 
 
This vision is clearly eschatological as it anticipates the end of time and the 
Second Coming when time is no more. In V poiskakh temnogo Logosa (In 
Search of the Dark Logos), a volume of essays published in 2013, Dugin 
offers an erudite excursion into Greek philosophy, early Orthodox theology 
as well as the work of Martin Heidegger all of which are used to support his 
geopolitical doctrine. Pointing to Heidegger’s location of the possibility of 
authentic Dasein in the temporality of the future, Dugin explains that it is 
only by a decisive “switching of one’s regime of existence towards Er-eignis 
[singular event]” that one can be saved by the eventuation of “the Truth of 
Being.” (Dugin 2013 347). This, to Dugin, is not just a philosophical premise 
but rather a call for political action that neatly fits into his political-religious 
construct. It is by transitioning to the latter that the Truth of Being can be 
entered as the authentic future. What is this construct? In essence, Dugin 
champions the pre-Petrine and pre-Schism political order based on the 
Byzantine paradigm. In his view, Ivan the Terrible is the model, 
quintessential ruler, “the figure of the tsar philosopher, an eschatological 
analogy of the first Christian emperor Constantine setting the church and 
political order in his kingdom as the execution of God’s will” (Dugin 2013 
37). More recently, Dugin has consistently asserted Russia’s role as the 
katechon, that which holds the Antichrist at bay as per 2 Thessalonians 2.5-
7: “And you know what is now restraining him, so that he may be revealed 
when his time comes.” In Dugin’s 2018 “Theses on the Antichrist” published 
in his videoblog on the zavtra.ru website, he asserts that “the Orthodox Tsar 
is he who stands at the last stronghold, before the Antichrist. And when he 
falls, and a hole opens up in Being, the Antichrist comes” (Dugin 2018). 
Predictably, when in the 2017 conversation we just cited, Prokhanov who, 
as we have seen, is fond of the “city” metaphor, asks Dugin to “fantasise” 
about a city built according to his own views, Dugin paints the following 
picture: 
 
Он, во-первых, должен быть концентричен. Если мы сейчас 
предложим этот город, мы придём к Москве дораскольного 
периода. В центре находится ось — воплощение самой вечности 
в человеческом мире. Царь и патриарх, духовное и земное, 
связанное воедино. Этот город строится вокруг своего центра. 
Центр является священным. В нём находится дворец и храм. Два 
уровня вечности: вечности небесной, которая воплощена в 
патриархе, в церкви, и вечности земной, недвижимым двигателем 
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которой является царь. Соответственно, вокруг него эта вечность 
расходится лучами, как солнце нисходит по вертикали. […]  
 
First of all, it must be concentric. If we offer [a vision] of this city 
now, we will come to the Moscow of the pre-Schism period. At its 
centre, there will be an axis: the embodiment of eternity itself in the 
human world. The tsar and the patriarch, the earthly and the spiritual, 
bound together. This city is built around its centre. The centre is 
sacred. In it, we have the palace and the temple. There are two levels 
of eternity: heavenly eternity embodied in the patriarch and earthly 
eternity whose immoveable mover is the tsar. This eternity radiates 
from him same as the sun descends in a vertical. (Prokhanov, Dugin 
2017) 
 
This picture is consistent with Dugin’s adherence to the Byzantine notion of 
a symphony of the secular and ecclesiastical powers which in Muscovy was 
presumably in place from Ivan III to the Time of Trouble and subsequently 
in the 17th century, during the rule of the first Romanovs until Nikon ended 
it with the Schism of the Church. Dugin’s model does not envisage more 
than three classes or castes (sosloviia) in this society: below the symphony 
of the philosopher tsar and the Church patriarch, stand philosopher priests, 
noble warriors, and, finally, labourers on the land: “Так мы приходим к 
идеалу Святой Руси. Есть Святая Русь — перемещаем в XXI век. 
Другие материалы, но вечные формы.”  (Prokhanov, Dugin 2017) (“Thus 
we come to the ideal of Holy Rus. There is Holy Rus—we move it into the 
21st century.”) Dugin’s authentic zavtra is neo-medieval: it is both archaic 
and post-modern in that it steps over hated modernity with its utopia of 
liberal democracy. This said, his understanding of modernity is peculiar: he 
does not cast away the Soviet experience—not in its entirety anyhow—
because, as he asserts in his 2012 textbook Geopolitika sovremennoi Rossii 
[Geopolitics of Contemporary Russia], Stalin’s USSR, despite its atheist and 
internationalist ideology, was nonetheless “a new edition of the Russian 
land-based tsardom, while Stalin was a ‘red tsar’” (Dugin 2012 327). In this 
scheme, Moscow as the15th-century Third Rome becomes, post 1917, home 
to the Third International, “a geopolitical instrument of spreading Russia’s 
tellurocratic, land-based influence” (ibid., original emphasis). Thus, the 
Christian messianism of the Muscovite Tsardom is equally reflected in the 
messianism of the world revolution centred in Moscow, particularly after the 
arrival of Stalin’s 1925 “socialism in one country” doctrine which makes the 
Soviet capital the centre of messianic gravity, a different kind of katechon. 
Given Stalin’s fascination with Ivan the Terrible, this parallel is rather self-
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evident, and, much like Prokhanov, Dugin is clearly inclined to incorporate 
Stalin both into his geopolitical and eschatological construct of Holy Rus, 
despite Stalin’s dogmatic Marxism, an obvious product of modernity and an 
offshoot of the European Enlightenment project. This, no doubt, is due to the 
fact that Stalin, Dugin’s red monarch, somehow re-established, if 
unconsciously, the umbilical link to the authentic Dasein of eternity which 
after his death is lost again. 
 
Importantly, although Holy Rus in Dugin’s scheme, is the katechon, 
other Indo-European nations that set themselves up according to his vision 
will be welcome in his empire. This empire stretching “from Dublin to 
Vladivostok” will embrace them if they share this vision and agree to be part 
of it on Dugin’s terms. The terms stipulate, for example, that while most 
nations should retain their particularity, some other ones have no claim to it 
whatsoever. Thus Ukrainians (with the exception of those living in the far 
West of the country to whom Dugin allows some form of nationhood) must 
realise that they are actually Russian. This is precisely what he asserts in his 
intimate “geopolitical diary” Ukraina: moia voina (Ukraine: My War) 
(2015) whose title, genre, and the overall preoccupation with the geopolitics 
of the future allude in no uncertain way to Hitler’s Mein Kampf (even as 
Dugin’s book condemns the Ukrainian “junta” as a quintessentially Nazi 
project). Ukraine as a nation state within its current borders, in his view, is 
nothing but a pernicious utopia spun by the Western liberals: 
  
Большая Украина – это чушь, несбыточная, злобная, мелкая, 
завистливая и кривая, основанная на ressentiment в качестве 
национальной идеи. А вот Великая Россия не чушь. Это было, и 
это будет. Наши земли сужаются, а затем – как пружина – 
расширяются. И так всегда. Это бьется русское сердце. В 1991 
году мы снова сжались. С Осетии, Абхазии и особенно с Крыма 
и Новороссии начался обратный отсчет – время Империи. 
Многие хотят нас сдержать, но не удастся. Мы строим вообще 
другое общество, другое Государство, чем то, которое есть 
сейчас. От нынешнего переходного состояния не останется камня 
на камне, как не осталось камня на камне от Российской империи, 
а затем от СССР. И мы идем не назад, но вперед. Вечность не 
прошлое, она всегда еще и настоящее и, главное, будущее. 
Вечность вообще впереди. Это и есть самый настоящий авангард. 
Индоевропейская Священная Империя Конца – вот наше 
истинное будущее. (Dugin 2015 485). 
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Greater Ukraine is nonsense: unrealisable, evil, petty, envious and 
crooked, based on ressentiment as its national idea. Great Russia, 
however, is no nonsense. It has been, and it will be. Our lands shrink 
and then, like a spring, they expand. This has always been so. This is 
the Russian heart beating. In 1991, we shrank again. A reverse 
countdown began with Ossetia, Abkhazia, and especially with Crimea 
and Novorossiya: the time of Empire. Many want to restrain us, but 
they won’t succeed. We are building a completely different kind of 
society, a different kind of State from the one we have now. No stone 
will remain from today’s transitional state as no stone was left from 
the Russian Empire and then the USSR. We are going forwards, not 
backwards. Eternity is not the past, it is always the present, and most 
importantly, the future. Eternity is ahead. It is the very real avant-
garde. The Holy Indo-European Empire of the End: this is our true 
future.  
 
Dugin’s vision of the future has no alternatives: as someone who believes he 
can access eternity, the axis of time, he clearly considers himself in 
possession of the knowledge of what is to come, even if this future may be 
deferred. Dugin’s 2014 diary ends on the note of bitter disappointment as 
Russia, despite starting the war in Donbass, setting up and supporting the 
separatist “republics,” fails to move to a direct annexation of “Novorossiya” 
with its own troops and instead settles for a stalemate, signing the Minsk 
agreements, while he himself gets fired from his position at Moscow 
University for inciting hatred and murder. This failure, according to him, is 
due to the efforts of the liberal fifth column within the Russian society as 
well as what he calls “the sixth column,” the oligarchs who only look after 
their own purses. Of all the Kremlin officials whom he castigates throughout 
the book, the most blame goes to Vladislav Surkov, Putin’s erstwhile 
ideologist and in 2014, the person directly in charge of the Kremlin’s 
Ukrainian diplomatic and military front. Surkov, too, has visions of the 
future inspired by Neo-Eurasianists.  
 
Surkov, the “deep people” and Putin’s “long state” 
 
In February of 2019, Surkov, at this point a presumed private citizen as 
he had resigned from his official position as Putin's advisor for the CIS 
countries, caused quite a stir in the Russian media, both conventional and 
social, with an article entitled “Putin’s Long State” in which he made a few 
bold pronouncements about the future of the regime, its place in the country’s 
history and its fundamental difference from Western democracies. Overall, 
 RUSSIA’S FUTURES: PROKHANOV, DUGIN, SURKOV  223 
this article is far from spectacular, and it would have passed unnoticed had it 
not been written by the author of the “sovereign democracy” concept coined 
in the mid-2000s as the main slogan of Putin’s 2007-2008 election campaign. 
In “Putin’s Long State,” Surkov starts out by discarding the very notion of 
democracy altogether as so much illusion. “The illusion of choice,” he 
argues, “is the most important of all illusions, the trademark trick of the 
Western way of life overall, and of the Western democracy, in particular. 
[…] A rejection of this illusion in favour of realistically acknowledging what 
is predetermined has led our society first to contemplate its own, special, 
sovereign version of democratic development, and then to a complete loss of 
interest in discussions on what democracy should be like and whether it 
should exist at all” (Surkov 2019)  
 
What we have in Russia, instead, is a state that does not need this 
imported “chimera” but is guided by the logic of historical processes. This 
country, whose place in history, is “far from modest,” went through a period 
of disintegration and then “returned to its natural and solely possible state of 
a great power” – a great power that increases in size, gathering communities 
of nations. This state, gathering lands, like Muscovy in the 14th-15th 
century, is of course Putin’s Russia, an “organically shaped model” of 
Russia’s “survival and elevation” for the coming years and decades until the 
end of this century. Surkov’s horizons of futurity are modest. His historical 
horizon, however, are rather less so. Echoing the 15th-century slogan of 
Moscow the Third Rome, he proposes a fourth. According to him, Putin’s 
Russia is the fourth model of statehood in the country’s history: it sits next 
to Lenin’s USSR which in turn is preceded by the Russian Empire of Peter 
the Great and the Grand Principality of Muscovy of Ivan III. Yeltsin is 
conspicuously absent from this list, as the founder of post-Soviet Russia and 
Putin’s anointer.  Even more noteworthy is the fact that neither Ivan the 
Terrible, nor Stalin are mentioned as the current president’s political 
antecedents but are simply subsumed under the Muscovite and Soviet 
models. It is, however, quite clear that the main national idea articulated in 
Surkov’s article is that of “land gathering” and military expansion.  
 
“These political machines replaced one another, got fixed up and 
adapted along the way, ensuring the Russian world’s consistent upward 
movement, century after century.” Their creators, were, according to Surkov, 
what Lev Gumilev calls “people of long will.” Gumilev’s figure is very 
significant in the context of Surkov’s ideological proposition: Gumilev first 
applied the term “people of long will” to the “passionary” Mongols who 
eventually co-opted their neighbours to conquer the boundless steppes and 
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thus ensured their own survival. Thus, the ideology of Eurasianism that 
propounds Russia’s middle path of development, distinct from both Western 
and Eastern, is a clear subtext to Surkov’s vision and is so signalled, just as 
it is the foundation of Prokhanov’s and Dugin’s views. At the same time, 
Surkov’s article also contains echoes not of Peter the Great’s Roman, 
secular, and Westernised vision of a Russian Empire, but rather of the 
Russian empire of Nicholas I, the police state of the gendarme of Europe 
reigning under the aegis of Count Uvarov’s official nationality doctrine, with 
Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality guiding the way forward. There is no 
conspicuous Orthodoxy in Surkov’s opus, because his too is ostensibly a 
secular, and presumably religiously inclusive vision, but it is a vision that 
resolutely refuses to import any Western notions, and also one in which the 
very idea of Russia’s uniqueness replaces (or implicitly incorporates) the 
religious component. Without this component, however, the uniqueness 
rings rather hollow as there is no divine “eternity” from which his model 
could be suspended. 
 
Autocracy and nationality (narodnost’) feature very prominently in the 
article, and again Surkov’s versions of these two concepts are presented in 
counterpoint to the Western notion of the democratic state. Just as Peter the 
Great, on his visit to England, rejected the idea of parliament as nonsense for 
a country like Russia and just as Lenin, in The State and the Revolution, 
rejected the idea of multi-party democracy as bourgeois veneer that hides 
and protects the exploitation of the masses, Surkov unmasks Western 
democracy to expose what in Turkish is known as derin devlet or the deep 
state. This term, explains Surkov, “signifies a hard, totally undemocratic 
network of real power structures concealed under the window dressing of 
democratic institutions. […] It is a mechanism hidden deep under the surface 
of the civil society that in practice operates through violence, corruption and 
manipulation.” This kind of exposure of Western democracies is of course 
nothing new and forms the core agenda of the Russian media, broadcasting 
both domestically and to foreign audiences. What is new, however, is that in 
Surkov’s manifesto, the Western deep state is countered with the Russian 
one—a state that while certainly not quite as pretty, is far more honest. It has 
no need for Western hypocrisies because it has no need to hide its power 
structures, no need to drape the truth with illusions: “The high inner tension 
associated with maintaining control of vast non-homogenous spaces and the 
constant participation in the thick of geopolitical struggle make the military-
police functions of the state most important and the decisive.” The honest 
Russian state has no need to conceal its necessarily brutal police and military 
functions; furthermore, they must be displayed for everyone to see.   
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Instead of the deep state, Russia has “a deep people” (глубинный 
народ). What is this people? No definition is given, and the description is 
more than vague. 
 
Глубинный народ всегда себе на уме, недосягаемый для 
социологических опросов, агитации, угроз и других способов 
прямого изучения и воздействия […] Своей гигантской 
супермассой глубокий народ создает непреодолимую силу 
культурной гравитации, которая соединяет нацию и притягивает 
(придавливает) к земле (к родной земле) элиту, время от времени 
пытающуюся космополитически воспарить. 
 
The deep people always has its own idea of what is going on, is 
inaccessible to sociological surveys, threats, indoctrination, and other 
methods of direct impact […] With its giant supermass, the people 
creates an insurmountable power of cultural gravitation that binds the 
nation and pushes (presses) down to earth (the native soil) the elite 
which from time to time attempts to hover up in a cosmopolitan flight. 
 
One finds out its true feelings and desires always too late. This inner 
narod is truly mysterious in that it does not fully coincide with the 
population. There is no point idealising its sections which is what at various 
points in time did Russian populists, Slavophiles, and Bolsheviks.  
 
Surkov’s new understanding of narodnost’ is then immediately linked 
with Putin’s “long state.” This state is unique in that it can actually hear and 
understand the people, the narod, “see through it,” and act accordingly. The 
Russian model is based in trust. The deep people can only trust the leader, 
“первое лицо.” This is not the naïve faith in the good tsar as exhibited by 
the Russian peasants for centuries (even though it has its roots in this faith). 
The deep people is not naïve, and the trust it has in the leader is based on 
understanding, cooperation, and effective communication exercised through 
various institutions of the state as well as informally. Thus, instead of the 
Western oppositional model based in accountability of the leader and 
consequently inherent mistrust, the Russian one is open, honest and based in 
utter trust. And because of this trust, Putin’s state is a long one, its principles 
will outlive Putin himself and will continue long afterwards, akin to the 
Gaullist state in France or even the state of the founding fathers in the US.  
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While Dugin’s nation is a bearer of eternity, Surkov’s model of futurity, 
as we have seen, lacks this essentialist religious axis or Prokhanov’s 
essentialist national dreams. Surkov’s vision is, on the one hand, hollow and 
bland and, on the other hand, no less fanciful and fairy-tale-like. Instead of 
the Christian eternity beyond our fallen time or dreams that drive nations’ 
development through socio-economic formations, Surkov proclaims the 
implied eternity of Putin and his regime—supported by nothing, except some 
dark magic of “the deep people” about which we know nothing and never 
will. In 2020, the current Speaker of the State Duma Vyacheslav Volodin, 
put it in even plainer language when asked whether the Constitutional 
amendments adopted at Putin’s suggestion that year were introduced in order 
to create a system that will come after Putin: “Why, after Putin, there’ll be 
Putin!” (Volodin 2020). Surkov and Volodin thus openly suggest that 
Putinism is larger than Putin the man and will outlive him. Surkov’s article 
did not get an official response from the Kremlin (apart from a lukewarm 
nod from Putin’s press-secretary Peskov), but just about every pro-Putin 
commentator praised the article as an important discussion document, while 
most liberal commentators predictably ridiculed it. Dugin and Prokhanov, 
too, were asked what they thought. Prokhanov, in an interview with the 
Kremlin’s top propagandist Vladimir Solovyov, said that while Surkov was 
right to name the deep people as the nucleus of Russian history, he failed to 
identify “its content” which, in Prokhanov’s view, is “the dream of a strong, 
benevolent state, a kingdom that defends the meek, the poor […], often the 
dream of the kingdom of heaven” (Prokhanov 2019). This dream that, as we 
know, according to Prokhanov, was cherished by the deep people throughout 
both the imperial and the communist era is something Surkov “is afraid to 
talk about” (ibid.). 
 
Dugin went further in his criticism. While stating many logical and 
legitimate facts, Surkov, in Dugin’s opinion, spoke for the country’s entire 
elite which desperately wants for Putin’s status quo to last forever. Such 
pronouncements, says Dugin, are usually made just before a state, on the eve 
of its collapse, loses touch with reality. This is akin to hypnotising people to 
believe that everything will stay as it is in the present. Putin, for his part, 
although a hero, has exhausted his potential, and the future is not his.  
 
Путин сделал огромный вклад в развитие России, его заслуги 
нельзя ставить под сомнение. Это спаситель и герой нашей страны. 
В этом отношении я считаю, что его миссия выполнена. Путин 
полностью исчерпал все, что он мог сделать хорошего. […] 
Соответственно, Путину полностью принадлежит настоящее и 
 RUSSIA’S FUTURES: PROKHANOV, DUGIN, SURKOV  227 
совершенно не принадлежит будущее. В будущем потребуется 
полное изменение и пересмотр всех параметров сложившейся в 
России системы. (Dugin 2019) 
 
Putin has made a tremendous contribution to the development of 
Russia; his achievements are beyond any doubt. He is the saviour and 
hero of our country. In this regard, I think that his mission is 
accomplished. Putin has completely exhausted everything good that he 
could do. […] Thus, the present fully belongs to him, but the future does 
not belong to him at all. The future will require a complete overhaul of 
all the parameters of the system that has taken shape in Russia.  
 
Surkov may have borrowed some key notions from the Neo-Eurasianist 
discourse that drives the ideas of Prokhanov and Dugin, but his future is 
indeed far from “passionary.” Just as the secular dreams of the Americans or 
the Chinese in Prokhanov’s editorial, Surkov’s future is devoid of 
eschatology, aspirations towards eternity, or dreams of immortality. Emptied 
out of that content, it is indeed a suspended present, with nothing but Putin’s 
person to prop it up. 
 
Conclusion: eschatology, nationalism, and geopolitics 
 
 It is quite apparent that Putin’s propaganda machine has hit a wall after 
the initial wave of post-Crimea euphoria subsided. The narrative of the 
Russian people rising up from its knees following years of post-Soviet 
humiliation clearly had a limited shelf life, with an ideological void at the 
core of the Putin regime urgently requiring new concepts in order to shape a 
vision of the future that would logically stem from a narrative of the past. 
Neo-Eurasianist discourse provides a very tempting model to follow. In our 
case studies of Aleksandr Prokhanov’s editorials and Aleksandr Dugin’s we 
have demonstrated that the future proposed by these utopian ultra-right 
figures is based on eschatological notions rooted in the Russia’s pre-Petrine 
past and in folklore. Proleptic or analeptic, their future is neo-medieval and 
not entirely compatible with the reactionary yet secular nature of the Putin 
regime. Vyacheslav Surkov’s desperate attempt at adapting the Neo-
Eurasianist narrative to the geopolitical requirements of the Kremlin is, 
however, devoid of any emotive appeal and is an apt reflection of the 
stagnant state of Putin’s regime whose increasing draconian qualities make 
its future prospects ever so much dimmer.  
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